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Many organizations have a problem with synchronizing individual values regarding information 
security with expectations set by the relevant security policy. Such discordance leads to failure in 
compliance or simply subversion of existing or imposed controls. The problem of the mismatch 
in understanding the security policies amongst individuals in an organization has a devastating 
effect on the security of the organization. Different individuals hold different understanding and 
knowledge about IS security, which is reflected on IS security policies design and practice 
(Vaast, 2007). Albrecthsen and Hovdena (2009) argue that users and managers practice IS 
security differently because they have different rationalities. This difference in rationalities may 
reflect the mismatch between the security policies and individuals’ values.     
In this research, we argue that occurrence of a security breach can change individuals’ values in 
light of security policy of the organization. These changes in the values can be reflected on the 
compliance between individuals’ norms and security rules and standards. Indeed, organizations 
need to guarantee the compliance between security policy and values of their employees. Thus, 
they can alleviate or prevent violations of security of the organization. However, it is difficult to 
find a common method that all organizations can adopt to guarantee the sync between security 
rules and individuals’ norms. 
The main aim of this research is to investigate how people perceive information security policy 
and how their perceptions change in response to security breaches. Besides, this research aims to 
investigate the relationship between individuals’ values and security policy. Thus, organizations 
can have the intended level of compliance between individual norms and security rules and 
standards.  
With the aid of the Repertory Grid technique, this research examines how a security breach 
shapes people’s values with respect to the security policy of an organization. To conduct the 
argument, this research offers an assessment mechanism that aids the organization to evaluate 
employees’ values in regard to security policy. Based on that evaluation, the organization can 
develop a proper mechanism to guarantee compliance between individuals’ norms and security 
rules. The results of this research show that employees in an organization hold different 
perceptions regarding the security policy. These perceptions change in response to a security 
incident. This change in perceptions does not necessarily result in better compliance with the 
security policy. Factors like the type of breach and people’s experience can affect the amount of 
change in the perceptions. Contributions, implications, and directions for future research of this 
study will be discussed. 
 
Keywords: information system security policy, Repertory Grid, Action Design Research, 
security rules, norms, values, norm-rule compliance.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Over the past few years, mainstream IS Security literature has identified ‘security policy 
compliance’ as an area of concern. The majority of the security breaches occur due to violations 
of established security controls by employees within organizations. Poor compliance with 
security policies mostly occurs because of 1) lack of awareness and proper understanding of the 
meaning of the security policies, 2) and the mismatch between organization’s rules and 
individual’s norms (i.e. values). In fact, employees in the same organization may have different 
understanding and perceptions regarding organization security policies, which can be seen 
obviously in their behavior (i.e. the conflict between policies and actions) (Vaast, 2007; 
Albrecthsen and Hovden, 2009). Also, employee norms can be affected by security incidents that 
an organization may face.    
There is no doubt that the agreement between individuals’ norms and organization security rules 
affect the security of an organization. Most IS literature considers factors that directly or 
indirectly cause the violation of security policies. They studied the extrinsic and intrinsic factors 
that affect compliance with security policies. These factors include, but are not limited to, self-
efficacy (Herath and Rao, 2009b; Rhee et al., 2009); perceived effectiveness (Herath and Rao 
(2009a); perceived value congruence (Son, 2011); sanctions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010); rewards 
(Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2005); and normative beliefs (Herath and 
Rao, 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Indeed, few studies touch on how norms influence employee 
intention to comply with security policies. That is, they consider only the link between norms 
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and security policies. However, IS literature tends to ignore how individuals’ norms in respect to 
security policy change following a security breach, which reflects the conflict between norms 
and security rules. 
In this thesis, we argue that occurrence of security breach cause changes to individuals’ values in 
light of security policy of the organization. These changes in the values can be reflected on the 
compliance of individuals’ norms with security rules and standards, which in turn reflected on 
individuals’ behavior within the organization. Organizations need to ensure the compliance of 
security policy with values of their employees. Thus, they can mitigate or eliminate violations of 
organizational security. However, it is difficult to find a standard method that organizations can 
use to ensure the agreement between security rules and individuals’ norms.  
Using the Repertory Grid technique based on the Personal Construct Theory, we examine how a 
security breach shapes individual values concerning security policy of an organization. In order 
to conduct the argument, we propose an assessment mechanism that helps the organization to 
assess individuals’ values regarding security policy. Based on that assessment, the organization 
can develop an appropriate mechanism to ensure compliance of individuals’ norms with security 
rules, and to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of the security policy. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the overall aim, 
contribution, and scope of this dissertation besides research questions. Section 1.3 provides 





1.2 Nature and Scope of the Research 
The main objective of this research is to understand how individuals perceive information 
security policy and how their perceptions change in response to the occurrence of security 
breaches. Also, this study aims to identify the relationship between individuals’ norms and 
values, and security rules and policy. Thus, organizations can ensure that they have the required 
level of compliance of individual norms with security rules and standards. This research aims to 
address the following research questions:           
• How does security policy shape an individual’s values in the first place? 
• How does security breach change an individual’s values? 
• What is the relationship between security policy and individual values? 
• How could assessment of norm and rule compliance help in creating better policy?    
This research contributes to research and practice. For research, the Repertory Grid technique, 
which is grounded on the Personal Construct Theory, is widely used in the field of psychology 
besides other disciplines. However, this methodology is new to the field of Information Systems. 
Using this methodology helps to study human values and perceptions more deeply. Currently, 
most research in the field of information systems focuses heavily on technical and organizational 
issues. Applying Repertory Grid technique can be a motivation to consider the human aspects 
more in the research. For practice, organizations can use Repertory Grids to investigate and 
understand employees’ values and to examine how their norms differ in response to some 
incidents. This research uses a combination of Repertory Grid technique and Action Design 
Research to develop a mechanism that organizations can use to sync norms and rules.   
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This research falls under the behavioral Information Security research. Specifically, it focuses on 
studying individual’s norms and how it relates to organization’s rules. That is, it investigates the 
compliance of norms with security rules (i.e. norm-rule compliance).    
 
1.3 Key Terms 
This section provides definitions for some key terms that form a basis for the concept of “norm-
rule compliance” in the organization. The arguments of this dissertation are rooted in these 
concepts.   
1.3.1 Information Systems Security (InfoSec) 
There are many definitions information systems security (or information security) that are 
available in the literature. Pipkin (2000) defines information security as “the process of 
protecting the intellectual property of an organization.” Anderson (2003) defines information 
security as “a well-informed sense of assurance that information risks and controls are in 
balance.” On the other hand, Venter and Eloff (2003) defines information security as “the 
protection of information and minimizes the risk of exposing information to unauthorized 
parties.”  
Threats to the information systems could be either internal to the organization or external; could 
be caused by human actions or non-human (environmental) incidents. Regardless of the source 
of threats, violations may be either intentional or unintentional (Loch et al., 1992). Information 
systems security focuses on securing formal and informal systems besides technical system. Any 
contention between these three systems may disrupt information security in an organization. A 
formal system encompasses information systems and information security. An informal system is 
“the natural means to augment the formal system” (Dhillon, 2007; p .4). The technical system is 
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computerized parts of the formal system (Dhillon, 2007). Thus, information security is more than 
the security of technical aspect; it also concerns social and organizational aspects of information 
systems (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006).  
However, information security goes beyond ensuring that information systems are not damaged, 
stolen or destroyed. Instead, information security focuses on protecting information systems 
from any incident that may threaten information confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, 
authentication, identification, authorization, and accountability. Information security involves 
management of information security and security of the computer, data, and network. A security 
policy represents the overlap between information security management, computer and data 
security, and network security (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). 
 
1.3.2 Information Systems Security Policy  
A policy is organizational rules and guidelines that guide behaviors within the organization. 
Thus, information security policy is a set of instructions and rules that are developed by the 
management to guide employees in the organization to an appropriate behavior about the usage 
of information systems to guarantee their security (Dhillon, 1997). There are three main 
categories of the policy within the context of information security: enterprise information 
security policy; issue-specific security policies; and system-specific policies (Whitman and 
Mattord, 2013). Enterprise information security policy is created within the context of strategic 
IT plan and forms the key for information security within the organization. Issue-specific 
security policies provide rules that guide the usage of specific technology. System-specific 
policies govern the configuration and usage of certain aspects of technology. These policies may 
be technical, managerial, or both (Dhillon, 1997). 
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Information security policy is a key aspect in ensuring information security (Von Solms, 2001). 
It is the first step to secure the organizations against internal and external incidents that may 
disrupt its information security (Whitman et al., 2001). Security policy should direct employees 
within the organization to the proper means for managing information security and reaching 
desired consequences (Stahl et al., 2012). Security policy is critical to information security; it can 
be considered as a platform for overall security program practices within an organization (von 
Solms and von Solms, 2004b). It helps in ensuring the integrity, availability, and confidentiality 
of information (Straub, 1990).  
Information security policies should be informed by the current practices of the organization. 
However, most organizations use pre-defined international standards as a basis for defining 
organizational practices. The content and form of the security policy are two elements related to 
security policy effectiveness (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010). However, most organizations 
pay more attention to the content of the security policy. The literature related to the policy 
content suggests using pre-defined security policies and standards (Janczewski, 2000). On the 
other hand, Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) propose three dimensions for the format of 
security policy that must be considered to ensure effectiveness. These dimensions are breadth 
(i.e. coverage of the policy); clarity (i.e. policy should be written in a language that is easily 
understood by technical and non-technical users); and brevity (i.e. policy is short and to the 
point) (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010). 
 
1.3.3 Values and Norms 
Individual’s values are a system of “learned beliefs” related to favored things, behaviors and/or a 
final existential state (Horley, 2012). Scheibe (1970) emphasizes that values involve “what is 
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wanted, what is best, what is desirable or preferable, what ought to be done” (Scheibe, 1970; p. 
42). That is, an individual always uses her or his values as standards to assess objects, people, 
and opinions. Thus, values can be considered as the core of the people. 
According to Kelly (1955), values are the core constructs that “govern a person’s maintenance 
process” and provide meaning for personal identity by providing information about who a person 
is and what kind of people she or he represents. By having this self-knowledge, a person can 
interact socially and then protect her/his existence. Kelly (1955) differentiates between values, 
which are core constructs, and the beliefs, which are peripheral constructs. That is, values are 
different from people’s beliefs.          
Values are bipolar; they need opposites to make sense. People evaluate events and/or situations 
around them based on their “bipolar” values (Kelly, 1955). For example, values such as big and 
tall do not make sense without their opposites, small and short. Many researchers (Kelly, 1955; 
Fishben and Ajzen, 1975) have emphasized that values should be described as bipolar constructs 
to have a meaning.       
In the field of information systems, there is a growing interest in investigating the way people 
think and how they perceive information systems and technology they create and use. Some 
researchers agree that understanding expectations, perceptions, values, and beliefs of individuals 
can ensure getting more successful results of information systems (Tan and Hunter, 2002).  
On the other hand, individual norms (also called subjective norms) reflect how an individual 
perceive social pressures and opinions of “referent” people, and how she or he behave based on 
that perception (Mathieson, 1991). That is, individual norms explain the perception of an 
individual regarding what is important concerning a certain behavior (Ifinedo, 2012). Ifinedo 
(2012) defines individual norms as “normative stimuli, beliefs, and motivations to comply with a 
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particular act, which is largely informed by consultation or observation of the behaviors of 
others” (Ifinedo, 2012). Individual norms are affected by what is perceived as common norms in 
the environment, which in turn affect or motivate individual’s behavior (Johnston and 
Warkentin, 2010). Therefore, Individuals within an organization tend to comply with information 
security of their organization when they observe that individuals around them are complying 
with these security policies (Ifinedo, 2012). Indeed, norms are criteria that are involved in the 
concept of human values. That is, norms are guidelines that are established in advance and 
represent an individual’s values (Hayden et al., 2007; Björkdahl, 2002; Rallapalli et al., 2000).     
Various information security literature emphasizes that individual norms have a strong effect on 
individual’s intention to comply with the security policy (Venkatesh et al., 2003; Herath and 
Rao, 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
 
1.3.4 Systems Security Engineering-Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM)   
The SSE-CMM is a model that focuses on implementing security in the systems. This model is 
derived from the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) that is developed to help organizations to 
evolve from an ad hoc state to a highly organized and effective state. SSE-CMM has been 
recognized as an ISO standard, which focuses on security. The main purpose of developing SSE-
CMM is to ensure and improve system security and develop trusted products. However, SSE-
CMM integrates security engineering with the other engineering disciplines (Carnegie-Mellon, 
2003).  
The security engineering field has different principles and frameworks to assess security 
engineering; however, these frameworks are not comprehensive. SSE-CMM provides a 
comprehensive framework that can be used to evaluate the maturity levels for organizations 
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security and identify improvements to security engineering practices. SSE-CMM is used to 
improve the security engineering practices and advance the quality and availability of secure, 
reliable products and security engineering services (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
The SSE-CMM encompasses two dimensions: domain and capability. The domain dimension 
involves the “base practices” that describe security engineering. The capability dimension 
includes “generic practices” which suggest process management capability and should be 
achieved as part of performing base practices. The SSE-CMM comprises 129 base practices that 
offer context and support for the Systems Security Engineering. 61 base practices cover main 
areas of security engineering. 68 base practices deal with the project and organization domains 
(Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
Generic practices are applied to deal with the process management, process measurement, and 
process institutionalization, as well as to define the capability of an organization. Generic 
practices are grouped into five “Capability Levels” that ordered according to the maturity level. 
Thus, generic practices that are placed on the top of the capability dimension imply higher levels 
of process capability. Each capability level has one or more general practices. The SSE-CMM 
five capability levels are as follow (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003): 
• Level 1: Performed Informally 
This level focuses on performing a process that combines the base practices. That is, base 
practices are performed. This level can be described by the statement “you have to do it before 
you can manage it” (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
• Level 2: Planned and Tracked 
This level concentrates on issues related to the project-level definition, planning, and 
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performance. This level can be described by the statement “understand what's happening on the 
project before defining organization-wide processes” (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
• Level 3: Well Defined 
This level focuses on achieving controlled tailoring from organizational defined processes. This 
level can be described by the statement “use the best of what you've learned from your projects 
to create organization-wide processes” (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
• Level 4: Quantitatively Controlled 
This level concentrates on linking measurements to the business objectives. At this level, 
measurements and data use are not organization-wide. This level can be described by the 
statements “you can't measure it until you know what ‘it’ is,” and “managing with measurement 
is only meaningful when you are measuring the right things” (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 
• Level 5: Continuously Improving 
This level focuses on gaining leverage from improvements to the management practice. Then, 
emphasizes the cultural moves that will aid in sustaining the gains. This level can be described 
by the statement, “a culture of continuous improvement requires a foundation of sound 
management practice, defined processes, and measurable goals” (Carnegie-Mellon, 2003). 




Figure 1.1: Systems Security Engineering-Capability Maturity Model (from Carnegie-Mellon (2003)). 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation  
This section introduces the structure of this study and how it is organized. This dissertation is 
organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the research topic and problem, 
research questions, and the contributions and scope of this research. Chapter 2 reviews selected 
literature related to this research topic. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research theory 
and methodology. It presents the Personal Constructs Theory (PCP) that underlies our 
methodology (RepGrid). Also, it explains the Repertory Grids (RepGrid) technique and the 
different alternatives that fall under RepGrid technique. Chapter 3 is concluded by explaining the 
design of this dissertation. Chapter 4 describes the first stage of the research design. This chapter 
explains the research process of collecting and analyzing data before the occurrence of a security 
breach. Chapter 5 explains the second stage of the research design. This chapter describes the 
research process of collecting and analyzing data after the occurrence of a security breach. 
	 12	
Chapter 6 discusses the findings and synthesizes key issues of this study. Chapter 8 concludes 
this research by reviewing the results, discussing research implications, explaining research 
























Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a mismatch between expected employee behavior regarding information security policy 
and their actual behavior (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), which may expose the organization to various 
security problems. Lack of consistency between expected behaviors and actual behaviors is 
mostly due to the misunderstanding of the security policy and/or a mismatch between people’s 
norms and security rules and standards. The divergence between the individual’s norm and 
security rule poses a critical challenge for the information systems security within organizations.  
One of the common themes emerging in the information systems security field is the mismatch 
found amongst various individuals in an organization regarding how they perceive information 
security (Johnston and Hale, 2009). Another common theme emerging in the information 
systems security field is the compliance with the security policy. Various information systems 
literature investigates the factors that affect the motivation and intention to comply with security 
policy. More specifically, many of those studies examine the relationship between values (or 
norms) and compliance with the security policy (e.g. Myyry et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Herath and Rao, 2009). Another common theme is related to the development and 
implementation of an effective security policy to ensure the security of an organization (e.g. 
Smith et al., 2010; Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010; Siponen and Iivari, 2006). Indeed, there is a 
lack of the literature that focuses on the consistency between individual’s norms and security 
rules and standards, and how an understanding of this relationship can affect the success of the 
implementation of information security in the organization.    
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This chapter reviews previous literature related to the topic of “norm-rule” compliance. It 
focuses mainly on the behavioral security literature. More specifically, this chapter reviews 
studies that are related to rule aspect and normative aspect of security literature. We reviewed top 
journals of the information systems and information systems security fields. This research study 
is informed by three bodies of literature: individual values and how they influence the 
compliance and intention to comply (section 2.2); security policy and how it is created and 
implemented (section 2.3); and the relationship between values and security policy (section 2.4). 
Section 2.5 discusses the gap in the literature addressed in this research. Section 2.6 concludes 
this chapter. 
 
2.2 Values and Compliance 
This section discusses the literature that is focusing on individual’s values and compliance with 
security policy. Since norms are criteria that represent values (Hayden et al., 2007; Björkdahl, 
2002; Rallapalli et al., 2000), literature focusing on norms and compliance is also considered.  
There is various literature in the field of information systems security that focus on investigating 
the relationship between individual’s values and the compliance with security policy. Some 
researchers have used different terminologies to represent values such as rationalities, norms, 
perceptions and cognitions. In some context, such terminologies are used to represent values, 
while in other cases they are used to represent a part of the value. On the other hand, some of 
these studies examine how values affect the individual intention to comply with the security 
policy. Other research studies how values can be linked to compliance behavior. Thus, this 
section includes two subsections. The first subsection discusses the relationship between values 
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and intention to comply with security policy. The second section discusses the relationship 
between values and compliance behavior.  
 
2.2.1 Values and Intention to comply  
Chatterjee et al. (2015) identify factors that contribute to the unethical use of IT and how these 
factors interrelate. The result of this study suggests that an individual’s ethical beliefs, besides 
economic, social, and technological aspects are the factors related to the unethical use of IT. 
Chatterjee et al. (2015) argue that these factors should be combined into a group of “focal 
constructs” and relations. On the other hand, individual’s ethical beliefs and perceptions of the 
reward have a strong relationship with attitude toward the unethical use of IT. Also, intention to 
unethical use of IT is derived by individual’s attitude toward unethical use, individual’s norms, 
behavioral control, past behavior and overall gain. Chatterjee et al. (2015) emphasize that the 
moral intensity and non-traceability that technology provides and punishment severity are the 
consequences of the unethical use of IT (Chatterjee et al., 2015).  
Hu et al. (2012) argue that understanding the way organization, people, and technology influence 
the information security is one of the main challenges of the information systems security. 
Various evidences show that many security breaches are caused by insiders. Hu et al. (2012) 
emphasize the need to investigate why insiders do not comply with the security policy and how 
organizations can manage behaviors of the insiders.    
This study aims to understand compliance behavior of the insiders taking in consideration 
organizational motivations and insiders’ cognitions, which may be affected by management and 
organizational culture. Hu et al. (2012) emphasize that insiders’ attitude toward compliance, 
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insiders’ norms, and perceived governance of compliance are directly and indirectly affected by 
top management involvement in information security actions.  
Additionally, top management involvement in information security actions affects organizational 
culture, which affects insiders’ attitudes towards compliance and perceived governance of 
compliance with information security policies. Furthermore, this study concludes that an 
insider’s cognitive beliefs regarding compliance with security policies moderate the relationship 
between top management involvement and organizational culture from one side and insiders’ 
intentions to comply from the other side (Hu et al., 2012). This study stresses the important role 
of top management in information security management and illustrates how top management and 
organizational culture can shape insiders’ attitudes, norms and perceived control over 
compliance.  
A study by Warkentin et al. (2011) argues that organizations tend to develop and perform formal 
SETA programs, monitor compliance with security policies, and create an environment which 
motivates individuals to comply with the policies. Also, the informal learning that individuals 
gain from their social environment can affect their behavior and intention to comply with the 
policies. Warkentin et al. (2011) propose certain factors that affect individual’s compliance with 
privacy policies. The findings of this study show that the informal learning is affected by social 
conditions such as cues from outsiders, comprising a situational support, verbal inducement, and 
long experience. The informal learning affects individual’s intention to comply with the policies, 
which is affected directly by compliance efficacy and indirectly by the external cues.  
Most information security studies focus on studying “intentional” engagement in violation 
behaviors. However, some individuals unintentionally become involved in some violation 
behavior (Guo et al., 2011). Guo et al. (2011) offer a non-malicious security violation (NMSV) 
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model to study non-malicious behavioral intentions. The finding of this study suggests that the 
intention to involve in non-malicious violation behavior is derived by the advantage for job 
performance, perceived security risk, normative outcomes (or workgroup norms), and self-
identity outcomes (or perceived identity match). This study highlights that the objectives of job 
performance and perceptions of security risk help in determining attitudes toward non-malicious 
security violation. Also, workgroup norms and perceived identity match have a direct effect on 
an individual’s attitudes and behavioral intentions. On the other hand, perceived security risk is 
found to be an important driver for the behavioral decision. That is, when individuals perceive 
security risk is high, they are less likely to involve in non-malicious violation behaviors (Guo et 
al., 2011). Guo et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of aligning security goals with business 
objectives, acquiring security measures buy-in, and developing a culture of secure behavior at 
the organizations.  
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) examine the phenomenon of conscientious cybercitizens through 
conducting two studies. Conscientious cybercitizens are defined as “individuals who are 
motivated to take the necessary precautions under their direct control to secure their computer 
and the Internet in a home setting” (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; p. 613). The goal of these two 
studies is to study the security behavior of users of home computers. The first study develops a 
model of the conscientious cybercitizen. The second study studies how the antecedents of 
intentions to perform security-related behavior can be affected by message cues. Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) emphasize that normative beliefs do not have a significant influence on the 
intention to perform a security-related behavior in the context of home-users. This finding is 
important to consider when designing effective marketing messages that can motivate security 
behavior of home users. Indeed, this study examines how qualities of messages can affect user’s 
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attitude toward security-related behavior in addition to the subjective and descriptive norm. The 
finding of this study shows that intention to accomplish security-related behavior is affected by a 
set of cognitive, social, and psychological factors. Message cues can affect individual’s norm 
(subjective and descriptive), which in turn affects intentions to perform security-related 
behaviors. In some instances, messages that are framed in a positive way can increase perceived 
subjective norms that are related to a security behavior. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) introduce a theoretical model that shows the influence of 
neutralization techniques on the compliance behavior. It describes how security in the 
organization is related to the employees’ behavior. Siponen and Vance (2010) define 
neutralization techniques as “rationalizations, which allow [individuals] to minimize the 
perceived harm of their policy violations” (p. 488). This study shows that neutralization 
techniques are more effective than deterrence mechanisms in decreasing the violations of 
security policy. Individuals use neutralization techniques in order to determine their compliance 
behavior. The findings of this study highlight that neutralization is an important driver for 
intention to violate information security policies. Indeed, Siponen and Vance (2010) emphasize 
that intention to violate security policy is not a direct representative of compliance behavior. 
Instead, intention indicates the motivation to comply or not comply that exists just before acting 
the behavior. According to Siponen and Vance (2010), neutralization mainly influences the 
tendency to violate security policy. Also, formal and informal sanctions do not predict intention 
to violate security policy. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) propose that rationality-based factors affect individuals’ compliance 
behavior. This study emphasizes that attitude toward compliance, normative beliefs and self-
efficacy have a critical effect on compliance intention. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) define normative 
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beliefs as how an individual perceives social pressure that results from behavioral anticipations 
of main referents such as administrators and managers. The study emphasizes that outcome 
beliefs influence beliefs related to the evaluation of consequences, which in turn influence an 
attitude toward compliance. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) define outcome beliefs as believing that 
specific events will come as a logical outcome of doing (or not doing) a specific compliance 
action. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) point out that information security awareness has a positive impact 
on attitudes toward compliance and outcome beliefs. Also, perceptions regarding consequences 
of compliance, which affect intention to comply, are derived from awareness of information 
security policies.  
D’Arcy et al. (2009) use an extended version of the general deterrence theory (GDT) model to 
show how organizations can decrease IS misuse that can be acted by insiders. This study 
emphasizes that security countermeasures (i.e. security rules, SETA programs and computer 
monitoring) can be used as tools to affect individual’s perceptions regarding the consequences of 
information systems misuse. That is, when security rules, SETA programs, and computer 
monitoring are available in place, the cases of IS misuse will decrease significantly. Furthermore, 
the findings of this research emphasize that an individual’s awareness of these security 
countermeasures affects their perceptions regarding sanctions, which helps in decreasing 
intention to misuse IS. This study suggests that perceived severity of sanctions has more 
influence in decreasing misuse of IS (D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
Herath and Rao (2009) created an “Integrated Protection Motivation and Deterrence” model to 
study how organizational commitment can influence individual’s intention to comply with 
security policies. They argue that threat appraisal and coping appraisal form the attitude toward 
applying the security technology and practices. Individuals tend to appraise security issues and 
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apply security technologies and practices to deal with these security issues (Herath and Rao, 
2009). Herath and Rao (2009) point out that threat appraisal is linked to the perceptions of an 
individual’s feelings regarding intimidating somebody based on an assessment of fear appeal 
components. On the other hand, the coping appraisal assesses response efficacy, response cost, 
and self-efficacy. 
Herath and Rao (2009), also investigated how environmental factors like deterrence, facilitating 
conditions, and social norms can affect compliance intention. The result of this study suggests 
that individual’s attitude towards security policies, which govern the individual’s intention to 
comply, is derived by how they perceive the breaches’ severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, 
and response costs. Self-efficacy is a significant factor that influences policy compliance 
intentions. It can be enhanced through the availability of resources within the organization. On 
the other hand, Herath and Rao (2009) emphasize that individual’s intention to comply with the 
policy has a strong relationship with organizational commitment and social influence. 
Organizations need to ensure that employees understand security policy and tailor precautions in 
order to employ security policy more effectively. Herath and Rao (2009) highlight that 
individuals can have a positive attitude toward the security policies when they perceive how their 
adherence to security policy may influence their organization positively.   
 
2.2.2 Values and Compliance Behavior 
Tsohou et al. (2015) investigate how cognitive and cultural biases can form perceptions and 
behaviors of information security through developing a conceptual framework to assess and 
analyze this relation. The study argues that cognitive and cultural biases influence the reception 
and processing of information and security awareness. Security and safety awareness programs 
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tend to manage threats through affecting people’s behavior. Thus, Tsohou et al. (2015) recognize 
and examine security-related biases and how such biases can affect the shaping of risk 
perceptions and security behavior. Certainly, this research study tends to illustrate the cognitive 
processes as an antecedent of information security compliance.  
Tsohou et al. (2015) point out that availability of heuristic has an important effect on risk 
perceptions, which in turn affect the compliance behavior. Additionally, compliance intention 
can be affected by the effect bias. Individuals may share some sensitive information with peers 
since they hold feelings of appreciation, while knowing the risk of such behavior. On the other 
hand, the anchoring and confirmation bias complicate the change of people’s attitudes because 
people tend to underestimate evidence that opposes their views. Also, optimism influences 
evaluation of the likelihood to experience penalties of noncompliance (Tsohou et al., 2015). The 
study concludes with ten recommendations. First, organizations need to identify and consider 
cultural biases and risk misunderstanding when evaluating the process of dividing target groups. 
Second, organizations need to consider cultural groups and risk misunderstanding when selecting 
strategies for communication. Third, organizations need to indicate and address biases while 
showing budget of the awareness program and presenting management results. Fourth, risk 
biases should be handled when explaining the budget of the awareness program. Fifth, to cope 
and control affect biases, security awareness material need to use affirmative stimuli and 
incidences. Sixth, individuals usually depend on the first part of the information they receive. 
This issue should be considered when planning security practices. Seventh, to prevent reduced 
perceived costs, experts need to focus on applying sanctions directly in case of non-compliance 
with security policy. Eighth, experts also need to motivate individuals to inquire their work 
practices continuously. Ninth, security practices should be linked to easy to memorized and 
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realistic stories. Tenth, workshops and mockups can be used as a tool to involve individuals to 
security risks and threats. 
D'Arcy et al. (2014) examined how security-related stress, which occurs because of the frequent 
enhancements to information security policies, is associated with violation of information 
security policy. They created a model of information security policy violation, which suggests 
that security-related stress drives individuals to involve in emotion-focused coping, which 
represented in moral separation from security policy violations. That is, the complex, uncertain 
and excessive security-related activates have a negative impact on security compliance behavior. 
Such activities can create security-related stress, which in turn increase “moral disengagement” 
that causes non-compliance to security policies (D'Arcy et al., 2014). 
Vance et al. (2014) investigate the effectiveness of warning messages and why individuals do 
ignore such warnings in order to understand individual’s perceptions and behaviors regarding 
security risks. They argue that Electroencephalography (EEG), which measure individual’s 
neural responses to feedbacks, can be used to predict individual’s behavior. The results of this 
study show that electroencephalography measures expect the behavior in different conditions. 
Thus, electroencephalography measures are a strong predictor of individual’s behavior regarding 
information security. Vance et al. (2014) emphasize that an individual usually tends to disregard 
warning messages except when she or he feels she or he is exposed to an attack and will lose 
something valuable. Also, the tendency of individuals to ignore security warning is higher before 
the occurrence of security incidents. Individuals disregard warning messages because it is hard to 
understand, unclear and brief (Vance et al., 2014). Here, Vance et al. (2014) measure the 
effectiveness of warning messages in motivating individuals to conform to intended behavior 
through investigating how individuals perceive these warning messages. 
	 23	
Willison and Warkentin (2013), in their research commentary, argue that the research should 
focus on the security policy violation and the antecedents of intention to violate and deterrence 
of the violation. Also, they emphasize that the research should focus on phenomena that 
temporally go before these acts. That is, they stress the importance of investigating the thought 
processes of expected criminals. 
The way the context of the organization can affect the thought processes of the criminals before 
deterrence. Indeed, Willison and Warkentin (2013) suppose there is a correlation between 
thought processes and organizational context, which in turn may affect the efficacy of deterrence 
protections. 
Chen et al. (2012) introduce a model that investigates the associations between coercive control, 
remunerative control, and certainty of control. This study aims to examine the relationship 
between punitive enforcement, rewarding enforcement and enforcement certainty on the one side 
and security compliance on the other side. Also, it examines how punitive and rewarding 
enforcement in combination influence security compliance. Chen et al. (2012) highlight that 
punitive and rewarding besides certainty of control have a significant influence on compliance 
behavior. This study emphasizes that reward enforcement could be employed in the 
organizations where punishment does not prevent security violation. Also, this study emphasizes 
the importance of educating and training the employees to increase their awareness and 
motivation to comply with the security policies. An individual’s awareness of security policies 
and rules may affect his or her intentions, attitudes, and behaviors regarding security (Chen et al., 
2012). 
Myyry et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model that describes the relationship between moral 
reasoning and values on one hand, and compliance (or noncompliance) with information security 
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policy on the other hand. They define moral reasoning as “the process in which an individual 
applies moral principles to determine a course of action” (p. 127). Their model has been 
developed based on two psychological theories: the Theory of Cognitive Moral Development 
and the Theory of Motivational Types of Values. The Theory of Cognitive Moral Development 
states that the moral reasoning has three levels: the pre-conventional, conventional and post-
conventional moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984). Myyry et al. (2009) study the relationship of 
each of these levels with compliance behavior. According to the Theory of Motivational Types 
of Values, the value has two types: openness to change versus conservation and self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement (Schwartz, 1992). The Myyry et al. (2009) study 
considers the relationship between openness to change versus conservation on one hand and 
compliance behavior on the other hand. 
This study pays more attention to the motivational factors that cause behavior change. The result 
of this study indicates that moral reasoning and values can describe individual’s commitment to 
security policies and rules. Moreover, Myyry et al. (2009) emphasize that pre-conventional and 
conventional moral reasoning and openness to change have a strong relationship with 
compliance behavior study concludes that pre-conventional moral reasoning has a positive effect 
on compliance behavior, whereas openness to change and conventional moral reasoning have a 
negative effect on compliance behavior.   
Boss et al. (2009) develop a model that describes “information security precaution-taking” 
behavior. This model identifies the factors that influence the perception of “mandatoriness,” 
which in turn can influence compliance behavior. Boss et al. (2009) define mandatoriness as “the 
degree to which individuals perceive that compliance with existing security policies and 
procedures is compulsory or expected by organizational management” (p. 152). This study 
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emphasizes that specifying security policies and behavior evaluation are critical drivers for 
compliance behavior through increasing the feeling of mandatoriness of the policy. Also, the 
perception of mandatoriness helps in encouraging people to take security precautions. 
Siponen and Iivari (2006) developed a theoretical model that illustrates how various normative 
theories can influence the “success” of information security policies. They argue that some of the 
business opportunities may force individuals to violate security policies. The model helps in 
dealing with such situation through employing normative theories. That is, this model provides 
guidance to understand under which conditions information security policies can be violated. 
Normative theories can be used mainly to evaluate and guide individual’s action and behavior 
(Siponen and Iivari, 2006).  
Normative theories involve two central functions: assessing people’s action and direct 
individual’s behavior (Siponen and Iivari, 2006). These two functions are grounded on a 
normative logic that is usually being used to judge whether an act is good or bad. Indeed, making 
such judgment is a significant challenge since the current information security world becomes 
more unpredictable than before. Siponen and Iivari (2006) emphasize that security managers 
must ensure that employees in the organization have the required knowledge capability that helps 
them to deal with situations in which business objectives contradict security policies.   
 
2.3 Security Policy  
This section discusses the literature that focuses on security policy development and 
implementation. Security rules and standards represent security policy. Thus, the literature 
focusing on developing and implementing security rules and/or standards is also considered.  
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Many research studies in the field of information systems security have provided suggestions for 
ways to develop, design and implement the security policy. They provide different models and 
frameworks, in addition to different guidelines that can ensure the effectiveness of the security 
policy. In this section, the literature is divided into two groups. The first group focuses on the 
literature that concern about the design and development of the security policy. The second 
group discusses the literature that focuses on the implementation of the security policy. 
    
2.3.1 Security Policy Design and Development  
Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) reviewed the policy literature and provided three measures 
that can be used to measure the effectiveness of the security policy and the way it is written. The 
three measures are breadth, which measures whether the policy is comprehensive or not; clarity, 
which measures whether the policy is easy to read and understand; and brevity. Goel and 
Chengalur-Smith (2010) argue that there is a lack of measures and standards that can be used to 
ensure the effectiveness of the security policy. Thus, they develop frameworks to evaluate the 
three measures. Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) emphasize that using these measures to 
characterize policies will aid in facilitating the examination of the relationship between policy 
form and policy effectiveness. This study validates these measures through examining user 
perceptions.       
Spears and Barki (2010) investigated the effect of user’s involvement in information system 
security development and on the implementation of the security controls. They argue that user 
involvement in developing information systems affect the success of the system. Thus, they 
examine user’s involvement in the context of information system security.  
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User involvement can increase individual’s awareness, increase alignment between security risk 
management and business, and enhance the development of security controls, which in turn 
advances the control performance (Spears and Barki, 2010). Moreover, Spears and Barki (2010) 
emphasize that when providing necessary business knowledge to users, they can be a critical 
resource for information security. This study concludes user involvement contributes to 
information system security development and implementation. Also, user involvement can be 
employed to govern perceptions of users regarding the significance and meaning of information 
security (Spears and Barki, 2010). 
Knapp et al. (2009) emphasize the importance of the scholarly involvement in the area of 
information security policies. Their study emphasizes that the information security policy aimed 
to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information resources. Knapp et 
al. (2009) propose an “information security policy process” model that shows a novel, 
comprehensive security policy process. This model is developed based on a group of correlated 
policy management processes or categories that can be implemented in an iterated rotation. The 
processes of managing the information security policy include four categories: the policy review 
process, which involves evaluating policies to ensure continuous applicability; the risk 
assessment process, which involves measuring and assessing business risk; the policy 
development process, which involves forming, sustaining, and changing security policy of the 
organization; and policy approval. The Knapp et al. (2009) model takes into consideration the 
effect of business governance in addition to external and internal impacts. Additionally, this 




2.3.2 Security Policy Implementation 
Smith et al. (2010) argue that employing “de jure standards” is highly important for 
implementing and certifying the security of organizations. According to Smith et al. (2010), 
information security implementation frequently leads to problems and difficulties related to 
power associations, politics, and resistance, usually because of an organization’s norms or 
culture. Thus, this study examines governmental information security through studying power 
associations during the process of information security adoption and accreditation taking in 
consideration that all government organizations must obey the de jure ISS standard. Smith et al. 
(2010) also claim that factors including lack of resource, lack of input from management input, 
and commitment can result in resistance to security policy and standard compliance. Thus, this 
issue should also be considered during the process of information security adoption and 
accreditation.   
Siponen and Iivari (2006) point out that unpredictable situations force organizations to make 
quick decisions without preparation. They claim that normative theories can explain the way 
such cases can be solved. This study offers six design theories (i.e. the conservative-
deontological, liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, virtue, utilitarian, and universalizability normative 
theories) and proposes a theoretical model that can be used to illustrate how normative theories 
can affect the success of security policies and standards. These theories can be used to direct the 
application of security policies. 
This study concludes that the conservative-deontological theory may be appropriate in the case 
of rule-oriented or steady business organizations. For organizations that are not rule-oriented and 
those with unstable business, this study recommends employing the prima-facie, virtue, 
utilitarian, or universalizability design theory. The proposed framework provides insight into 
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which security policies should be supported by anticipated benefits, virtuous activities, and 
contentment. Thus, that can aid organizations in designing and implementing effective security 
policies and standards. 
Karyda et al. (2005) claim that there is a lack of work in the literature concentrating on issues 
related to the application and effectiveness of security policy. Security policy implementation is 
not a direct task and relies on several factors. Thus, this study focuses on designing, 
implementing and adopting security policies within two different contexts. It proposes a 
theoretical framework to understand and investigate the interaction between processes associated 
with the application of an organization’s security policy. Karyda et al. (2005) adopted the theory 
of contextualism to investigate the effect of a specific context on managing the security. This 
study emphasizes the availability of the association between application of security practices and 
the environment, illuminating the importance of considering how contextual aspects can 
influence the success of information security adoption and implementation.   
 
2.4 Values and Security Policy 
This section discusses the literature that focuses on the relationship between security policy and 
individual values. That is, it considers the literature that focuses on the relationship between 
norms and security rules and standards.  
Some of the research studies within the information systems security discipline point out the 
relationship between people’s values and security policy. Therefore, this section concerns about 
research studies that explore the relationship between security policy and individual’s values. 
Hedström et al. (2011) propose “value-based compliance” model to examine the conflict 
between information security policies and the information use practice. This study aims to 
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explore individuals’ compliance with security policies and security practices as part of 
individuals’ daily practices. It provides a different viewpoint of information security 
management through taking into consideration the different rationalities of stakeholders. The 
proposed model recognizes the divergence in the values within the organization where different 
rationalities are utilized in the daily activities. That is, the conflict in the values could be 
reflected in the individuals’ behavior. Hedström et al. (2011) argue that the traditional 
compliance model that is a control-based is less effective for the implementation of information 
security compliance than the value-based model. Security behaviors with respect to security 
policies are expressed in term of values that are associated with individuals’ jobs. Hedström et al. 
(2011) argue that the control-based compliance model tends to enforce policies to guarantee 
appropriate information security. However, security should be considered as “the most important 
value enacted by users in their daily work” (p.374).  
Hsu (2009) applies the “frames analysis” concept to examine how financial institution employees 
understand information security certification (i.e. BS 7799 Part 2), which in turn affects their 
behaviors. This study highlights that the implementation of the certification is strongly affected 
by the management expectations. Indeed, individuals may perceive the security requirements 
based on their operating perspective. Thus, the inconsistency between the managers’ perceptions 
and the perceptions of the certification group and employees reflect that the concept of 
information security management may not be completely involved in the daily work practices. 
Thus, more attention should be paid to investigate the incongruence between the managers’ 
perceptions and the perceptions of the certification group, and try to align these perceptions to 
have more effective security in the organization (Hsu, 2009). 
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Albrecthsen and Hovdena (2009) emphasize that people within an organization have different 
rationalities, so they practice information system security in different ways. This divergent in 
rationalities may reveal the disagreement between security policy and practice. Indeed, this study 
examines the concept of “digital divide” in the context of information system security. It 
investigates the divergent in the information security opinions, beliefs and experiences between 
employees in an organization, and how that divergent will be reflected in the decisions regarding 
risks. Therefore, Albrecthsen and Hovdena (2009) study the way employees perceive their role 
in comparison to the way they view the role of the others. Also, it studies the way they view the 
measures of organizational security. Albrecthsen and Hovdena (2009) conclude that a digital 
divide is available between managers and users, which is reflected on how they view and 
practice information security. Users usually are seen as a threat to the information security, while 
they consider themselves as an unexploited asset for security. The divergent in understanding the 
others view has resulted from the lack of collaboration between users and managers. 
Consequently, security managers mostly base their practices on not realistic suppositions, which 
lead to misalignment between management and user’s daily work.   
Vaast (2007) explores how people from different communities perceive information systems 
security via a social representations perspective. He argues that social representations perspective 
plays a critical role in understanding information security that is embedded in the social context 
of the organization. The information security can be understood by members of different 
communities who represent information security and its work practices in various ways based on 
their previous knowledge. That is, people from different community may have different 
interpretations to the information security. Therefore, Vaast (2007) emphasizes the importance of 
considering the context of work practices to interpret information security problems. He also 
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highlights the importance of customizing security and awareness programs to consider people 
from different communities who may hold different knowledge regarding different security 
issues. People within the organization held different personal values. That difference is reflected 
in the people’s behaviors in response to different security issues (Vaast, 2007).  
 
2.5 Discussion  
To sum up, various information systems security research focuses on the compliance issue. They 
focus on the antecedents of compliance (and non-compliance) with the information security 
policy. Scholars consider individual values (or norms) as one of the main drivers for the 
compliance intention and behavior.   
Many research study how individual’s values affect compliance or intention to comply with 
security rules and standards (e.g. Myyry et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath and Rao, 
2009). These studies consider values as a significant antecedent to compliance intention and 
behavior. However, to our knowledge, there is a lack of the research studies that investigate how 
information security policy shape people’s values in the first place, and how these values can 
change in response to the occurrence of a security breach. Also, these studies do not show how 
these values can be used to shape or re-shape the information security policy. Some studies make 
a call to involve users (or non-security professionals) in the process of designing and developing 
information systems security to develop sync between users values and security policy (Hu et al., 
2012; Spears and Barki, 2010). However, they do not provide any mechanism that shows in 
which way users can involve in developing or enhancing the security policy to ensure 
compliance of norms with security rules. On the other hand, there is very limited literature that 
focuses on ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of the security policy. 
	 33	
This research aims to identify how security policy can shape individual’s perceptions and how 
these perceptions change in light of security incidents. It points out the importance of 
considering the relationship between the security rules of the organization and the norms of the 
employees within that organization. Indeed, it is difficult to develop a methodology or 
mechanism that can ensure the sync between norms and rules and can fit all organizations and 
contexts. Thus, in this research, we try to fill this gap by introducing a RepGrid security 
assessment mechanism.  This assessment mechanism allows organizations to assess the maturity 
of the organization security through reactively understand individuals’ norms and perceptions 
regarding security rules to ensure compliance of norms with the rules and the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and efficacy of the security policy. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter classifies and identifies opportunities for further research in the normative- and 
compliance-related security literature. Three bodies of literature inform this research study: 
individual’s values and how they influence the compliance intention and behavior; security 
policy development and implementation; and norm-rule compliance. This literature review 
reveals the shortage in fully examining the mutual relationship between people’s norms and 
security rules and standards, and how they influence the shaping of each other. There are some 
attempts to highlight the relationship between norms and rules; however, these studies focus 
mainly on the norms and rules and pay less attention to the nature and the influence of this 
relationship.  
Thus, this study provides new research directions in examining information systems security in 
relation to normative beliefs and security policies and rules. There is a call in the information 
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system security literature to involve users in the designing and developing information systems 
security in order to ensure the sync between user values and security policy (Hu et al., 2012; 
Spears and Barki, 2010).  However, it is difficult to develop a methodology that can create sync 
between norms and rules while remaining suitable for all organizations. Therefore, this study 
introduces the RepGrid security assessment mechanism, which can be used to evaluate and 
understand individuals’ norms and how they perceive security rules in order to create sync 










Chapter 3: Research Theory and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology (i.e. Repertory Grid 
technique) and theory (i.e. Personal Construct Theory) underpinning this methodology. 
Repertory Grid technique has been used in Information Systems research (e.g. Kanellis et al. 
1999; Davis and Hufnagel, 2007) to study human cognition, i.e. how a person interprets or 
understands events that occur in the environment. In addition to Information Systems, this 
technique has been used in different fields such as Psychology (e.g. Wright, 2004), education 
(e.g. Kreber et al., 2003), human resource management (e.g. Siau et al., 2007), and human-
computer interaction (e.g. Crudge and Johnson, 2004). This chapter consists of five sections. The 
first section provides an overview of Kelly's (1950s) Personal Construct Theory (PCT), which 
underpins the Repertory Grid technique. The second section explains Kelly’s Personal Construct 
Theory. The third section provides an explanation of the Repertory Grid and the different 
alternatives that can be used within this technique. The fourth section explains the Action Design 
Research method adopted by this research, while the fifth section provides an overview of the 
design of this research.  
 
3.2 Personal Construct Theory (PCT) 
The Repertory Grid technique was invented by George Kelly, a psychologist, and is grounded on 
Kelly's (1950s) Personal Construct Theory (PCT). Personal Construct Theory is a cognitive 
theory that was proposed by Kelly (1955, 1963). The main focus of Kelly’s work is to help 
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individuals analyze and investigate their interpersonal relationships. Kelly (1955) argues that 
people use their background, personal experiences, beliefs, and values to form their “personal 
construct systems” that help them in understating and interpreting (i.e. construing) the world 
around them. People's cognition, which represents the way of making meanings of the world, 
forms individual's personality (Kelly, 1963). Thus, the Personal Construct Theory is also known 
as the Theory of Personality (Kelly, 1955). 
An individual’s “personal construct system” assists them to construe the present situation and to 
predict future incidents (Tan and Hunter, 2002). Furthermore, people can share in varying 
degrees the “personal construct systems” with others. Kelly argues that the similarity of people’s 
constructs determines the degree to which the psychological processes match (Kelly, 1955).  
Personal constructs are bipolar in nature. That is, constructs should be represented as a pair of 
phrases, specifically the phrase and its opposite (Kelly, 1955). For example, employees in an 
organization can be organized and categorized into those with a high-level Information Security 
awareness and those with low-level Information Security awareness. Using bipolar labels to 
represent constructs may help in gaining a better understanding of how people use their 
constructs in interpreting the events around them (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
 
3.3 Repertory Grid Technique (RepGrid) 
Repertory Grid is an interview technique for identifying people's constructs and perceptions that 
are represented by a 2-dimensional matrix. The matrix consists of elements dimension and 
constructs dimension. Elements are objects of interest such as events, objects or people. 
Constructs represent people's perceptions, thoughts, beliefs or opinions (Kreber, et al., 2003; Tan 
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and Hunter, 2002). Each construct should be represented as a bipolar statement to identify the 
differences and similarities concurrently (Kelly, 1955). That is, each construct should be 
represented as a pair of phrases; the phrase and its opposite (e.g. strong – weak; secure – risky). 
Elements and constructs should be linked to show how each element may be interpreted in 
regard to each construct (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
Repertory Grid technique has been used in many studies across different disciplines; however, it 
has received various critiques regarding how this technique was applied. Some researchers using 
this technique have not grounded their technique on the assumptions of Kelly's Personal 
Construct Theory (Marsden and Littler, 2000).  
This research mainly focuses on people’s norms. Specifically, it focuses on how employees 
understand the Information Security policy in their organization. That is, this research seeks 
cognitive data that is related to people’s values. Reliable, trustworthy and efficient techniques are 
needed to elicit and analyze such data. Thus, the Repertory Grid technique is the appropriate 
method for this research, which seeks qualitative data (Hair et al., 2009). Curtis et al. (2008) 
emphasize that the Repertory Grid technique helps in reduce research bias and supports 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data (Curtis et al., 2008). Also, the Repertory Grid 
technique was proven to be a superior technique to get people’s constructs through structured 
interviews (Cassell and Walsh, 2004). The structured nature of this technique eases comparative 
analysis that is needed to compare different perceptions and beliefs of the participants (Curtis et 
al., 2008). 
The following section discusses the different alternatives for applying Repertory Grid technique. 
This outline is grounded on Kelly's Personal Construct Theory.   
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3.3.1 Outline of The Method 
Repertory Grid is a hybrid qualitative-quantitative technique; that is, the elicited data will be 
analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. In this section, we clearly outline a sound 
Repertory Grid method. The first part focuses on selecting participants and data collection. The 
data collection consists of two phases: the first phase is about collecting data to elicit elements, 
and the second phase is about collecting data to elicit constructs. 
Before explaining the method, it is important to mention that there are four types of Repertory 
Grids:  
(1) Full/real Repertory Grids; both elements and constructs are elicited. 
(2) Partial/fixed elements Repertory Grids: elements are supplied, whereas constructs are 
elicited. 
(3) Fixed elements and constructs Grids: both elements and constructs are supplied (Edwards et 
al., 2009).  
(4) Fixed constructs Grids: constructs are supplied and elements are elicited. The last type of 
Repertory Grids is mostly used when there is a need to compare multiple Grids (Tan and Hunter, 














Figure 3.1: The four types of Repertory Grids. 
 
The second part of the method outline focuses on analyzing grids and reporting findings. Various 
analyses techniques may be used to analyze Repertory Grids. The choice among these techniques 
depends on the context and purpose of the study. The third part focuses on the trustworthiness of 
the technique, which is an important issue to be considered while conducting data collection and 





















Figure 3.2: The process of Repertory Grid technique. 
 
3.3.1.1 Participants and Data collection    
Many studies emphasize that 15 to 25 participants are sufficient for Repertory Grids (Ginsberg, 
1989; Tan and Hunter, 2002). That is, normally no more constructs will be generated even if the 
sample size increased. The data collection process involves three stages: elements' elicitation, 
constructs' elicitation, and elements' ranking/rating, in which elements are linked to constructs. 
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Stage One: Elements Elicitation 
                       I.         Interview 
The main purpose of this stage is to identify the elements of the Repertory Grids. In the case of 
full Repertory Grids or fixed constructs Repertory Grids, participants will be interviewed to elicit 
elements for which they have opinions or thoughts. Most examples in the literature using the 
Repertory Grid method used 'structured' interviews for data collection. However, structured 
interviews restrict participants' freedom to fully express their opinions and thoughts. Thus, semi-
structured interviews will be a better substituent because they allow participants to convey their 
views easily, and elaborate and ask questions for clarification. 
                      II.         Coding and Categorization 
In qualitative research, semi-structured interviews usually result in a large number of concepts 
that can be used to generate elements. These concepts should be grouped and categorized to 
manage them more easily. The qualitative data analysis should be conducted as follows. First, 
the researcher needs to transcribe parts of interviews that are related to the subject under study. 
Second, the researcher should perform thematic coding in order to group data into specific 
categories, which encompasses all knowledge and experience of participants regarding the 
subject under study. Thus, data should be decomposed, conceptualized, and grouped together in 
different groups (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This type of coding involves two steps. The first 
step focuses on eliciting all concepts from interview transcriptions related to the subject under 
study. This process called “open coding.” The second step focuses on decomposing, grouping, 
and categorizing concepts resulting from the previous step. This process is known as “axial 
coding” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The categorization process helps in identifying the concepts 
that are more related to the subject under study. After the coding and categorization, the 
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redundancy should be calculated for each concept. That is, research should report how many 
times each concept was mentioned by all participants, and how many participants mentioned a 
specific concept. This process helps later in selecting the group of elements to be used in the 
study (Jankowics, 2004).           
                    III.         Elements selection 
Many studies suggested that the number of elements should not exceed ten elements. Indeed, 
having more than ten elements will lengthen the interviews in the next stage and will not 
guarantee the generation of more constructs (Stewart et al., 1981; Easterby-Smith et al., 1996).  
For the final set of elements, most studies select the ten most redundant elements (i.e. 10 most 
elements that are mentioned by all participants). To select the appropriate elements, we need to 
take two issues into consideration. All elements should be of the same type in the sense that 
whether they are people, places, things, etc., and in the sense whether they are nouns or verbs 
(Stewart et al., 1981). Another important issue is that elements should be mutually exclusive, that 
is, there is no overlap between any two elements (Tan and Hunter 2002; Jankowics, 2004). 
After deciding on which elements will be used in the Repertory Grids, the researcher moves to 
identify constructs for the Grids.       
Stage Two: Constructs Elicitation 
                       I.         Interviews 
This stage aims to identify bipolar constructs, which reflects participants' perceptions and beliefs 
about elements. After deciding on the elements, the researcher should identify constructs that 
will be used in each grid. If the researcher decides to use supplied constructs, all the grids will 
use the same constructs and the researcher move directly to rate/rank the constructs (move 
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directly to stage 3). The supplied constructs can be provided from different sources. Also, the 
researcher may elicit constructs from a group and supply it to another group of participants for 
rating (Tan and Hunter, 2002). On the other hand, if the researcher decides to elicit constructs, a 
set of interviews should be conducted. Here, the researcher can use the same participants from 
the first stage or a different group of participants. An important issue is that purposive sampling 
should be employed at this stage to avoid any biases, which mostly happen when random 
sampling is used. Also, purposive sampling can ensure that the sample is more representative 
(Miles et al. 1994). 
Repertory Grid interview is a kind of structured interview that is used in this research. In this 
stage, this kind of interviews is the proper choice (Tan and Hunter 2002; Jankowics, 2004; Hair 
et al., 2009) where participants need to explain how they construe similarities and differences 
between elements. The structured interviews will use elements identified in stage 1 to elicit 
constructs. There are different elicitation techniques the researcher can use to elicit constructs 
during the interviews. Figure 3 shows a sample interview sheet used in this study for eliciting 
and rating constructs. The sheet may include interviewee name or a given identification, date of 
the interview and the purpose of the interview. Since we only elicit constructs, we have not 
included the purpose of the interview in the interview sheet.  
The elements should be represented on the top of the sheet (represented by E1, E2, etc. in figure 
3). The bipolar constructs should be represented on the both sides of the sheet. The left-hand side 
includes the constructs, while the right-hand side includes their opposites. The elicitation 
technique should be specified at the bottom of the sheet, along with a brief illustration of how 
this process was achieved. For example, the triadic method is used in this research to elicit 




























1 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 5 
C1           C1 
C2           C2 
C3           C3 
C4           C4 
C5           C5 
C6           C6 
C7           C7 
C8           C8 
C9           C9 
C10           C10 
Elicitation method: 
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                      II.         Elicitation methods 
Researchers may use different elicitation methods to elicit “bipolar” constructs from the 
participants. Construct elicitation is a method-dependent. That is, the type of constructs will 
differ based on the elicitation method used (Caputi and Reddy, 1999). These methods are 
different in the way elements are presented to participants. The five main methods for construct 
elicitation are as follows: 
• Monadic approach: the researcher asks a participant to describe each element with a 
single word or phrase. Then, the participant will be requested to provide the opposite of 
the word or phrase (Caputi and Reddy, 1999). 
• Dyadic approach: the researcher provides two elements at a time to a participant. Then, 
the participant will be asked to determine whether these elements are similar or different. 
If the participants perceive these elements as similar, the remaining elements will be 
considered to identify an element that is different from the original two and the 
participant will be asked to describe the difference. On the other hand, if the two 
elements are perceived to be different, then the participant will be asked to describe the 
difference. This process will be repeated until reaching a proper set of relevant constructs 
(i.e. reach the saturation point). This method is simpler than the triadic as it generates less 
complex constructs. It is preferred for participants such as children who require a simpler 
elicitation process. In this process, a participant must consider similarity or differences 
between elements. Thus, there is a balance between positive and negative constructs 
(Caputi and Reddy, 1999). 
• Triadic approach: this is the traditional method for eliciting constructs (Kelly's (1955) 
triadic approach). The researcher randomly selects three elements and asks a participant 
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to identify and describe how two elements are similar and how they are different from the 
third. This process will be repeated until reached proper set of relevant constructs (i.e. 
saturation) (Tan and Hunter, 2002). This method creates constructs that are cognitively 
more complex than those generated by the dyadic method. A participant needs to 
compare and contrast elements simultaneously. Thus, it focuses more on positive 
constructs (Caputi and Reddy, 1999).  
• Full context form approach: the researcher asks a participant to sort all the elements into 
separate groups based on similarities between them. Then, the participant will be asked to 
describe each group in two or three words, which represent the group label. This 
approach focuses more on similarities. Thus, it may be used in research about 
"understanding cognitive grouping" and "shared meaning" (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
• Group elicitation: all participants work together to elicit constructs (e.g. work in a 
workshop). Any of the techniques described above can be used to elicit the constructs but 
with all participants instead of one participant. This method allows participants to explore 
different constructs, which may help participants gain a better understanding (Tan and 
Hunter, 2002). 
An important issue to consider when eliciting constructs is that constructs should be bipolar. 
Whatever method is used to elicit a construct, the researcher needs to elicit the opposite of the 
construct (e.g. very important – not important). Another issue is that each grid should be supplied 
with “overall bipolar construct,” which is a broad construct that can be applied for all of the 
elements. This construct summarized participants' overall perceptions and beliefs (Jankowicz, 
2004).  It is required later to ensure the reliability of constructs rating/ranking. Each participant 
	 47	
should rate or rank the overall construct regarding each element. Also, it is preferred to let 
participants rate or rank elements directly after completing constructs' elicitation process. 
Stage Three: Rating/Ranking of Elements 
Each bipolar construct should be rated/ranked regarding each element. Rating/ranking is a way 
for linking elements to constructs (Tan and Hunter, 2002). Different techniques can be used for 
ranking/rating elements. The first technique is dichotomizing. This technique is similar to binary 
ranking technique. When an element is closest to the left construct, then a check mark is located 
against that element. Otherwise, a cross is located against the element (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
This technique is not preferred because it can generate a skewed distribution (Esterby-Smith et 
al., 1996). Another problem is that a participant needs to select either the left or right construct. 
This technique ignores the options which may occur between the left and right construct, which 
may not reflect the participant's beliefs (Beail, 1985). 
The second method is ranking. A participant is asked to ranks elements between the right and 
left construct (Tan and Hunter, 2002). This technique reduces the problem of generating skewed 
distribution (Beail, 1985). However, participants need to differentiate elements, even if there is 
no difference between them (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
The third technique is rating. This technique is most preferred and widely used technique 
(Hunter, 1997). In this technique, a participant is asked to rate the elements on a Likert scale. 
The Likert scale can be three, five, seven, nine or eleven scale. Many researchers emphasize that 
five-points Likert scale is the optimal choice to use when rating elements in Repertory Grids 
(Jankowicz, 2004; Bell, 1990). Using a Likert scale with less than five points may restrict 
participants' freedom to explain their perceptions and beliefs (Tan and Hunter, 2002; Bell, 1990). 
On the other hand, using a Likert scale with more than five points make it hard to visually 
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examine results (Tan and Hunter, 2002; Stewart et al., 1981). After the elicitation and rating 
processes are completed, grids are ready for analysis. 
 
3.3.1.2 Repertory Grids Analysis 
Parts of the analysis process should be conducted in the first stage for coding and categorizing 
elements. It is important to mention that data analysis at this stage consists of the integration of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. In term of qualitative analysis, the researcher should 
perform a data coding and categorization for all constructs that are elicited from all participants, 
which is necessary before starting the qualitative analysis. To generate constructs' categories, a 
researcher can use pre-existing categories available in the literature, books, or international 
standards. Another technique is the “bootstrapping” technique (Jankowics, 2004). The 
bootstrapping technique involves examining each construct and see if it can fall under a pre-
defined group, or there is a need to create a new group. The categorization process is necessary 
as the first step for quantitative analysis to facilitate construct management (Jankowics, 2004). 
For quantitative analysis, different analysis methods that can be used to analyze the grids. The 
researcher should select an analysis method based on the type of data at hand and the purpose of 
the study. Thus, the researcher needs to define the type of data in the grids to ensure the validity 
of grid analysis (Bell, 1988). The data in grids can involve ratings, rankings or ticks (based on 
rating technique used). Grids can contain interval, nominal, categorical, or ordinal data. 




Analyzing a Single Grid 
Individual Repertory Grids can be analyzed using different statistical techniques. Deciding on 
which technique the researcher need to use depends on the purpose of study and data at hand. An 
important issue to consider is that each of the analysis technique can use visual representation to 
represent data in the form of tables and graphs. This visual representation is very useful for 
analyzing and interpreting results.         
The first technique is the frequency count. The frequency count is a simple analysis technique 
which involves counting how many times participants mentioned each element and construct. 
This technique is mostly used to find the most popular trends. Another issue is that a frequency 
count can be used only when constructs and elements are well defined. Having well-defined 
constructs and elements minimizes the chance for having different understandings and beliefs for 
the same element or construct (Hunter, 1997; Boyle, 2005). 
In case where elements or constructs are not well defined, content analysis should be used 
(Stewart et al., 1981). As mentioned above, elements and constructs coding and categorizing is 
the first step before starting the content analysis. There are different methods for doing content 
analysis. Jankowics (2004) suggested nine steps for content analysis based on Honey's (1979) 
method.  
• The first step involves identifying ratings for the 'overall' construct regarding each 
element. The ratings of overall construct reflect overall perception and beliefs of each 
participant.  
• The second step involves calculating the sum of differences for each bipolar construct 
against the overall construct.  
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• The third step includes converting the sum of differences for each construct into 
'percentage similarity score' (i.e. normalization process). Thus, the researcher can 
compare grids that have a different number of constructs. A “look-up table” can be used 
to extract 'percentage similarity score' rather than calculate it manually. Jankowics (2004) 
provided a method for calculating “percentage similarity,” which can be used here.  
• In the fourth step, “reversed” scores should be calculated for the overall construct. For 
example, in a five-point scale 1 converted into 5, 2 into 4, 3 stays the same and so on. 
The rule of thumb for reversing score is that if the researcher uses n-points scale then 
each score should be subtracted from n+1 to reverse it (Jankowics, 2004). After reversing 
the overall construct scores, the sum of the differences should be calculated against the 
“reversed” scores.  
• The fifth step involves converting the sum of differences for each construct (from step 4) 
into percentage similarity scores per step 3.  
• In step six, the highest percentage of similarity should be identified. This refers to the 
highest percentage between the two “percentage similarity scores’ (from step 3 and step 
5).  
• Step seven includes recording the ranking for each “highest” percentage similarity score 
in term of high, medium, or low. These rankings reflect the correlation between each 
bipolar construct and the “overall” construct.  
By completing step seven, individual grids are prepared for group analysis. The following 
section focuses on multiple grid analysis comparing different grids together.  
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• In step eight, each construct should be assigned to one of the categories that were 
generated before starting the quantitative analysis. All the information from the previous 
steps should be recorded in spreadsheet tables.  
• In step nine, all the tables should be converted into bar charts to show the most important 
constructs' categories. Each chart is related to a subgroup of participants. Participants can 
be categorized into subgroups based on specific criteria such as type or level of 
professionalism or gender.  
The researcher needs to create a table for each subgroup of participants. One chart can be created 
for all participants. This chart shows the percentage of constructs in each subgroup or category. 
Each bar represents a construct’s category and shows high, medium and low correlations 
between constructs within that category and the overall construct. The most important category is 
the one that with the highest bar. Another way for interpreting the charts is by considering the 
categories that have the highest part of the bar that shows high correlation. That is, the researcher 
should focus only on constructs that have high correlations and considers the ones that have 
highest “high” part of the bar as the most important construct categories. Content analysis is 
important when analyzing Repertory Grids. Many researchers have employed content analysis 
before doing any quantitative analysis. 
Moreover, Repertory Grids can be analyzed using a technique called “visual focusing” (Hunter, 
1997). Visual focusing involves reordering elements and constructs, such that similar elements 
are located next to each other. The same thing applied for constructs. In some cases, the 
researcher needs to reverse the bipolar construct (i.e. the right construct placed in the left side 
and the left construct placed in right side) based on the match between the ratings. Visual 
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focusing helps in elucidating the similarities and differences among elements and constructs (Tan 
and Hunter, 2002).   
Another way to analyze Repertory Grids is to employ statistical analysis, which can explain 
relationships between constructs and elements and among constructs and elements. One 
technique is Cluster Analysis, which is considered a form of visual focusing (always electronic) 
(Tan and Hunter, 2002). Certain Repertory Grids software provides a visual representation for 
elements clustering as well as construct clustering using FOCUS algorithm.  
Another statistical technique consists of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and factor 
analysis. This technique is the most common method used when analyzing Repertory Grids 
(Bell, 1990). This technique allows the researcher to examine correlations and to decide on the 
number of factors to retain based on eigenvalue (Velicer, 1976), percentage of variance 
explained (Bell, 1990), or both. Other rules of thumb can be used to decide on the number of 
factors to retain, such as scree plots and minimal average partial correlation (Velicer, 1976). 
PCA also measures loading of constructs onto the factors, which helps in identifying the main 
factors that can help in answering research questions. Besides tables, PCA can be represented 
graphically through tables with clusters and plots to show the match among constructs and 
elements, and loadings. 
Finally, a researcher may use a combination of some or all of the above techniques. For example, 
Hunter (1997) used content analysis and visual focusing to analyze different grids. Thus, the 




Analyzing Multiple Grids 
Besides content analysis, Principle Component Analysis and Cluster Analysis, other techniques 
can be used to inspect similarities and differences between different grids. Tan and Hunter 
(2002) suggested three approaches to compare multiple grids. The first approach is linguistic 
analysis. This approach focuses on classifying and grouping constructs through analyzing 
participants' linguistics. Linguistic analysis reduces researcher bias in understanding participants' 
constructs. However, this analysis is hard to carry (Tan and Hunter, 2002). The second approach 
is to employ a mapping technique (e.g. Q-type factor analysis) to map participants' constructs 
(Tan and Hunter, 2002). Unlike standard factor analysis, Q-type factor analysis used to examine 
correlation among cases (or participants). The primary goal of this technique is "to identify 
factors based on which several individuals can be compared, wherein variables are not grouped, 
but individuals discriminate among them" (Iliescu, 2005, p. 82). This technique results in 
clustering participants based on the similarities among their constructs (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
The last approach is to use multivariate analysis techniques such as regression and discriminant 
analysis. These techniques focus on grouping participants based on the similarities of their 
cognitive constructs (Tan and Hunter, 2002). 
 
3.3.1.3 Trustworthiness       
Like any other scientific research, Repertory Grids must be verified to ensure the trustworthiness 
(i.e. rigor) of the study. A study should be verified incrementally during the research process to 
guarantee reliability and validity. The verification process is "the process of checking, 
confirming, making sure, and being certain." Verification is important to build a solid product 
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through identifying and fixing errors. Also, it helps in directing the researcher regarding when to 
continue, stop or modify the research to ensure reliability and validity (Morse et al., 2008). 
In this method, different processes should be considered to ensure trustworthiness of the study. 
Collecting data using structured interviews, as conducted based on Kelly's (1955) Personal 
Construct theory, can ensure the validity and reliability of the data because structured interviews 
(i.e. Repertory Grid interviews) can minimize or mitigate the researcher's bias (Tan and Hunter, 
2002). A hermeneutic circle should be conducted to ensure reliability and validity of the data. 
That is, after the researcher transcripts the interviews, he or she should forward the interviews 
back to participants so; they can verify the data elicited from the interviews. Also, purposeful 
sampling is used to increase the chance to gather more representative and relevant data and to 
minimize bias (Strauss et al., 1990).  Despite the suggestion in the current literature regarding the 
sample size, interviews may be continued until a saturation is reached, ensuring more reliable 
and valid data.   
After all, selecting the right method to analyze specific data and to serve a specific purpose in the 
study is an important issue that contributes to the trustworthiness of the findings (Bell, 1988). 
 
3.4 Action Design Research (ADR) 
Many IS researchers emphasize that IS research must provide theoretical contributions and solve 
issues that practitioners may face (Rosemann and Vessey, 2008). However, IS research still 
suffers from the gap between research and practice. 
Hevner et al. (2004) propose a design science approach that focuses on designing and building IT 
artifacts. This approach allows researchers to create design knowledge related to practice 
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(Hevner et al. 2004). Sein et al. (2011) claim that the traditional design of science research 
ignore or do not appreciate how organizational context can shape the design and the artifact. 
They argue that IS research needs a method that “aims at building innovative IT artifacts in an 
organizational context and learning from the intervention while addressing a problematic 
situation” (Sein et al., 2011, p. 38). Sein et al. (2011) have introduced a research method known 
as action design research (ADR), which encompasses constructing, intervention, and evaluation 
of an ensemble artifact. Sein et al. (2011) define ensemble artifact as “the material and 
organizational features that are socially recognized as bundles of hardware and/or software” and 
which emerge from design, use, and continuous alteration in an organizational context (Sein et 
al., 2011, p. 38).  
In this research, we adopted Sein et al.’s (2011) action design research (ADR) method to show 
how our artifact can emerge as a result of the interaction between information security and 
people values. With ADR, the building and continuous testing of the artifact within an 
organizational context helps in generating “prescriptive design knowledge.” Moreover, ADR 
tends to solve a problem within an organizational context through building, intervening and 
evaluating the artifact. ADR consists of four stages. Each stage is supported by principles that 
recognize the core assumptions, beliefs, and values (Sein et al., 2011). 
Stage One: Problem Formulation  
This stage is triggered by an immediate or anticipated problem. Practitioners may perceive a 
problem that can be framed by the researchers. Practitioners, users, the researchers, technologies, 
and literature can provide input for this stage, where a research problem is recognized and 
conceptualized based on current theories and technologies. In this stage, the researchers 
determine the initial scope and frame the initial research questions. Also, the problem is defined 
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as an instantiation of a class of problems. One of the important tasks to be considered at this 
stage is to secure the long-term organizational commitment from the participating organizations. 
Another critical task that should be considered in this stage is deciding the roles and 
responsibilities of participant practitioners (Sein et al., 2011). 
This stage is anchored by two principles:  
• Practice-Inspired Research 
This principle stresses that problems should be considered as “knowledge-creation opportunities” 
that are positioned at the intersection of technological and organizational fields. With ADR, 
researchers need to create knowledge that is applicable to the class of problems where the 
particular problem instantiated from. Thus, the research process is “problem-inspired.”   
• Theory-Ingrained Artifact 
This principle emphasizes that theories should underlie the ensemble artifacts. Within this 
principle, previous theories can be used to structure the problem, identify solutions and direct 
design. Also, action design researchers “ingrained” theoretical aspects in the artifact, so the 
theory can be expressed “in a socially recognizable form.” As a result, this process results in the 
production of the preliminary design of the “theory-ingrained” artifact.  
Stage Two: Building, Intervention, and Evaluation  
In this stage, the problem formulation and theoretical premises, which are generated in the first 
stage, are used to provide a base to create the preliminary design of the artifact. Here, the 
processes of building, intervention, and evaluation (BIE) of the artifact are interlinked. This stage 
involves continuous testing of the problem and the artifact. The BIE stage results in “the realized 
design of the artifact.” Also, it explains whether innovation derived from the artifact design or 
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the organizational intervention. Sein et al. (2011) have defined two end points for the range of 
research design that a researcher can choose from: 
• IT-Dominant BIE: This method fits ADR that tends to generate an innovative 
technological design at the beginning. Organizational commitment can be shaped through 
continuous instantiation and evaluation of the emerging artifact and the theories 
embedded in it, which can be achieved through organizational intervention. The 
emerging artifact is exposed to participants’ expectations and knowledge. This process 
leads to the final design of the ensemble artifact. Therefore, researchers take “beta 
version” of the artifact and apply it in a broader organizational context. This process 
comprises assessing the artifact in the use setting. This extensive evaluation aims to keep 
the continuous refinement of the artifact that is formed and re-formed by the setting of its 
usage.  
• Organization-Dominant BIE: This approach tends to create design knowledge, 
although the main cause of innovation is organizational intervention. During BIE, 
researchers should deal with the participants’ current thoughts and assumptions regarding 
the use of the artifact in certain context to generate and enhance the design. At the end of 
each iteration, the artifact and design principles should be evaluated. Here, researchers 
deploy the artifact in the organization during the design iterations. The iterations should 
be ended when the decision is made to accept or refuse the artifact, or when the further 
cycles add no or minor contributions.  
This stage anchored by three principles:  
• Reciprocal Shaping 
This principle highlights that the mutual influences of the artifact and the organizational context 
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cannot be separated. Here, researchers are involved in the continuous decision cycles that go to 
very detailed elements in each domain.  
• Mutually Influential Roles 
This principle emphasizes that it is important for the participants in ADR to learn from each 
other and to share knowledge with each other. Researchers can provide knowledge about theory 
and technology while practitioners can provide knowledge about work practices.  
• Authentic and Concurrent Evaluation 
This principle stresses that the process of evaluation cannot be not separated from the research 
process that comes after the building. Thus, decisions regarding the design and shape of the 
artifact should be associated with continuing evaluation. Here, the alpha version of the artifact is 
exposed to “formative” evaluation, which helps in recognizing the expected and unexpected 
consequences. On the other hand, the beta version of the artifact is exposed to “summative” 
evaluation to evaluate its value and usefulness.  
Stage Three: Reflection and Learning  
This stage applies the learning from the previous stage to a wider class of problems. It is 
continuous and can be achieved in parallel with the stage one and stage two. This stage 
emphasizes that the “conscious reflection on the problem framing, the theories chosen, and the 
emerging ensemble is critical to ensure that contributions to knowledge are identified.” The 
contiguous evaluation may lead to changes in the research process, as the understanding of the 
artifact increases during the research.    
This stage anchored by one principle, namely Guided Emergence. This notion is used to reflect 
the interplay between the design and the emergence. Researchers generate the initial design that 
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shaped by ongoing organizational use, perceptions and results of the evaluation. That is, the 
ensemble artifact combines the preliminary design of the artifact (Principle 2) as refined by 
interactions among participants, organizational use, and perceptions (Principles 3 and 4) and by 
results of the “formative” evaluation (Principle 5). The refinement is triggered by both expected 
and unexpected outcomes from BIE iterations. 
Stage Four: Formalization of Learning  
This stage aims to develop the learning from the ADR into general concepts for a class of field 
problems. Researchers can formalize the learning through abstracting what is accomplished in 
the artifact and defining the organizational consequences that can be considered as design 
principles and reshaping to theories that support the preliminary design.  
This stage anchored by the principle of Generalized Outcomes.  
The resulting artifact from ADR is “a bundle of properties in different domains,” which can be a 
solution to a specific problem. ADR emphasized that both problem and solution could be 
generalized. One of the critical elements of ADR is the “move from the specific-and-unique to 
generic-and-abstract.” Here, generalization has three levels: (1) generalizing the problem 
instance through considering the problem as an instantiation of a class of problems, (2) 
generalizing the solution instance through re-conceptualize the instantiated solution into a class 
of solutions, and (3) driving design principles from the design research outcomes. The design 
principles are framed and articulated in the stage of formalization of learning and refined thru the 
BIE cycles. BIE is an inductive step linking design principles to a class of solutions and a class 
of problems. 
To sum up, ADR is a design research technique that supports knowledge generation through 
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recognizing ensemble artifacts. It provides researchers with more comprehensive views of 
artifact design and use. ADR tends to analyze the ongoing refinement and use of the artifact in 
order to generalize the outcomes. It is an appropriate method to theorize ensemble artifacts 
through exploring ongoing evolution of the artifact. ADR emphasizes that the artifact emerges 
from the interplay between the organizational context and technology.  
 
3.5 Research Design 
3.5.1 Unit of Analysis 
This research focuses on studying norms of employees within an organization. To do so, we 
established a virtual e-commerce company known as Crown Confections. Crown Confections is 
an independent, small e-commerce business that provides various interesting desserts for sale 
through its website. The Crown Confections company offers a variety of desserts at a reasonable 
price for different kinds of customers. The goal of the Crown Confections is to help customers to 
find desserts they are looking for easier and faster. The website was launched in February 2015. 
The Internet commerce website operates only in laboratory settings and does not have any 
public-facing access. This social experiment is conducted to simulate a real e-commerce 
business. Like any organization, Crown Confections has information security policies created 
based on security standards typically used in real organizations.  
 
3.5.2 Data Collection 
This research adopts a hybrid type of Repertory Grid between fixed RepGrid and fixed element 
RepGrid because the constructs were elicited from one group and supplied to other groups, and 
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the elements were supplied from the information security policy that was developed for the 
experiment. In this research, the data is collected using Repertory Grids technique. This study is 
conducted in two stages: the alpha stage and the beta stage. At the first stage, data is collected 
through conducting a “conceptual” experiment that simulates real organizations. The participants 
were grouped into five groups based on the SSE-CMM levels in addition to the “expert” group. 
The elements were supplied from the information security policy that was developed for the 
social experiment. Here, five elements are used in this study: acceptable use policy, information 
security roles and responsibility, password policy, email policy, and remote access policy. These 
five elements represent the five policy themes available in the information security policy that 
was developed for the Crown Confections.  
After deciding on the elements, “bipolar” constructs are elicited through interviewing the 
“expert” group using Repertory Grid, structured interviews. In this research, the triadic approach 
is adopted. The triadic approach is Kelly’s (1955) traditional method for eliciting constructs.  
After eliciting constructs, participants need to rate each construct against each element. So, 
participants should rate the constructs using five points Likert scale because it is the optimal 
choice to use when rating elements in Repertory Grids (Jankowicz, 2004; Bell, 1990). The rating 
technique is adopted because it is the most preferred and widely used technique for 
rating/ranking Repertory Grids (Hunter, 1997). For the purpose of this study, each participant 
rated the same grid twice, one before introducing the security breach and one after. At this point, 
grids are ready for the analysis. 
At the second stage, the data is collected through conducting a laboratory experiment. This 
experiment simulates a real e-commerce organization. The participants were divided into five 
groups based on the SSE-CMM levels in addition to the “expert” group. We used the expert 
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group to validate the constructs from the first stage and identifying emerging constructs. The 
same process as the first stage was followed.  
 
3.5.3 Data Analysis 
The first step to analyze the grids is to code and categorize the constructs. In this research, 
“bootstrapping” technique is use to categorize the constructs. By deciding on the categories, the 
grids are ready for the quantitative analysis. Selecting an analysis method depends on the kind of 
data at hand and the purpose of the study. As mentioned above, this research uses a 5-Likert 
scale to rate the constructs against each element. Therefore, the data this research seeks is ordinal 
data.  
This research aims to exploring the different norms of employees with respect to security rules 
and standards and the changing in these norms following a security breach. In addition, it aims to 
explore the relationship between security rules and employee’s norms. Therefore, each grid will 
be analyzed separately, and then the grids will be analyzed in combination in order to compare 
them. 
Since our constructs are not well defined, the content analysis is conducted. In this research, the 
content analysis method that is proposed by Jankowics (2004) is adopted. Jankowics (2004) 
suggested nine steps for the content analysis based on Honey's (1979) method.  
1. Identifying ratings for the overall construct regarding each element.  
2. Calculating the sum of differences for each bipolar construct against the overall 
construct.  
3. Converting the sum of differences for each construct into “ percentage similarity score.”  
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4. Calculating reversed scores for the overall construct.  
5. Converting sum of differences for each construct (from step 4) into percentage similarity 
scores.  
6. Identifying the highest percentage of similarity. 
7. Recording ranking for each highest percentage similarity score in term of high, medium 
or low.  
After the completion of step seven, individual grids are ready for group analysis: 
8. Each construct should be assigned to one of the categories that were generated before 
starting the quantitative analysis. All the information from the previous steps should be 
recorded in spreadsheet tables.  
9. All the tables should be converted into bar charts to show the most important constructs' 
categories. Each chart is related to a subgroup of participants. Participants may be 
categorized into subgroups based on specific criteria. 
After finishing content analysis, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is conducted to examine 
the correlations among the constructs, among the elements and between the constructs and 
elements. In this research, Microsoft Excel 2011 and SPSS Statistics 23 are used to conduct PCA 
analysis. Also, trustworthiness has been considered during the data collection and analysis to 





3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provides an overview of the theory and research methodology that are used in this 
study. It aims to present Repertory Grid technique, which is grounded on the Personal Construct 
Theory, as a mean of investigation in this research. Also, it provides an overview of the different 
alternatives that can be employed when conducting Repertory Grid technique. Selecting between 
the alternatives of the Repertory Grid method depends on the nature and purpose of the research 
topic and the type of data in hand. 
On the other hand, this chapter describes the research design of this study. It provides an 
overview of the Crown Confections company as the unit of analysis in this research. Besides, it 
provides an overview of the two stages of this study. It also explains the RepGrid interview 
(triadic approach), rating approach, coding and categorization, content analysis, and principle 











Chapter 4: Conceptual Definition of the Artifact  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study examines how employees of an organization perceive the security policy of their 
organization and how their perceptions change in response to the occurrence of a security 
incident. The goal of the alpha stage is to develop the alpha version of our artifact (i.e. the 
emerging artifact). The emerging norm-rule compliance RepGrids (i.e. the alpha artifact) are 
continuously tested and validated in order to build the beta artifact (at the beta stage).   
In this chapter, we provide a detailed explanation of the alpha stage process. The alpha stage 
aims to examine people perceptions regarding security policy of their organization and the 
changes in their perception following security incidents. Also, it aims to build an “emerging” 
artifact following Kelly’s Repertory Grid technique that was explained in the previous 
chapter.        
As previously mentioned, the Repertory Grid technique is an interviewing technique, which 
generates data from a set of interviews. The elicited data is represented in two-dimensional grids 
that can be analyzed using qualitative and quantitative methods. Here, elements are the main five 
policy themes in Crown Confections security policy. Thus, the elements will be supplied in this 
study, whereas the constructs will be elicited from one group and supplied to other groups. 
Therefore, this research has adopted a hybrid type of Repertory Grid between fixed RepGrid and 




4.2 Data collection  
The alpha stage of this study was conducted over a period of four months. As previously 
mentioned, the elements are the main five policies in Crown Confections security policy. The 
“supplied” five elements are: 
• Clean desk policy 
• Information security roles and responsibilities 
• Password policy 
• Email policy  
• Remote access policy 
Then, these five elements were used to elicit the constructs. The elicited constructs represent 
employee perceptions regarding the security policy of the organization.  
 
4.2.1 Eliciting Bipolar Constructs  
i. Participants 
A purposive sample was obtained to represent the “expert” group at this stage. This sampling 
technique was used to serve the needs of this study. Purposive sampling helps to mitigate 
research biases and ensure that the sample is more representative (Miles et al., 1994), which 
helps in satisfying the research needs. So, five graduate students were chosen to represent the 
“expert” group who were used to elicit the constructs. Each of the five students has high 
experience with the information systems security, high technical skills or both. Also, they 
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worked or are working in varying types of organizations that have a different level of 
information security. 
ii. Structured interviews and Construct Elicitation 
In this research, RepGrid interviewing technique was adopted to elicit the constructs. The 
RepGrid interview is a qualitative data collection technique to elicit beliefs, thoughts, views and 
perceptions of the participants, which grounded on Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Theory. 
Many studies show how RepGrid interviews should be conducted to ensure the validity of the 
results.  
Five one-to-one RepGrid interviews were conducted with the five “experts” to elicit a set of 
“bipolar” constructs that shows how each participant perceives security policy. Each interview 
was arranged through email contact with each participant. A copy of the Crown Confections 
security policy was sent to each one of the experts before the day of the interview. One or two 
interviews were conducted per day. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes to one and half 
hours. At the beginning of the interview, the Crown Confection company was introduced to the 
interviewee. After each interview, the researcher reviewed the interview script and reflected. It is 
important to mention that a point of saturation was reached after the third interview. That is, the 
fourth and the fifth interviews added no new constructs. However, the interviews were continued 
after the saturation point to ensure that different types of “experts” were covered.  
After clarifying the purpose and background of this research, the process of the traditional 
RepGrid interview (i.e. triadic) was explained to the participants. The interviews involved five 
index cards. Each element was written on one of the cards. The researcher clarified that the 
purpose of the interview was to elicit the participant’s perception regarding each one of the five 
security policies. During each interview, the index cards were offered to the participant in triads 
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(i.e. three cards at a time). The researcher asked the participant to specify which two of the three 
policies are similar and how the third is different. By determining how two policies are similar, 
the researcher can get the construct. On the other hand, obtaining how the third policy differs 
from the other two provides the opposite. The researcher gave the participant some time to think 
before getting her or his response. The researcher repeated this process for many triads. This 
process continued until saturation point was reached. After some “trial and error,” the researcher 
was able to get some “good” constructs. Jankowicz (2004) explains a good construct as “one 
which expresses your interviewee’s meaningfully and precisely, and this is matter of three 
things: (a) a clear contrast (b) appropriate detail, and (c) a clear relationship to the topic in 
question” (Jankowicz, 2004; p.33).    
Each interview was transcribed and reviewed by the corresponding participant to check and 
change if needed. Four of the participants verified the elicited bipolar constructs. One of the 
participants requested some minor changes. The interviews were recorded in case the researcher 
needs clarification for some information in the interviews. After the refinement and validation, a 
set of 26 bipolar constructs was elicited. A RepGrid interview sheet was used to record the 
bipolar constructs elicited from the interviews such that the left-hand column represents the 
construct, and the right-hand column represent the opposite. Figure 4.1 shows a sample of a 
































































This policy is customized / reflects the organization's 
culture 
     
This policy is standard / similar to other organizations 
This policy is at an advanced level / provide high level of 
security / strong 
     
This policy is at a basic level / does not provide high level 
of security / weak 
This policy follows the latest standard for creating policies 
     
This policy does not follow the latest standard for creating 
policies 
This policy shows who is responsible for what 
     
This policy does not show who is responsible for what 
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it 
     
This policy is descriptive / shows only what to do 
This policy is very detailed / explain all the rules in details 
     
This policy is brief and general  
Employees can have the same understanding to this policy 
     
This policy is open to different interpretations 
Removing this policy will affect the level of security in the 
organization 
     
Removing this policy will not affect the level of security 
in the organization 
This policy tells what to do in case of breach 
     
This policy does not tell what to do in case of breach-
preventative 
This policy is simple, clear, and straightforward 
     
This policy is complicated, ambiguous and not 
understandable 
The link between this policy and other policies is available 
and clear 
     
The link between this policy and other policies is not 
available/ not clear 
The purpose of this policy is clear and understandable 
     
The purpose of this policy is not clear  
This policy is easy to remember  
     
This policy is hard to remember  
The consequences of non-compliance to this policy is clear 
     
The consequences of non-compliance are not available / 
not clear 
The consequences of non- compliance to this policy is 
enough 
     
The consequences of non- compliance are not enough  
This policy is complete / includes all the needed rules 
     
This policy is incomplete / missing some rules 
Easy to comply with this policy  
     
Hard to comply with this policy 
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear what it 
covers and what not  
     
The boundary of the policy is not clear / it is not clear 
what it covers and what not 
The cost of following this policy is less than the benefit of 
following it 
     
The cost of following this policy exceeds the benefit of 
following it 
This policy serves the business objectives / goals 
     
This policy does not serve the business objectives / goals 
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an employee) / 
it is important for the security of the organization 
     
This policy does not reflect its importance to me (as an 
employee) / it is not important for the security of the 
organization 
This policy is flexible / less strict 
     
This policy is stricter 
This policy is reasonable and appropriate 
     
This policy is not reasonable 
This policy is written in simple, plain language 
     
This policy includes some technical terminologies that are 
not understandable by all employees 
The technical part of this policy is available 
     
The technical part is missing 
This policy is well-documented / well-structured / precise / 
organized 
     
This policy is not well-documented / not well-structured  
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and robust  
     
Overall, this policy is neither comprehensive nor robust  




4.2.2 Rating the Elements 
The elicited bipolar constructs needed to be rated against each of the five elements. The 
participants rated the constructs using the five-Likert scale, such that five represents the construct 
and one represents the opposite. The participants rated the elements based on how they perceive 
these elements.     
i. The Participants  
A group of 57 participants (different from the “expert” group) was grouped into five sub-groups 
in accordance with the SSE-CMM five levels. That is, the first group consists of 11 participants 
and represents an organization with the first level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. performed informally). 
The second group consists of 8 participants and represents an organization with the second level 
of the SSE-CMM (i.e. planned and tracked). The third group consists of 12 participants and 
represents an organization with the third level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. well defined). The fourth 
group consists of 9 participants and represents an organization with the fourth level of the SSE-
CMM (i.e. qualitatively controlled). The fifth group consists of 17 participants and represents an 
organization with the fifth level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. continuously improving). Each group was 
given one version of the five security policy versions that were developed in accordance with the 
SSE-CMM levels. The five versions of the security policy were created based on the SANS 
Institute Information Security Policy Templates (SANS, 2015). Also, some demographic 
information was collected for each participant, including age and experience.            
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ii. The Rating Process  
The participants rated the bipolar constructs using a five-points Likert scale. A five-points Likert 
scale was chosen for this study because Jankowicz (2004) considered it as “current practice” (p. 
37). Also, a five-points Likert scale is easier to analyze than higher scales (Stewart et al., 1981).   
Before starting the process of rating the constructs, the overall bipolar construct was supplied. 
The overall construct should be broad so that it can be applied to all elements. Each participant 
should rate the overall bipolar construct against each element using the five-point Likert scale. 
The overall bipolar constructs were:  
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and robust -- Overall, this policy is neither comprehensive nor robust 
The resulted data from rating the overall construct is useful in comparing different grids using 
Honey’s (1979) content analysis (as shown in the next section). 
For each group of the participants, the researcher introduced the virtual company (Crown 
Confections) and provided the corresponding security policy version to the participants. The first 
group was given a security policy with the level 1 SSE-CMM (i.e. performed informally), the 
second group was given a security policy that is at the second level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. 
planned and tracked) and so on. Then, the researcher asked the participants to rate the constructs 
using a five-point Likert scale. All participants rated the same constructs that were elicited from 
the “expert” group in addition to the supplied overall construct. A total of 57 grids resulted from 
the first round of the rating process.    
After the first rating, the researcher “conceptually” introduced a security breach. The participants 
were given time to think about that security breach and the security policy after the occurrence of 
the breach. Five security breaches were used in this study such that each group had a different 
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breach. Table 4.1 shows the scenarios for the five security breaches introduced for the five 
groups. 
Table 4.1: the scenarios for the five security breaches that were introduced for the five groups. 
The Scenario The group 
Last week Crown Confections suffered a security breach. An insider logged into Crown 
Confections server using SFTP and downloaded the database file. What is your first reaction to the 
breach and how would you deal with this kind of a breach? 
Level 1 group 
Last week Crown Confections suffered a security breach. There was a “Phishing” E-mail that was 
sent to System Administrator, requesting a username/password for access to the database.  Then, 
someone logged into Crown Confections server using SFTP and downloaded the database file. 
What is your first reaction to the breach and how would you deal with this kind of a breach? 
Level 2 group 
Last week Crown Confections suffered a security breach. An insider obtained Physical access to 
System Administrator’s computer to install Keylogger hardware and/or install malware 
keylogger/spyware.  Once Administrator logged into the system, credentials were stolen, and a 
login to the system occurred with username/password to steal the database. What is your first 
reaction to the breach and how would you deal with this kind of a breach? 
Level 3 group 
Last week Crown Confections suffered a security breach. An employee copied data on sticky notes 
while taking Telephone orders. The customers’ information on those sticky notes was stolen. What 
is your first reaction to the breach and how would you deal with this kind of a breach? 
Level 4 group 
Last week Crown Confections suffered a security breach. An employee did a DDoS attack, which 
is shutting down the system during unmonitored periods. What is your first reaction to the breach 
and how would you deal with this kind of a breach?  
Level 5 group 
 
After introducing the security breach, the participants were asked to re-rate the same bipolar 





4.3 Data Analysis and Results 
In this study, the data was analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. That is, data was 
analyzed using qualitative data coding and categorization and quantitative content analysis, in 
addition to the statistical analysis (Jankowicz, 2004).  
Indeed, the quantitative data analysis method should be selected based on the type of data 
generated from the RepGrid rating (Bell, 1988). The type of data at hand should be defined 
before deciding on techniques for the quantitative data analysis. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the RepGrids can generate different types of data. The RepGrid data can be rankings, 
ratings or different kinds of scores. The data in this study was generated through rating the grids 
to examine the relationship between the elements and constructs. The ratings that were created 
from the grids are integers ranging from one to five. Thus, this study uses an interval scale as 
measurement scale to generate interval data. An interval scale was adopted because the distance 
between two consecutive points is equal.    
The data of the grids are close to being normally distributed and satisfy homoscedasticity. Also, 
the relationship between elements and constructs is linear. These aspects represent the 
assumption of principal components analysis. On the other hand, this study adopts Honey’s 
(1979) content analysis to analyze the bipolar constructs. For this kind of analysis, type of data is 
not an issue.      
Many available software packages can be used to analyze RepGrids. Some of these packages 
such as SPSS statistics, SAS and MATLAB are reliable in performing principal components 
analysis, cluster analysis, and other kinds of statistical analysis. On the other hand, some of the 
software packages are dedicated to elicit and/or analyze Repertory Grids such as Rep V, 
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WEBGRID, IDIOGRID and GRIDSTAT. For this study, Excel 2011 and SPSS 23 were used to 
analyze the generated grids.        
 
4.3.1 Core Categorization 
Before performing content analysis, we need to categorize the bipolar constructs (i.e. the 
perceptions of security policy). Eliciting perceptions regarding security policy from the “expert” 
group previously resulted in 26 bipolar constructs. These constructs need to be categorized using 
the core categorization process to be more manageable (Jankowicz, 2004).  
The core categorization process is important before content analysis so the results can have more 
meaning (Jankowicz, 2004). First, a set of themes or categories needs to be developed. There are 
various techniques that can be used to develop the categories or themes. The researcher can use 
pre-existing categories that are available in the literature or from the international standards. 
However, most of the literature and standards do not provide categories for perceptions regarding 
the security policy. In such cases, Jankowicz (2004) suggests using the “bootstrapping” 
technique to generate categories in accordance to the bipolar constructs. The “bootstrapping” 
technique has been adopted in this study to categorize the perceptions regarding the security 
policy.  
The “bootstrapping” process started with examining each elicited construct. Each construct is 
compared with the other constructs. If a construct is in some way similar to the first construct, 
the two constructs are placed under the same category. On the other hand, if a construct is 
different from the first one, the construct should be placed in a separate category. The rest of the 
constructs are compared with each category and placed under the appropriate category. If the 
construct does not fit under any category, a new category should be created. This process is 
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continued until all constructs are classified. The unclassified constructs are placed under one 
category called “miscellaneous,” which should not include more that 5% of the constructs 
(Jankowicz, 2004).  
After generating the first version of the categories, a reliability check was performed with an 
information security expert. The expert performed a crosschecking to verify the constructs 
categorization. The information security expert has high-level knowledge and experience with 
information security. The expert was given the categories and the constructs, then asked to 
approve or change the category for each construct. The expert was able to create a new category 
if needed. Few changes were made to the first version of the categorization. The changes were 
discussed with the expert, and the final categorization was generated. Three main categories or 
themes were generated from the core categorization process: policy form, policy content, and 
policy process. The constructs that fall under policy form category represent 30.8% of the 
constructs. The policy content category comprises 46.2% of the constructs. The policy process 
category contains 23.1% of the constructs. These categories will be used in the content analysis 
discussed below.   
 
4.3.2 Content Analysis 
This section discusses the process of content analysis that was performed for the 57 grids. The 57 
grids were sub-grouped into five groups (as previously mentioned) in accordance with the SSE-
CMM five levels.  Each of these groups was subject to the content analysis as one group in 
addition to different subgroups of the participants to compare perceptions of different groups of 
participants. Each group of the five groups was sub-grouped once based on the age range, and 
once based on experience.    
	 76	
The content analysis method adopted in this study was Honey’s (1979) content analysis, which is 
described in Jankowicz (2004) book. One advantage of this method over the other methods is 
that it does not lose any construct rating through performing averaging of the ratings.   
Content analysis process was performed as follows: 
Step 1: identify ratings for the overall construct regarding each element. The ratings of overall 
construct reflect the overall perception of each participant. Figure 4.2 shows a sample grid with 
the overall construct rating rated as 5, 4, 4, 5, and 2. 
Step 2: Calculate the sum of differences for each bipolar construct against the overall construct. 
For example, the first construct (in the first row) has ratings as 3, 4, 3, 4, 2, whereas the overall 
construct has ratings as 5, 4, 4, 5, and 2. Then, the difference between each two corresponding 
ratings was identified. That is, we identified the difference between the rating of the first 
construct against the first element and the overall construct against the first element and so on. 
After that, the differences were added to get the sum of differences, which was equal to 4 for the 
first row. This number is then written under the column “sum of differences” in the first row 































































































































This policy is customized / reflect the 
organization's culture 3 4 3 4 2
This policy is standard / similar to other 
organizations G2 4 88.89 10 72.22 H
This policy is at an advanced level / provide 
high level of security / strong 4 5 3 4 3
This policy is at a basic level / does not 
provide high level of security / weak G2 5 86.11 11 69.44 M
This policy follows the latest standard for 
creating policies 3 4 4 3 2
This policy does not follow the latest standard 
for creating policies G1 4 88.89 10 72.22 H
This policy shows who is responsible for what 4 5 3 3 3 This policy does not shows who is responsible for what G2 6 83.33 10 72.22 L
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it 3 2 2 3 2 This policy is descriptive / shows only what to do G2 8 77.78 6 83.33 L
This policy is very detailed / explain all the 
rules in details 3 4 3 2 2 This policy is brief and general G1 6 83.33 8 77.78 L
Employees can have the same understanding to 
this policy 3 4 3 4 4 This policy is open to different interpretations G2 6 83.33 8 77.78 L
Removing this policy will affect the level of 
security in the organization 3 3 4 4 4
Removing this policy will not affect the level 
of security in the organization G2 6 83.33 8 77.78 L
This policy tells what to do in case of breach 3 3 1 1 1 This policy does not tell what to do in case of breach-preventative G3 11 69.44 7 80.56 L
This policy is simple, clear and straightforward 4 3 1 3 4 This policy is complicated, ambiguous and not understandable G1 9 75.00 7 80.56 L
The link between this policy and other policies 
is available and clear 1 1 1 2 1
The link between this policy and other policies 
is not available/ not clear G3 14 61.11 6 83.33 L
The purpose of this policy is clear and 
understandable 4 4 2 4 4 The purpose of this policy is not clear G1 6 83.33 8 77.78 L
This policy is easy to remember 3 1 1 3 4 This policy is hard to remember G2 12 66.67 6 83.33 L
The consequences of non-compliance to this 
policy is clear 3 3 3 3 5
The consequences of non-compliance is not 
available / not clear G3 9 75.00 7 80.56 L
The consequences of non- compliance to this 
policy is enough 2 2 1 1 4
The consequences of non- compliance is not 
enough G3 14 61.11 2 94.44 H
This policy is complete / includes all the 
needed rules 2 2 1 1 1 This policy is incomplete / missing some rules G3 13 63.89 5 86.11 M
Easy to comply with this policy 2 2 3 2 2 Hard to comply with this policy G2 9 75.00 5 86.11 M
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear 
what it cover and what not 3 2 3 3 4
The boundary of the policy is not clear / it is 
not clear what it cover and what not G1 9 75.00 5 86.11 M
The cost of following this policy is less than 
the benefit of following it 2 2 5 2 2
The cost of following this policy exceeds the 
benefit of following it G2 9 75.00 7 80.56 L
This policy serves the business objectives / 
goals 5 4 2 5 5
This policy does not serve the business 
objectives / goals G2 5 86.11 11 69.44 M
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an 
employee) / it is important for the security of 
the organization
5 2 2 4 4
This policy does not reflect its importance to 
me (as an employee) / it is not important for 
the security of the organization
G2 7 80.56 7 80.56 L
This policy is flexible / less strict 4 1 1 4 3 This policy is more strict G2 9 75.00 9 75.00 L
This policy is reasonable and appropriate 4 3 1 4 5 This policy is not reasonable G3 9 75.00 9 75.00 L
This policy is written in simple, plain language 5 1 1 5 5
This policy includes some technical 
terminologies that are not understandable by 
all employees
G1 9 75.00 11 69.44 L
The technical part of this policy is available 4 5 5 2 2 The technical part is missing G3 6 83.33 12 66.67 L
This policy is well-documented / well-
structured / precise / organized 5 3 3 3 3
This policy is not well-documented / not well-
structured G3 5 86.11 9 75.00 M
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and 
robust 5 4 4 5 2
Overall, this policy is neither comprehensive 
nor robust 
Overall reverse 1 2 2 1 4
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Step 3: Convert the sum of differences for each construct into “percentage similarity score.” 
Thus, the researcher can compare grids that have a different number of constructs. A “look-up 
table” can be used to extract “percentage similarity score” rather than calculate it manually. 
Jankowics (2004) provided a method for calculating “percentage similarity look-up” that can be 
used here. In this study, the “percentage similarity score” was calculated using the following 
formula (extracted from Jankowics (2004)):  
100-{[SD/((LR-1) *C)] *100}. 
where SD is the sum of difference, LR is the largest rating possible (i.e. 5 in this study), and C is 
the number of constructs (i.e. 26 in this study). 
The “percentage similarity score” was calculated for each row (i.e. bipolar construct). The result 
from this calculation was written under “% of similarity” column (refer to figure 4.2). For 
example, “percentage similarity score” for the first row is 88.89% (refer to figure 4.2).  
Step 4: “Reversed” scores should be calculated for the “overall” construct. For example, in five-
points scale 1 should be converted into 5, 2 into 4, 3 stays the same. The rule of thumb for 
reversing score is that if the researcher uses an n-points scale, then each score should be 
subtracted from n+1 to reverse it (Jankowics, 2004). After reversing the overall construct scores, 
the sum of the differences should be calculated against the “reversed” scores. For example, the 
“reverse” score for the grid in figure 4.2 was 1, 2, 2, 1, and 4.  The “reversed” scores were 
recorded directly under overall construct row, and the sum of differences for the “reversed” score 
was written under “reverse sum of differences” column (refer to figure 4.2). In our example, the 
“reverse sum of differences” for the first row was 10 (refer to figure 4.2). 
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Step 5: Convert the reverse sum of differences for each construct (from step 4) into percentage 
similarity scores following the same way in step 3. The result from this calculation was written 
under “reverse % of similarity” column (refer to figure 4.2). For example, the reverse percentage 
similarity score for the first row was 72.22% (refer to figure 4.2). 
Step 6: The highest percentage of similarity should be identified. That is, the highest percentage 
between the two “percentage similarity scores” (from step 3 and step 5) should be identified. The 
number highlighted in yellow represented the highest percentage of similarity (refer to figure 
4.2). 
Step 7: Record the ranking for each “highest” percentage similarity score in term of high (H), 
medium (M) or low (L). These rankings reflect the correlation between each bipolar construct 
and the “overall” construct. These similarity scores were looked at as a group such that third of 
them are ranked as H, the next third as M, and the last third as L, per figure 4. 
By completing step seven, individual grids were ready for group analysis. The following section 
focuses on multiple grids analysis that involves comparing different grids together.  
Step 8: Each construct should be assigned to one of the categories that were generated in the 
previous section before beginning the quantitative analysis. All the information from the 
previous steps was recorded in spreadsheet tables. The category was recorded under “group” 
column (refer to figure 4.2). G1 refers to the constructs related to the form of the policy; G2 
refers to the constructs related to the process of the policy and G3 refers to the constructs related 
to the content of the policy.    
Step 9: Each of the tables should be converted into a bar chart to show the most important 
constructs categories, which is the most significant security policy aspect that should be 
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considered when creating or changing security policy. Each chart was related to a subgroup of 
participants. Participants can be categorized into subgroups based on specific criteria. In this 
study, the participants were categorized in accordance with the SSE-CMM levels. Then each 
group was sub-grouped twice based on gender and experience.    
The researcher needs to create a table for each subgroup of participants. One chart can be created 
for all participants. This chart shows the percentage of constructs in each subgroup or category. 
Each bar represents a construct category and shows high, medium, and low correlations between 
constructs within that category and the overall construct. The most important category is the one 
that with the highest bar. Another way of interpreting the charts is by considering the categories 
that have the highest part of the bar that shows high correlation. That is, the researcher should 
focus only on constructs that have high correlations and consider the ones with the highest 
“high” part of the bar as the most important construct categories.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
Figure 4.3 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 5 participants. The chart shows the 
assignment of the constructs’ categories in a form of a percentage of the total number of 
constructs in each group rated as high, medium, or low.  
Each bar shows the high, medium, and low correlations between the constructs in each group and 
the overall comprehension and robustness of the policy. As seen in the chart, the most significant 
security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process since it has the tallest 
bar among the groups. That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security 
policy process and how they should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The 
next most significant constructs are those fall under the policy form, which focuses on the 
documentation and the core components of the policy.  Another way to interpret the result is to 
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focus on only the height of the highly correlated constructs rather than focusing on the 
accumulated height of high, medium, and low correlated constructs. Here, both ways give the 
same result about which category considered the most significant construct group. However, it 
gives a different result regarding the next significant group. Considering the later method, the 
second most significant group is the policy content. However, the percentage of the highly 
correlated constructs for policy form and policy content are almost the same at 13.2% and 12.9% 
respectively.  In this study, we adopted the second method for interpreting the chart, which 




Figure 4.3: Content analysis of the total group of level 5 participants before the breach. 
 
The previous results show the perception of level five participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our case study before introducing the security breach. The same analysis was 
conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the 
security breach. Figure 4.4 depicts a bar chart for the total group of level 5 participants after 
introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions are 
those related to security policy process. That is, the participants considered the constructs related 
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to the security policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the security 
policy. The next most significant constructs were those fall under the policy content.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Content analysis of the total group of level 5 participants after the breach. 
Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the 
occurrence of the breach was very close. The small variance between the two results could be 
due to the maturity level of the policy that was introduced to the group. This group had a security 
policy version with the highest maturity level among the other versions of the policy.  
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
Figure 4.5 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 4 participants. This chart shows that 
the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. 
That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process and how 
it should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most significant 




Figure 4.5: Content analysis of the total group of level 4 participants before the breach. 
 
The previous results show the perception of level four participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our experiment before introducing the security breach. The same analysis 
was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the 
security breach. Figure 4.6 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 4 participants after 
introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions 
were those related to security policy process. That is, the participants considered the constructs 
related to the security policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the 
security policy. The next most significant constructs were those fall under the policy content.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Content analysis of the total group of level 4 participants after the breach. 
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Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the 
occurrence of the breach was very close. The maturity level of the policy that was introduced for 
the participants may affect the difference between the two results. An interesting observation is 
that the number of constructs that were seen as low significance was decreased. For example, 
4.9% of the constructs under the policy form group (G1) were considered to be of low 
significance before introducing the breach. However, after introducing the breach the percentage 
change to 0.8%.    
• SSE-CMM Level Three 
Figure 4.7 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 3 participants. The chart shows that the 
most significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. That is, 
the participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process and how it should 
be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most significant constructs 
were those fall under policy form. However, the percentage of the highly correlated constructs 
for policy form and policy content were 10.2% and 11.7%, respectively.   
 
 




The previous results show the perception of level three participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our experiment before introducing the security breach. The same analysis 
was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the 
security breach. Figure 4.8 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 3 participants after 
introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions 
were those related to security policy process and content. That is, the participants considered the 
constructs related to the security policy process, how it should be, and the content of the policy 
as the most significant aspects of security policy.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Content analysis of the total group of level 3 participants after the breach. 
 
 
Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after introducing 
the breach has been changed. Comparing figure 4.7 and figure 4.8, we realize that the number of 
constructs in G3 considered highly significant increases from 10.1% (before the breach) to 




• SSE-CMM Level Two 
Figure 4.9 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 2 participants. As it appears in the 
chart, the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy 
process. That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process 
and how they should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most 
significant constructs are those fall under the policy content. The percentage of the highly 
correlated constructs for policy process and policy content are 13.4% and 10.6%, respectively.   
 
 
Figure 4.9: Content analysis of the total group of level 2 participants before the breach. 
 
 
The previous results show the perception of level two participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our experiment before introducing the security breach. The same analysis 
was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the 
security breach. Figure 4.10 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 2 participants after 
introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions 
were those related to security policy content. That is, the participants considered the constructs 
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related to the content of the policy as the most significant aspects of the security policy, followed 




Figure 4.10: Content analysis of the total group of level 2 participants after the breach. 
 
Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after introducing 
the breach has been changed. By comparing figures 4.9 and 4.10, we can realize that the number 
of constructs considered highly significant increases from 6.9% (before the breach) to 8.8% 
(after the breach) in the policy form group. Similarly, the number of constructs considered highly 
significant increases from 13.4% (before the breach) to 13.8% (after the breach) in the policy 
process group and from 10.6% (before the breach) to 15.3% (after the breach) in the policy 
content group.   
• SSE-CMM Level One 
Figure 4.11 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 1 participants. As we can see from the 
chart, the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy 
process. That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process 
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and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most 
significant constructs were those fall under policy form.  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Content analysis of the total group of level 1 participants before the breach. 
 
 
The previous results show the perception of level one participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our experiment before introducing the security breach. The same analysis 
was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the 
security breach. Figure 4.12 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 1 participants after 
introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions 
were those related to security policy process. That is, the participants considered the constructs 
related to the security policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the 
security policy, followed by the constructs related to the policy form. An interesting observation 
here is that the number of constructs that considered as highly significant constructs in the policy 
process group was increased from 14.1% (before the breach) to 18.8% (after the breach). On the 
other hand, the number of constructs that considered as highly significant constructs in the policy 
process group was decreased from 13.1% (before the breach) to 10.8% (after the breach) in the 
policy form group. Similarly, the number of constructs that considered as highly significant 
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constructs in the policy process group was decreased from 6.4% (before the breach) to 5.4% 
(after the breach) in the policy content group. 
 
Figure 4.12: Content analysis of the total group of level 1 participants after the breach. 
 
To sum up, before introducing the security breach, the five groups of the participants agreed on 
that the constructs related to policy process were the most significant aspects of the security 
policy. However, they disagreed on which group was the next significant group. In this study, we 
considered the second method to interpret the bar charts. Thus, level five, level three, and level 
one groups agreed on was that the second most significant group is the policy form whereas the 
rest of the groups agreed on that the second most significant group was the policy content.   
After introducing the security breach, four of the five groups agreed on that the constructs related 
to policy process were the most significant aspects of security policy. Level three participants 
perceived the constructs related to policy process and policy content as the most significant 
aspects of the security policy. However, the five groups perceptions were different regarding the 
next significant group. Thus, level five, level one and level three groups agreed on that the 
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second most significant group was the policy form, whereas the rest of the groups agreed on that 
the second most significant group was the policy content.  
Comparing the results for all the groups before and after the introduction of security breach 
shows the changes that occur in the participant perceptions regarding the security policy of the 
Crown Confection Company. Here, the comparison was conducted for the group as a whole 
before and after the breach.  
Another comparison was performed to see how the perception of each person changes after 
introducing the security breach. Figure 4.13 shows a sample of five participants from the five 
levels and how the perceptions of each one changed after introducing the security breach. 
The sample in figure 4.13 was selected randomly. Each chart represents one of the participants in 
one of the SSE-CMM five levels. In the charts the much two points from each color get closer, 
the much the perception of the participant get closer before and after the breach. For example, if 
we take the level 1 participant, we may conclude that her/his perception regarding the five 
security policy themes was very different. On the other hand, if we consider the level 4 
participant, we can see that her/his perception regarding acceptable use policy, email policy, and 
remote access policy was different before and after the breach, whereas her/his perception 
regarding information security roles and responsibilities policy and password policy was very 
similar. To sum up, the perception of the participants after the breach was different from their 
perception before the breach. Some of them had some similarities in their perceptions regarding 
some of the policy themes, as we see in the example above. However, no one had an identical or 




Figure 4.13: A sample of five participants from the five levels and how the perception of each of them changed after 
introducing the security breach (1=acceptable use policy, 2=Info. Sec. roles and responsibilities, 3=password policy, 
4=email policy, and 5=remote access policy). 
 
 
Also, a comparison was conducted to compare the participant’s perception within each group. 
For example, figure 4.14 shows how participants from the same group had different perception 



















































































Figure 4.14: Difference in the participant’s perception regarding the security policy. 
 
 
Each colored line in the figure 4.14 represents a participant’s perception. This figure shows how 
participants had some differences in their perceptions regarding policy. When two points on two 
lines intersect, that means the two participants have the same perception regarding the respected 
policy. As the two points diverge, perceptions differ. For example, P1 and P5 had the same 
perception regarding the E-mail policy; however, their perceptions were quite different regarding 




The same analysis was conducted for all of the groups before and after the introduction of the 
security breach. The results were consistent with the previous results. The participants in each 
group hold different perceptions regarding the security policy. That difference in their perception 
may be because of the different understanding of the same security policy. People in an 
organization can understand the same security policy differently because of the differences in the 
people’s norms and values. A person has a different psychological process that he or she can use 
to understand the world around her/him (Kelly, 1963). 
It is hard to link these results to the previous studies because (to our knowledge) no study 
investigated the people perceptions regarding security policy. For example, Siponen and Iivari 
(2006) conducted a study that shows how various normative theories can influence the success of 
the security policy. They emphasize that some exceptional situations such as unexpected 
business opportunities may require a violation to security policy. Goel and Chengalur-Smith 
(2010) propose a metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy. They argue that breadth, 
clarity, and brevity are the three dimensions that could be used to measure how well a policy is 
documented. Their paper mainly focuses on the form of the security policy and ignores other 
aspects such as content and process of the policy, which may play a role in the success of a 
security policy.   
Similar content analysis has been conducted for different sub-groups to show how various sub-
groups of the participants perceived the security policy. In this study, participants were mainly 
grouped into five groups in accordance with the SSE-CMM five levels. Then, each of the five 
groups was subcategorized once based on the participants’ age and once based on participant’s 
experience. The content analysis is important when analyzing Repertory Grids. Many researchers 
have employed content analysis before doing any quantitative analysis. 
	 94	
4.3.2.1 Security Policy Perception and Age  
in this section, the content analysis is conducted on the groups that were categorized based on 
participant age. Each group of the participants in the SSE-CMM levels was categorized based on 
the age of the participants of the corresponding group. Then, content analyses were conducted 
for each sub-group.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
The participants of this group were sub-grouped based on their ages. They were grouped into 
three groups: participants whose ages were between 18 and 25 years old; participants whose ages 
were between 26 and 30 years old; and participants who were older that 30 years old. Figure 4.15 
shows how the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived 
by participants whose ages were between 18 and 25 years old before and after the occurrence of 
the security breach.  
 
 
Figure 4.15: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age was between 18 and 25 years old (before and after the breach).  
     
 
Figure 4.15 shows the bar chart for the level 5 participants whose ages were between 18 and 25 
years old. These charts show how this group perceived the security policy before the breach and 
how their perception changed after introducing the breach. According to the charts, the level 5 
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participants whose age was between 18 and 25 years old perceive that the most significant 
security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. That is, the participants 
considered the constructs related to the security policy process and how it should be as the most 
significant aspects of the security policy. The second predominant perceptions were those related 
to policy form. 
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the occurrence of the breach was very close. However, the number of constructs that were 
considered as high, medium, or low differed after introducing the breach. For example, 25.9% of 
the constructs that fall under G2 group are considered highly important before introducing the 
breach. However, this percentage changed to 17% after the breach.  
The same results were reached from the level 5 participants whose age was between 26 and 30 
years old as it appears in figure 4.16.  This group of the participants perceives that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The 
perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the breach was very close. 
However, the number of the constructs that were considered as high, medium, or low changed 





Figure 4.16: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 26 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Lastly, the third group of level 5 participants who were older than 30 years old had very different 
perceptions of the policy before and after the breach, as can be drawn from figure 4.17.  Before 
introducing the security breach, this group of the participants perceived that the most important 
security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process, whereas the policy 
content and the policy form groups had the same importance. After introducing the breach, this 
group of the participants perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to security policy form, while the policy process has the least importance.  
 
 
Figure 4.17: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 





To summarize, from the analysis above we can see that the people who work for organizations 
that have level 5 information security policy believed that the policy process was the most 
important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security 
policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they 
have faced.   
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
The participants of this group were sub-grouped based on their age. They were grouped into 
three groups: participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old; participants whose age 
was between 31 and 40 years old; and participants who were older than 40 years old. Figure 4.18 
shows how the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived 
by participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old before and after the occurrence of 
the security breach.  
 
 
Figure 4.18: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach). 
     
 
Figure 4.18 shows how the participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old perceive the 
security policy before the breach and how their perception differs after introducing the breach. 
According to the charts, this group perceived that the constructs that related to security policy 
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process as the most significant security policy perceptions before and after the introduction of the 
security breach. Here, the perception of this group of participants regarding the security policy 
before and after the breach was mostly the same. However, the number of the constructs that got 
high, medium, or low importance changed after introducing the breach. For example, 25.9% of 
the constructs that are related to the G2 group are considered highly important before introducing 
the breach. However, this percentage changed to 17.6% after the breach.  
The same results were reached from the level 4 participants whose age was between 31 and 40 
years old as it is shown in figure 4.19.  This group of the participants perceived that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The 
perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the breach was almost the 
same. However, the number of the constructs with high, medium, or low importance level 
changed after introducing the breach (refer to figure 4.19). 
 
 
Figure 4.19: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 30 and 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
Finally, the level 4 participants who were older than 40 years old had very similar perceptions of 
the policy before and after the breach especially for the constructs related to the G1 and G2 
groups as can be drawn from figure 4.20. However, for constructs related to the G3 group, the 
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number of constructs that were perceived as highly significant dramatically increased from 3.7% 
(before the breach) to 18.5% (after the breach).   
 
 
Figure 4.20: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
To summarize, from the analysis above we can see that the people who work for organizations 
that have level 4 information security policy believed that the policy process was the most 
important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security 
policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they 
have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Three 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups; participants whose age was 
between 20 and 30 years old, participants whose age was between 31 and 40 years old and 
participants who were older than 40 years old. Figure 4.21 shows how the five main policy 
themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by participants whose age was 





Figure 4.20: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
     
 
Figure 4.21 shows how the participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old perceived 
the security policy before and how their perception differs after introducing the breach. 
According to the charts, this group perceived that the constructs related to security policy process 
to be the most significant security policy perceptions before and after the introduction of the 
security breach.  
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the occurrence of the breach was very close. However, the number of the constructs related 
to the G2 group that were considered as high, medium, or low important changed after 
introducing the breach. For example, 19.4% of the constructs that are related to the G2 group 
were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage 
changed to 17.6% after the breach.  
Although, before the breach level 3 participants whose age was between 31 and 40 years old (as 
it is shown in figure 4.22) perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to security policy process. After the breach, the perception of this group was 
changed. They perceived the constructs related to the policy content as the highest significant 
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group. The perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the breach 
changed, per figure 4.22.  
 
 
Figure 4.22: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 30 and 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
The same results were drawn from the level 3 participants who were older than 40 years old. 
Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions are those 
related to security policy process. After the breach, the perception of this group changed. They 
perceive the constructs related to the policy content as the highest significant group (refer to 
figure 4.23). In general, the number of constructs that were rated as “high” significant in all of 
the three groups increased after the occurrence of the security breach.  
 
Figure 4.23: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 





To summarize, the analysis above shows that people who work for organizations with a level 3 
information security policy believed that the policy process is the most important aspect that 
should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. However, their 
perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Two 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants whose age was 
between 18 and 25 years old; participants whose age was between 26 and 35 years old; and 
participants who were older than 35 years old. Figure 4.24 shows how the five main policy 
themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by participants whose age was 
between 18 and 25 years old before and after the occurrence of the security breach.  
 
 
Figure 4.24: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 18 and 25 years old (before and after the breach).  
     
 
As can be seen from figure 4.24, the participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old 
perceive that the constructs related to security policy content. Here, the perception of this group 
of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach was very close. 
However, the number of the constructs related to each group that was considered as high, 
medium, or low important changed after introducing the breach. For example, 12.9% of the 
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constructs that are related to the G3 group are considered highly important before introducing the 
breach. However, this percentage changed to 16.7% after the breach.  
The level 2 participants whose age was between 31 and 40 years old had different perception 
regarding the security policy. This group perceived that the most important security policy 
perceptions were those related to security policy process. The perception of this group of the 
participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach was very similar. However, 
the number of constructs that were perceived as highly significant in all of the groups increased 
after the occurrence of the breach (refer to figure 4.25). For example, 3.7% of the constructs that 
related to the G1 group were considered the highest significant before introducing the breach. 
After introducing the breach, this percentage changed to 16.7%.  
 
 
Figure 4.25: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 26 and 35 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Finally, different results were drawn from the level 2 participants who were older than 35 years 
old. Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to security policy process. After the breach, the perception of this group changed. 
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They then perceive the constructs related to both the policy process and policy content as the 
highest significant (refer to figure 4.26).   
 
 
Figure 4.26: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 35 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
To summarize, the analysis above shows that people who was older than 35 years and who work 
for organizations that have level 2 information security policy believed that the policy process 
was the most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or 
updating security policy. However, their perception was not stable, being affected by the security 
incidents respondents have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level One 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants whose age was 
between 20 and 30 years old; participants whose age was between 31 and 40 years old; and 
participants who were older than 40 years old. Figure 4.27 shows how the five main policy 
themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by participants whose age was 





Figure 4.27: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
     
 
This chart shows how the participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old perceived the 
security policy before and how their perception differed after introducing the breach. According 
to the charts, this group perceived that the constructs related to security policy process were the 
most significant security policy perceptions before and after the introduction of the security 
breach.  
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the breach was very similar. However, the number of the constructs that were considered as 
high, medium, or low important changed after introducing the breach. For example, 15.3% of the 
constructs that are related to the G2 group are considered highly important before introducing the 
breach. However, this percentage changed to 21.7% after the breach.  
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants whose age was between 31 and 40 
years old (as it is shown in figure 4.28). Before the breach, this group perceived that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy form. After the 
breach, the perception of this group was different. They perceive the constructs related to the 
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policy process to be the highest significant. The perceptions of this group regarding the security 
policy before and after the breach differed (refer to figure 4.28).  
 
 
Figure 4.28: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 30 and 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants who were older than 40 years. Before 
the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related 
to security policy form. After the breach, they perceived the constructs related to the policy 
process as the highest significant ones (refer to figure 4.29). Generally, the number of constructs 
that were perceived as the highest significant in all of the groups changed after the occurrence of 
the breach. With the G1 group, the percentage changed from 14.8% to 9.3%. For the G2 group, 
the percentage changed from 3.7% to 20.4%. Finally, for the G3 group, the percentage changed 





Figure 4.29: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
 
From the analysis above we can observe that people who was older than 40 years old and who 
work for organizations that have level 1 information security policy believed that the policy form 
was the most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or 
updating security policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the 
security incidents they have faced.  
To sum up, examining the five groups with the age sub-grouping shows how the perceptions of 
the participants in each group were different before and after introducing the security breach. 
That is, the perception of the participants regarding which constructs group was the highest 
significant one was different before and after the breach. For some of the groups, they perceived 
the same constructs group as the most important group before and after the breach. In this case, 
the change in their perception was not regarding the constructs group that perceived as the 
highest important, but it was regarding the number of the constructs within the constructs group 
that perceived as high, low or medium important. For example, the level 2 participants whose 
age was between 31 and 40 years perceived the policy process as the most significant construct 
group before and after the breach. However, the percentage of constructs that were rated as 
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highly important changed from 18.5% to 25.9%, the percentage of constructs that were rated as a 
medium important change from 22.2% to 12.9% and the percentage of constructs that were rated 
as the least important change from 3.7% to 5.6% after the breach. It is important to point out to 
that the perceptions of the participants after introducing the breach is not necessarily the right 
perception. That is, the occurrence of the breach does not correct the perception; it only changes 
the participants’ perceptions.    
  
4.3.2.2 Security Policy Perception and Experience   
The next step was to conduct the content analysis on the groups that were categorized based on 
the experience of the participants. After categorizing the participants into five groups based on 
the SSE-CMM five levels, each of the groups was categorized based on the experience of the 
participants. Then, the content analysis was conducted for each sub-group.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
The participants of this group were sub-grouped into three groups based on their experience: 
participants with less than 5 years of experience, participants who had between 5 to 10 years of 
experience and participants who had more than 10 years of experience. Figure 4.30 shows how 
the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who had less than 5 years of experience before and after the occurrence of the 





Figure 4.30: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
     
The charts in figure 4.30 show the level 5 participants who had less than 5 years of experience. 
These charts show how this group perceived the security policy before the breach and how their 
perception changed after introducing the breach. According to the charts, the participants in this 
group perceived that the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process. That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security 
policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy.  
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the breach was very similar. However, the number of the constructs that were considered as 
high, medium, or low has been changed after introducing the breach. For example, 14.2% of the 
constructs that fall under G2 group were rated as highly important before introducing the breach. 
However, this percentage changed to 19.2% after the occurrence of the breach.  
The same results were reached from the level 5 participants who had between 5 to 10 years of 
experience as it appears in figure 4.31.  This group perceives that perceptions that related to the 
security policy process were the most important security policy perceptions. Their perception 
regarding the security policy before and after the breach was similar. However, the number of 
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the constructs that were considered as high, medium, or low important changed after introducing 
the breach (refer to figure 4.31). 
 
 
Figure 4.31: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have between 5 to 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Also, the third group of the level 5 participants who had more than 10 years of experience had 
similar perceptions of the policy before and after the breach, as can be drawn from figure 
4.32.  Before introducing the security breach, this group of participants perceived that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. After 
introducing the breach, they had the same perception regarding which constructs group was the 
most important group. However, the number of the constructs that were considered as high, 






Figure 4.32: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have more than 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
To summarize, from the analysis above we can see that people who work for organizations that 
have level 5 information security policy believed that the policy process was the most important 
aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. 
However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have 
faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
The participants of this group were categorized into three groups based on their experience: 
participants who had less than 5 years of experience, participants who had between 5 to 10 years 
of experience and participants who had more than 10 years of experience. Figure 4.33 shows 
how the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who had less than 5 years of experience before and after the occurrence of the 





Figure 4.33: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
     
 
 Figure 4.33 shows how the participants with less than 5 years of experience perceived the 
security policy before and how their perception canged after introducing the breach. The charts 
show that this group perceived that the constructs related to security policy process as the most 
significant security policy perceptions before the introduction of the security breach. After the 
occurrence of the breach, their perception changed, so they perceived the constructs that were 
related to the policy form as the most significant constructs followed by policy process group 
and policy content group. Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the 
security policy before and after the breach was different.  
Different results were found from the level 4 participants who had more than 10 years of 
experience as it appears in figure 4.34.  This group perceived that the most important security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The perception of this group 
regarding the security policy before and after the breach was almost the same. However, the 
number of the constructs that ranked as high, medium, or low important changed after 
introducing the breach (refer to figure 4.34). For example, the percentage of the constructs that 
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Figure 4.34: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have more than 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Lastly, the level 4 participants with more than 10 years of experience perceived that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to the security policy process. They had 
the same perception regarding which group was the most important group before and after the 
breach. However, the number of the constructs that got high, medium, or low importance level 
changed after introducing the breach (refer to figure 4.35). For example, the percentage of the 






Figure 4.35: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
To conclude, from the analysis above we can see that the people who work for organizations that 
have a level 4 information security policy believed that the policy process was the most 
important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security 
policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they 
have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Three 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants who had less than 5 
years of experience; participants who had between 5 to 10 years of experience; and participants 
who had more than 10 years of experience. Figure 4.36 shows how participants with less than 5 
years of experience perceived the five main policy themes of the security policy before and after 





Figure 4.36: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
     
 
The charts reveal that the participants with less than 5 years of experience perceived the 
constructs related to security policy process as the most significant security policy perceptions 
before and after the introduction of the security breach. The perception of this group of the 
participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach was very similar. However, 
the number of the constructs that were rated as high, medium, or low important in each construct 
group changed after introducing the breach. For example, 19.8% of the constructs that are related 
to the G2 group were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, 
this percentage changed to 11.7% after the breach.  
Different results were drawn from the level 3 participants who had between 5 to 10 years of 
experience. They perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those 
related to security policy form, as shown in figure 4.37. The perception of this group regarding 
the security policy before and after the breach was similar (refer to figure 4.37). However, the 
number of the constructs that were considered as high, medium, or low important within each 
construct group changed after introducing the breach. As shown in figure 4.37, the percentage of 





Figure 4.37: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have between 5 to 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Finally, different results were seen from the level 3 participants who had more than 10 years of 
experience. Before the breach, this group perceived that the most significant security policy 
perceptions were those related to security policy process. After the breach, the perception of this 
group was changed. They perceived the constructs related to the policy content as the most 
important group (refer to figure 4.38).   
 
 
Figure 4.38: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 






From the analysis above, we can see that the people who had 5 to 10 years of experience and 
who work for organizations that have level 3 information security policy believed that the policy 
form was the most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or 
updating security policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the 
security incidents they have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Two 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants who had less than 5 
years of experience, participants who had between 5 to 10 years of experience and participants 
who had more than 10 years of experience.  
 
 
Figure 4.39: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
     
 
Figure 4.39 shows how participants who had less than 5 years of experience perceived the five 
main policy themes of the security policy before and after the occurrence of the security breach. 
As can be seen from the figure, the participants in this group perceived that the constructs related 
to security policy process as the most important group of the constructs. Here, the perception of 
this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach was close. 
However, the number of the constructs related to each group that was considered as high, 
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medium, or low important differed after introducing the breach. For example, 12.4% of the 
constructs that are related to the G2 group were considered highly important before introducing 
the breach. However, this percentage changed to 19.8% after the breach.  
Similarly, the level 2 participants who had between 5 to 10 years of experience perceive that the 
most important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The 
perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the 
breach was similar. However, the number of constructs that were perceived as highly significant 
in all of the groups changed after the breach (refer to figure 4.40). For example, 11.1% of the 
constructs related to the G1 group were considered as highly significant before introducing the 
breach. After introducing the breach, this percentage changed to 9.3%.  
 
 
Figure 4.40: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have between 5 to 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
Finally, similar results were drawn from the level 2 participants who had more than 10 years of 
experience. Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions 
were those related to security policy process. After the breach, the perception of this group was 
changed. They perceive the constructs related to the policy content as highly significant (refer to 





Figure 4.41: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have more than 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
To conclude, the analysis above shows that people who work for organizations that have level 2 
information security policy believed that the policy process was the most important aspect that 
should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. However, their 
perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level One 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants who had less than 5 
years of experience; participants who had between 5 to 10 years of experience; and participants 
who had than 10 years of experience.  
Figure 4.42 shows how the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy 
were perceived by participants who had less than 5 years of experience before and after the 
occurrence of the security breach. The chart shows that this group of participants perceives that 
the constructs related to security policy process as the most significant security policy 
perceptions before and after the introduction of the security breach. Here, the perception of this 
group of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach was similar. 
However, the number of the constructs that were considered as high, medium, or low important 
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changed after introducing the breach. For example, 20.4% of the constructs that are related to the 
G2 group were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this 
percentage changed to 12% after the breach.  
 
 
Figure 4.42: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with less than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
     
 
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants who had between 5 to 10 years of 
experience (as it is shown in figure 4.43). Before the breach, this group of participants perceived 
constructs related to security policy form as the most significant security policy perceptions. 
After the introduction of the security breach, they perceived that the constructs related to security 
policy process as the most significant security policy perceptions (refer to figure 4.43).  
 
 
Figure 4.43: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 




Similarly, before the breach, level 1 participants who had more than 10 years of experience 
perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to security 
policy form. After the breach, they perceived the constructs related to the policy process as 
highly significant (refer to figure 4.44). An interesting observation from the after the breach chart 
was that this group perceives that none of the constructs related to policy content were highly 
important.    
 
 
Figure 4.44: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have more than 10 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
The analysis above shows that people who work for organizations that have level 1 information 
security policy believed that policy form was the most important aspect that should be taken into 
consideration when developing or updating security policy. However, their perception was not 
stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have faced.  
To sum up, the results from analyzing the five groups with the experience sub-grouping shows 
the changes in the perceptions of the participants in each group before and after introducing the 
security breach. That is, the perception of the participants regarding which constructs group is 
the highest significant one was different before and after the breach. In some cases, some of the 
groups perceived the same constructs group as the most important group before and after the 
Before After 
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breach. In such cases, the difference in their perception was in the number of the constructs 
within the constructs group that perceived as high, low or medium important not regarding the 
constructs group that perceived as the highest important. For example, the level 3 participants 
who had between 5 to 10 years of experience perceived the policy content as the most important 
group both before and after the breach. However, the percentage of constructs that were rated as 
highly important changed from 6.2% to 18.5%. The percentage of constructs that were rated as 
medium important changed from 11.1% to 17.3%. Also, the percentage of constructs that were 
rated as the least important changed from 12.4% to 13.6% after the breach (refer to figure 4.37). 
It is important to point out to that the perceptions of the participants after introducing the breach 
not necessarily the right perception. That is, the occurrence of the breach does not correct the 
perception; it cause changes to the participants’ perceptions, which can be reflected on their 
norms. 
 
4.3.3 Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
The principal components analysis was applied on each Repertory Grid to identify the 
components or factors that represent a set of bipolar constructs. PCA became a very common 
method to be used in analyzing Repertory Grid data (Huang et al., 2007). It helps in identify the 
correlations between constructs and group the constructs into a set of labels. This step helps in 
finding which constructs are highly important. Here, the constructs were grouped using PCA 
using the ratings of the participants. The aim of this analysis is to show which security policy 
aspects have the most effect on developing an effective security policy. 
Each grid was analyzed using principle components analysis. In this research, both Excel 2011 
and SPSS 23 were used to perform this analysis. Here, the correlation was chosen to be among 
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the constructs. The researcher chooses the number of factors to retain based on the eigenvalues. 
The number of factors retained in this study was between three and four components. A sample 
of SPSS sheet is available in the appendix.  
Also, this research used Varimax Orthogonal Rotation, which is the default type of rotation. It is 
important to mention that PCA was applied on the data drawn before the introduction of the 
breach (called “pre-breach PCA”) and the data drawn after the breach (called “post-breach 
PCA”). Table 4.2 shows a sample of the loadings of one of the grids. It shows the constructs that 
























Table 4.2: Varimax Rotated Construct Loadings (pre-breach PCA) 
Constructs 1 2 3 
This policy is customized / reflect the organization's culture 0.664 0.082 -0.743 
This policy is at an advanced level / provide high level of security / strong -0.525 0.849 0.058 
This policy follows the latest standard for creating policies 0.646 -0.362 -0.247 
This policy shows who is responsible for what 0.205 0.062 0.975 
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it 0.289 -0.709 -0.643 
This policy is very detailed / explain all the rules in details -0.525 0.849 0.058 
Employees can have the same understanding to this policy 0.31 0.95 0.044 
Removing this policy will affect the level of security in the organization 0.669 0.454 -0.589 
This policy tells what to do in case of breach -0.055 -0.101 0.992 
This policy is simple, clear and straightforward 0.939 0.138 -0.313 
The link between this policy and other policies is available and clear -0.988 0.146 0.031 
The purpose of this policy is clear and understandable -0.087 0.96 -0.266 
This policy is easy to remember 0.939 0.138 -0.313 
The consequences of non-compliance to this policy is clear -0.903 0.355 0.239 
The consequences of non- compliance to this policy is enough -0.903 0.355 0.239 
This policy is complete / includes all the needed rules -0.903 0.355 0.239 
Easy to comply with this policy 0.952 0.157 0.254 
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear what it covers and what not 0.134 0.617 0.622 
The cost of following this policy is less than the benefit of following it -0.289 0.709 0.643 
This policy serves the business objectives / goals 0.849 0.526 0.009 
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an employee) 0.31 0.95 0.044 
This policy is flexible / less strict 0.952 0.157 0.254 
This policy is reasonable and appropriate 0.31 0.95 0.044 
This policy is written in simple, plain language 0.985 0.051 0.156 
The technical part of this policy is available -0.289 0.709 0.643 
This policy is well-documented / well-structured / precise / organized -0.289 0.709 0.643 
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After applying the principle components analysis on each grid, too many components were 
resulted from analyzing all the grids at this stage. Thus, a priori set of labels was identified so 
that the resulted components can be assigned to one of those labels. The researcher scoured the 
literature for the aspects of creating an optimal policy. This scanning resulted in the following 
list of labels: 
• Policy process (Knapp et al., 2009): how the policy should be and should be 
implemented. 
• Clarity of the policy (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010): clearness, non-ambiguity of the 
policy content and it easiness to understand.  
• Policy breadth (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010): the policy scope, range, or coverage. 
• Policy Standards and guidelines (Peltier, 2001): aspects related to the “how” aspect of the 
policy; how the rules should be applied and implemented.  
• Consequences of non-compliance with policy (Hsu et al., 2015): the influence of the non-
compliance to security policy on the organization or/and the individuals within the 
organization. 
• Policy level of advancement (Herath and Rao, 2009): aspects related to improving or 
advancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy. 
• Policy documentation: all rules, standards and guidelines needed are documented and 
available.  
The next step was to assign each component to on of the labels. Here, an “inductive coding” 
(Patton, 2002) was used to assign each component to the proper label. In some cases, a 
component could not be assigned to any label because the constructs under that component 
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cannot suit any label. In this case, the components were labeled as “Ambiguous.” A second 
round of the inductive coding were performed to evaluate the labeling and to see if any of the 
components that was labeled as “Ambiguous” can fit any of the labels. Thus, this process did not 
result in any change.  
For pre-breach PCA, 66 out of 222 components were labels as “Ambiguous.” Thus, 156 
components were assigned to the other labels. From these components, the most influential 
security policy aspects can be drawn. Table 4.3 shows a list of the labeled components that were 
generated from pre-breach PCA. The “X” indicates that the component is not included in the 
rotation.        
For the post-breach PCA, 67 out of 218 components were labels as “Ambiguous.” Thus, 151 
components were assigned to the other labels. From these components, the most influential 
security policy aspects can be drawn. Table 4.4 shows a list of the labeled components generated 
from post-breach PCA. The “X” indicates that the component has not been included in the 









Table 4.3: summary of pre-breach PCA that shows the labels of the components. 
The SSE-CMM Level Grid# Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
 
L1 
1 Ambiguous Process Guideline Process 
2 Ambiguous Process Consequences Guideline 
3 Process Ambiguous Level of advancement Guideline 
4 Breadth Ambiguous Process Process 
5 Ambiguous Ambiguous Consequence Guideline 
6 Clarity Clarity Ambiguous Process 
7 Level of advancement Ambiguous Clarity Ambiguous 
8 Ambiguous Process Clarity Clarity 
9 Documentation Ambiguous Process Process 
10 Ambiguous Process Clarity Ambiguous 
11 Clarity Process Guideline X 
 
L2 
1 Ambiguous Process Guideline X 
2 Ambiguous Process Clarity Ambiguous 
3 Process Clarity Process Guideline 
4 Ambiguous Breadth Guideline Process 
5 Process Clarity Process Consequence 
6 Process Ambiguous Ambiguous Consequence 
7 Process Breadth Clarity Clarity 
8 Ambiguous Process Breadth Clarity 
 
L3 
1 Ambiguous Process Clarity Clarity 
2 Clarity Ambiguous Ambiguous Process 
3 Documentation Ambiguous Ambiguous Process 
4 Ambiguous Consequence Documentation Ambiguous 
5 Process Ambiguous Ambiguous Clarity 
6 Process Consequence Process Clarity 
7 Process Ambiguous Process Breadth 
8 Process Ambiguous Process Clarity 
9 Process Breadth Ambiguous Process 
10 Ambiguous Process Clarity Clarity 
11 Clarity Process Process X 
12 Process Clarity Ambiguous Process 
 
L4 
1 Clarity Ambiguous Process Ambiguous 
2 Ambiguous Ambiguous Process Process 
3 Ambiguous Ambiguous Process Process 
4 Clarity Process Process Process 
5 Ambiguous Clarity Process Consequence 
6 Ambiguous Clarity Breadth X 
7 Clarity Process Process Consequence 
8 Process Clarity Process Ambiguous 
9 Ambiguous Ambiguous Process Process 
 
L5 
1 Clarity Process Clarity Process 
2 Ambiguous Process Clarity Consequence 
3 Ambiguous Ambiguous Clarity Breadth 
4 Ambiguous Clarity Documentation Guideline 
5 Ambiguous Ambiguous Consequence Process 
6 Ambiguous Ambiguous Breadth Clarity 
7 Ambiguous Clarity Clarity Consequence 
8 Breadth Breadth Ambiguous Guideline 
9 Ambiguous Clarity Consequence Documentation 
10 Process Ambiguous Process X 
11 Process Clarity Guideline Guideline 
12 Ambiguous Ambiguous Documentation Documentation 
13 Process Clarity Ambiguous Guideline 
14 Ambiguous Process Ambiguous Documentation 
15 Documentation Clarity Process Consequence 
16 Clarity Clarity Clarity Process 
17 Clarity Process Consequence Process 
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Table 4.4: summary of post-breach PCA that shows the labels of the components. 
The SSE-CMM Level Grid# Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
 
L1 
1 Ambiguous Process Process Clarity 
2 Documentation Clarity Consequence Guideline 
3 Clarity Ambiguous Ambiguous Process 
4 Ambiguous Process Clarity Consequence 
5 Clarity Process Documentation Consequences 
6 Process Documentation Clarity Breadth 
7 Ambiguous Process Process Documentation 
8 Ambiguous Process Documentation Process 
9 Breadth Process Consequence Process 
10 Ambiguous Process Process Guideline 
11 Process Clarity Documentation Ambiguous 
 
L2 
1 Ambiguous Breadth Process Breadth 
2 Process Documentation Process Clarity 
3 Process Breadth Ambiguous Documentation 
4 Breadth Ambiguous Process Ambiguous 
5 Process Ambiguous Clarity Breadth 
6 Ambiguous Clarity Consequence Breadth 
7 Ambiguous Documentation Ambiguous Process 
8 Process Documentation Ambiguous Process 
 
L3 
1 Ambiguous Clarity Process Ambiguous 
2 Clarity Documentation Ambiguous Process 
3 Ambiguous Process Process Breadth 
4 Ambiguous Consequence Consequence Ambiguous 
5 Ambiguous Documentation Ambiguous Consequence 
6 Process Process Process Breadth 
7 Process Ambiguous Ambiguous Consequence 
8 Process Process Breadth Ambiguous 
9 Process Ambiguous Ambiguous Process 
10 Process Ambiguous Documentation Process 
11 Clarity Ambiguous Process X 
12 Ambiguous Ambiguous Process Documentation 
 
L4 
1 Ambiguous Process Clarity Breadth 
2 Breadth Ambiguous Process X 
3 Ambiguous Documentation Process Clarity 
4 Clarity Process Ambiguous Process 
5 Breadth Ambiguous Breadth Consequence 
6 Ambiguous Documentation Breadth Ambiguous 
7 Ambiguous Clarity Ambiguous Consequence 
8 Process Ambiguous Documentation Clarity 
9 Ambiguous Process Process Ambiguous 
 
L5 
1 Ambiguous Process Process Clarity 
2 Ambiguous Ambiguous Consequence Level of advancement 
3 Ambiguous Process Clarity Documentation 
4 Process Ambiguous Documentation Clarity 
5 Ambiguous Process Ambiguous Process 
6 Process Ambiguous Process Clarity 
7 Ambiguous Documentation Ambiguous Consequence 
8 Documentation Ambiguous Clarity Documentation 
9 Ambiguous Clarity Documentation Process 
10 Process Ambiguous Level of advancement Process 
11 Ambiguous Breadth Documentation Breadth 
12 Process Process Ambiguous Clarity 
13 Process Ambiguous Breadth Documentation 
14 Ambiguous Process Documentation Clarity 
15 Documentation Ambiguous Process Process 
16 Ambiguous Clarity Ambiguous Documentation 
17 Ambiguous Process Documentation Process 
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By applying the eyeball analysis on both tables, we can conclude which bipolar constructs (i.e. 
perceptions of the security policy) that had the most influence on the effectiveness security 
policy. For the pre-breach PCA, the predominant, the most influential security policy perceptions 
were those related to policy process. The second predominant security policy perceptions were 
those related to policy clarity. The third predominant security policy perceptions were those 
related to consequences of non-compliance with the security policy. Table 4.5 shows the number 
of occurrence of each label for the pre-breach PCA. For the post-breach PCA, the predominant, 
the most influential security policy perceptions were those related to policy process. The second 
predominant security policy perceptions are those related to documentation of the policy. The 
third predominant security policy perceptions were those related to policy clarity. Table 4.6 
shows the number of occurrence of each label for the post-breach PCA.     
 
Table 4.5: the number of occurrence of each label for the pre-breach PCA. 















Table 4.6: the number of occurrence of each label for the post-breach PCA. 












The results of pre-breach and post-breach PCA agreed on the first predominant perception of the 
information security policy. However, they were different in the ranking of the rest of 
perceptions. Thus, the participants agreed on that the policy process had the most effect on 
developing an effective security policy. Examples of the aspects related to policy process are that 
“the policy should follow the latest standard,” and “the policy should reflect the organization 
culture.” Also, table 4.5 shows that the policy clarity (as the second predominant group) had a 
major effect on the security policy perception before the introduction of the breach. That is, 
before introducing the security breach the participants believed that the security policy should be 
clear and readable. Examples of the aspects related to policy clarity include “the purpose of the 
policy being clear” and “the policy being written in simple, clear language.” On the other hand, 
table 4.6 shows that the policy documentation (as the second predominant group) had a major 
effect on the security policy perception after the introduction of the breach. That is, after 
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introducing the security breach, participants believed that the security policy should be well 
documented in a structured and organized manner. 
The third predominant factor before the breach was the aspects related to consequences of non-
complying to security policy. In other words, participants believe that the consequences of non-
complying with the security policy should be available, clear, and sufficient. The consequences 
include the consequences on individuals (punishment and rewards) and organizations. The third 
predominant factor after the breach was the aspects related to security policy clarity. In other 
words, the participants believed that the security policy should not be ambiguous. The last three 
factors on each table had less effect on the perception of the security policy.   
Another interesting result can be drawn from this analysis. Comparing the results of the pre-
breach PCA and post-breach PCA reveals the change in the participant’s perceptions regarding 
which factors have the major influence on the perception of the security policy. Tables 4.5 and 
4.6 show that before the breach, the three factors that had the major influence were: policy 
process, policy clarity and consequences of non-compliance. This result is consistent with the 
previous studies. After the breach, the three factors that had the major influence were: policy 
process, policy documentation, and policy clarity. Knapp et al. (2009) emphasize the importance 
of policy process and how it can contribute to the success of the information security. Goel and 
Chengalur-Smith (2010) use the clarity as one of the dimensions to measure the effectiveness of 
the policy. They considered clarity as one of the vital aspects of the quality of the security policy. 
Trevino (1992) argues that punishment (as a consequence of non-compliance) may affect norms 
of employees in an organization and prevent deviant behaviors. Thus, punishment can result in 
favorable results. Also, Sims (1980) emphasizes that a reward has a strong influence on 
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individuals’ behavior. Thus, knowing the consequences motivates individuals to comply with the 
policy.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
In the alpha stage, we studied how individuals in an organization perceived the security policy of 
their organization differently and how their perceptions changed after the occurrence of a 
security breach. The aim of this chapter is to develop the alpha version of the artifact that can be 
used to develop the beta artifact at the beta stage. Here, the alpha version artifact was the 
Repertory Grid that was rated by the participants before and after the occurrence of the security 
breach (refer to figure 4.1).    
After the ratings, the grids were analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. First, the grids were 
subject to core categorization, where the constructs were grouped into three groups. Then, each 
one of the grids was analyzed using content analysis and principal components analysis (PCA). 
The results of these analyses showed how participants had different perceptions regarding the 








Chapter 5: Experimental Definition of the Artifact 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of the second stage (the beta stage) is to develop a beta version of the artifact. The alpha 
stage aims to develop the alpha version of our artifact; the emerging norm-rule compliance 
RepGrid. In the beta stage, the alpha artifact is tested and validated to develop the beta artifact, 
i.e. more mature norm-rule compliance RepGrid. The beta stage allows for a full involvement 
that comprises assessing the artifact “in the use setting” (Sein et al., 2011). Thus, the beta atage 
of this study evaluates and refines the artifact resulted from the alpha stage through simulating a 
real e-commerce organization and applying Repertory Grid data collection and analysis to get the 
beta version of the RepGrid.      
In this chapter, we provide a detailed explanation of the beta stage process. The beta stage aims 
to study people perceptions regarding security policy of their organization and how their 
perceptions change following the occurrence of security incidents. It will build a more mature 
artifact, following Kelly’s Repertory Grid technique explained in the chapter three.     
As previously mentioned, Repertory Grid is represented in two-dimensional grids that can be 
analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. In this stage, elements were the main five policies in 
Crown Confections security policy: acceptable use policy, information security roles and 
responsibilities, password policy, email policy, and remote access policy. These elements were 
supplied from the Crown Confections security policy. The constructs in the beta stage were 
elicited from one group and compared to the constructs from the alpha stage to generate the final 
version of the beta stage constructs. Then, the constructs were supplied to another group for 
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rating. This research adopts a hybrid type of Repertory Grid between fixed RepGrid and fixed 
element RepGrid, as the constructs were elicited from one group and supplied to another.    
 
5.2 Data collection  
The beta stage of this study was conducted over a period of three months. As mentioned before, 
elements were the main five policies of Crown Confections security policy. These “supplied” 
elements are: clean desk policy, information security roles and responsibilities, password policy, 
E-mail policy, and remote access policy. 
Then, these elements were used in the constructs elicitation. The elicited constructs represent 
individuals’ perceptions regarding the security policy of their organization.  
 
5.2.1 Eliciting Bipolar Constructs  
ii. Participants 
Again, a purposive sample was achieved to represent the “expert” group at the beta stage. This 
sampling technique was used to serve the needs of this study. As mentioned before, purposive 
sampling helps in mitigate research biases and ensure that the sample is more representative 
(Miles et al., 1994). Thus, four security professionals who had a good experience with 
information security were chosen to represent the “expert” group. Each of them had worked in at 
least two different organizations. The expert group was used to elicit the constructs in this stage. 
iii. Structured interviews and Construct Elicitation 
In this research, RepGrid interviewing technique, which is grounded on Kelly’s (1955) Personal 
Construct Theory is used to elicit the bipolar constructs from the expert group. Four one-to-one 
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RepGrid Structured interviews were conducted with the four experts to elicit a set of “bipolar” 
constructs that shows how each expert perceives the security policy. Each interview was 
arranged through email contact with each expert. A copy of the Crown Confections security 
policy was sent to each expert before the day of the interview. Indeed, one interview was 
conducted in a day. Each interview took between one to one and half hours. After each 
interview, the researcher reviewed the script and reflected. A point of saturation was reached 
after the third interview. That is, the fourth interview did not add any new constructs. However, 
the interviews were continued after the saturation point was reached to ensure that different types 
of experts were covered. Before the beginning of the interview, the purpose and background of 
this research were explained and clarified. Then, the process of the RepGrid interview adopted in 
this study (i.e. triadic) was introduced to each expert. The researcher used five index cards to 
conduct the interviews; each card contains one of the five elements. The researcher clarified that 
the purpose of the interview was to elicit the participant’s perception regarding each one of the 
five security policies. In each interview, index cards were provided to the participant in triads 
(i.e. three cards at a time). The expert was asked to identify which two of the three policies are 
similar and how the third is different. Getting two similar policies provided a construct, while 
eliciting how the third policy differs provided the opposite. The researcher gave each expert 
some time to think before getting her or his response. This process was repeated for many triads 
in each interview. The researcher continued presenting new triads until a saturation point was 
reached. After some “trial and error,” the researcher was able to get some “good” constructs.  
Each interview script was transcribed and reviewed by the corresponding expert to check and 
change if needed. Three of the experts verified the elicited bipolar constructs. One of the experts 
requested some changes. The interviews were recorded in case the researcher needed 
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clarification for some information. After eliciting the constructs from the four experts, the beta 
stage constructs were compared to the alpha stage constructs for evaluation and refinement. Most 
of the constructs from the alpha stage were mentioned by at least one expert from the beta stage. 
One of the constructs (i.e. “This policy is complete/ includes all the needed rules”) was not 
mentioned by any experts at this stage. The constructs “The consequences of non-compliance to 
this policy is clear,” and “The consequences of non-compliance to this policy is enough” were 
mention in more details at this stage. That is, these two constructs were replaced by the following 
constructs: “The risk of non-complying to this policy is available and clear,” “The sanctions of 
non-complying to this policy are stated clearly/explicit,” “The sanctions of non-complying to this 
policy are enough,” and “The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are specific.” Eight new 
constructs that were not mentioned at all by the experts from the alpha stage were added at this 
stage. A total of 34 bipolar constructs were resulted at this stage. Before starting the process of 
rating the constructs, the overall bipolar construct was supplied. The overall construct should be 
broad so that it can be applied to all elements. Each participant should rate the overall bipolar 
construct against each element using the five-point Likert scale. The overall bipolar constructs 
were as follows:  
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and robust -- Overall, this policy is neither comprehensive nor robust 
The resulted data from rating the overall construct is useful in comparing different grids using 
Honey’s (1979) content analysis (as shown in the next section). 
A RepGrid interview sheet was used to record the resulted bipolar constructs such that the left-
hand column represents the construct, and the right-hand column represent the opposite. Figure 
5.1 shows a sample of a RepGrid interview sheet with the resulted 34 bipolar constructs in 




































Figure 5.1: Sample of a RepGrid interview sheet with the 34 bipolar constructs that were resulted from the beta 



























































This policy is customized / reflect the organization's culture This policy is standard / similar to other organizations
This policy is in advanced level / provide high level of security 
/ strong
This policy is in basic level / does not provide high level of 
security / weak
This policy follows the latest standard for creating policies This policy does not follow the latest standard for creating policies
This policy shows who is responsible for what/ The employee 
can know if it applicable to him/her or not
This policy does not shows who is responsible/ The employee 
can’t know if it applicable to him/her or not
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it (guidelines is 
included) This policy is descriptive / shows only what to do
This policy tells what to do in case of breach / the guideline to 
execute the policy is clear This policy does not tell what to do in case of breach
The standards and guidelines are clearly separated The standards and guidelines are mixed and overlap
The standards within this policy do not conflict with other 
standards and policies
This policy has some standards that conflict with other 
standards and policies
The standards within this policy are consistent The standards within this policy are not consistent/ conflict
This policy has the required level of detail / explain all the 
rules in details
This policy is does not has the required level of detail/ brief 
and general 
This policy has the required controls/ rules Some necessary controls need to be added to this policy
Employees can have the same understanding to this policy This policy is open to different interpretations
Removing this policy will affect the level of security of the 
organization Removing this policy will not affect the level of security
This policy is simple, clear and straightforward This policy is complicated, ambiguous and not understandable
This policy is accurate and precise This policy lacks of accuracy and precision
The standards within this policy are not repeated in other 
policies
Some of the standards within this policy are repeated in other 
policies
This policy is easy to remember This policy is hard to remember 
The link between this policy and other policies is available and 
clear
The link between this policy and other policies is not available/ 
not clear
This policy has standards that are subset of another policy This policy does not has any standard that is subset of another policy
The purpose of this policy is clear and understandable The purpose of this policy is not clear 
The risk of non-complying to this policy is available and clear The risk of non-complying is not available / not clear
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are stated 
clearly/ explicit
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are not stated 
clearly/ need more details
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are enough The sanctions of non-complying are not enough 
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are specific The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are subjective and not specific
Both the technical and business parts of this policy are 
available The technical part or business part is missing
Easy to comply with this policy Hard or impossible to comply with this policy
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear what it cover 
and what not 
The boundary of the policy is not clear / it is not clear what it 
cover and what not
The cost of following this policy is less than the benefit of 
following it
The cost of following this policy exceeds the benefit of 
following it
This policy serves the business objectives / goals This policy does not serve the business objectives / goals
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an employee) / it 
is important for the security of the organization
This policy does not reflect its importance to me (as an 
employee) / it is not important for the security of the 
organization
This policy is flexible / less strict This policy is more strict
This policy is reasonable and appropriate This policy is not reasonable
This policy is written in simple, plain language This policy is include some technical terminologies that are not understandable by all employees
This policy is well-documented / well-structured / precise / 
organized This policy is not well-documented / not well-structured 
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and robust Overall, this policy is not comprehensive nor robust 
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5.2.2 Rating the Elements 
Each element should be rated against each of the elicited bipolar constructs. As mentioned 
above, in this stage we simulated a real organization and applied the Repertory Grid technique to 
collect and analyze the data. We created five versions of the Crown Confections security policy 
according to SSE-CMM Levels and associated a proper version of the security policy.  
ii.  Participants  
A group of 46 participants (excluding the “expert” group) was divided into five sub-groups. That 
is, the first group involved 8 participants and representd an organization with the first level of the 
SSE-CMM (i.e. performed informally). The second group contained 10 participants and 
represented an organization with the second level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. planned and tracked). 
The third group consisted of 10 participants and represented an organization with the third level 
of the SSE-CMM (i.e. well defined). The fourth group consisted of 9 participants and represents 
an organization with the fourth level of the SSE-CMM (i.e. qualitatively controlled). The fifth 
group had 10 participants and represented an organization with the fifth level of the SSE-CMM 
(i.e. continuously improving). Five versions of security policy were developed in accordance 
with SSE-CMM Levels. Each group was given the intended version of the security policy. The 
five versions of the security policy were created based on the SANS Institute Information 
Security Policy Templates (SANS, 2015). Also, some demographic information was collected 
including like age and experience.        
iii. Rating Process  
In this stage, five sessions of the Crown Confections e-commerce company were conducted and 
associated a proper version of the security policy. The participants were randomly associated 
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with each session, and the intended security policy was given to the participants before the day 
of the experiment. In each company session, the Crown Confections company was introduced. 
Each participant was given a particular role within the Crown Confections. Examples of the roles 
assigned to the participants include order fulfillment, finance, technical service, and call center. 
The researcher was the CEO of the company. The experiment was conducted in laboratory 
settings. All of the participants were working on the Crown Confections website that was 
develop for the purpose of this study. Each participant was given some responsibilities based on 
her or his role in the company. For example, participants working in the order fulfillment 
department were responsible for processing the orders. Participants who were working at the 
technical service were responsible for exploring the website and creating a report for any 
technical problem. Each session lasted between 3-4 hours. At the beginning of the session, the 
researcher explained the process of the experiment and the purpose of the study. Then, each 
participant was assigned to a certain role. After the introduction, the participants started working 
on based on their assigned roles. After 30 minutes, the participants were asked to rate the 
constructs that were elicited from the “expert” group in addition to the supplied overall construct 
using a five-point Likert scale, such that 5 represents the construct and 1 represents the opposite. 
The rating process reflects how the participants perceive the Crown Confections security policy. 
The participants were given between one hour and one hour and fifteen minutes to do the first 
rating (i.e. the pre-breach rating). Here, some demographic information was collected for the 
purpose of analysis. In total, 46 grids have resulted from the pre-breach rating process.   
During the first rating, the researcher introduced a security breach. A different security breach 
was introduced to each group (see table 5.1). The participants had no idea that a security breach 
would be introduced. Table 5.1 shows the scenarios for the five security breaches introduced to 
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the five groups. After the rating, the participants were asked to go back to their assigned roles 
such that they could experience the breach.  
 
Table 5.1: Scenarios for the five security breaches that were introduced for the five groups. 
The Scenario The group 
A person stole the names, addresses and personal details of all the Crown Confection customers 
and employees. That person sent an email to the Crown Confections employees that said: 
Hey... I cracked it. Now I have the names, addresses and personal details of all the Crown 
Confection customers and employees. Use them as you please. I am just a hacker doing this for fun. 
Then, another email was sent to the employees from the Crown Confections admin said:  
All, 
A security breach was taking place today. Someone logged into Crown Confections server and 
downloaded some database files that include confidential information related to customers and 
employee. 
We are really sorry that you have experienced this breach. We will offer one year of credit 
monitoring to ensure that your personal information is not abused. 
Level 1 group 
“Phishing” E-mail was sent to the employees and asked them to update their information (name, 
address, SSN, DOB, email, etc.). After few minutes, another email was sent to the employees from 
the Crown Confections admin that said:  
All, 
ALERT! Our systems were breached today. There was a phishing attack. Crown Confections 
employees were asked to update their information. Personally identifiable information was stolen 
and may be used inappropriately.  
Please be aware of such attacks in the future. 
Level 2 group 
The employees to sign in to the systems by their own.  
Suppose a person previously installed a keylogger in our system and all or some of the usernames 
and passwords of admin and employees were stolen. That person sends an email to all employees 
including administrator stating that: 
Hi Crown Confections 
All the credentials are mine now. The fun will begin soon. 
Then, another email was sent to the employees from the Crown Confections admin said:  
All, 
A security breach has taking place today. Someone installed a keylogger spyware on Crown 
Confection systems. Some of the credentials of Crown Confection employees may have been stolen. 
These may subsequently be used inappropriately.  
We are really sorry that you have experienced this breach.  
Level 3 group 
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Suppose that an employee copied customers’ data (includes: names, address and credit cards 
information) on a sticky note while taking Telephone orders. These sticky notes were stolen, which 
means customers’ data were stolen. The person who stole these data sent an email to Crown 
Confections’ employees, with a picture of the sticky notes said: 
Thanks, Crown Confections. All these are mine. 
Then, another email was sent to the employees from the Crown Confections admin said:  
All, 
A security breach was taking place today. Someone got the customer(s) information that was written 
on a paper note while taking phone orders. 
We are currently working on investigating the problem and ensure that customers’ information is not 
abused and to ensure such behavior is not happening in the future. 
Level 4 group 
Delete all the information from the database (customers information, employees information, 
financial information and orders).  
Then, an email was sent to the employees from the Crown Confections admin that said:  
All, 
A security breach was taking place today. Someone had access to Crown Confections database and 
deleted sensitive information related to customers, employees and financial information. 
We are really sorry that you have experienced this breach. We are currently working on 
investigating the problem. 
Level 5 group 
 
After the participants experienced the breach, the researcher asked them to respond based on the 
given security policy and to re-think the given security policy. After that, the participants were 
asked to re-rate the same bipolar constructs. In total, 92 grids resulted, 46 grids before the breach 
and 46 after the breach.   
 
5.3 Data Analysis and Results 
Similar to the alpha stage, the data from the beta stage was analyzed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The data was analyzed using data coding and categorization, and content analysis 
beside the statistical analysis (Jankowicz, 2004).  
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As mentioned before, selecting the quantitative data analysis method depends on the type of data 
generated from the RepGrid rating (Bell, 1988). Therefore, the type of data at hand should be 
defined before deciding on the quantitative data analysis method. The data from this stage was 
generated through rating the grids using a five-point Likert scale. The ratings that were generated 
from the grids of the beta stage were integers that were ranging between one and five. That is, 
this stage adopted an interval scale as measurement scale to generate interval data. An interval 
scale was adopted because the distance between two consecutive points is equal.   
Besides, the data of the grids are almost normally distributed and satisfy the homoscedasticity. 
Also, the elements and constructs have a linear relationship. These features embody the 
assumptions of the principal components analysis. To analyze the bipolar constructs, this stage 
applies Honey’s (1979) content analysis. Indeed, the type of data is not an issue with Honey’s 
(1979) content analysis.    
As we know, there are many software packages that can be used to elicit and/or analyze 
Repertory Grids. In this stage, Excel 2011 and SPSS 23 were used to analyze the generated 
grids.     
 
5.3.1 Core Categorization 
The bipolar constructs should be categorized before performing the content analysis. Eliciting 
perceptions regarding security policy from the “expert” group resulted in 34 bipolar constructs. 
These constructs should be classified to be more manageable through applying core 
categorization process (Jankowicz, 2004).  
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The core categorization process is important before doing the content analysis so the results can 
have more meaning (Jankowicz, 2004). First, we need to generate a set of themes or categories. 
Different methods can be used to develop the themes or categories such as using pre-existing 
categories that are available in the literature or from the international standards. In case the 
literature and standards do not provide categories for perceptions, Jankowicz (2004) suggests 
using “bootstrapping” technique to generate. In this stage, the “bootstrapping” technique was 
adopted to classify the perceptions regarding security policy.  
First, each construct was examined by comparing it with the other constructs. If a construct was 
in some way similar to the first construct, the two constructs were assigned to the same category. 
On the other hand, if the construct was different from the first one, the construct was assigned a 
separate category. The remaining constructs were compared with the constructs under each 
category and placed under the suitable category. If the construct did not fit any category, a new 
category should be generated. This process was continued until all constructs were categorized. 
The unclassified constructs were placed under one category called “miscellaneous,” which 
should not include more that 5% of the constructs (Jankowicz, 2004).  
A reliability check was performed after generating the first version of the categories with an 
information security expert. A crosschecking was conducted to validate the constructs 
categorization. The information security expert had high-level knowledge of and experience with 
information security. The expert was given the categories and the constructs and was asked to 
approve or suggest changes the categories. The expert could generate a new category as needed. 
Here, the same categories from the alpha stage were suggested and discussed with the expert. We 
tried to fit the constructs under these categories and asked the expert to verify the categorization. 
The expert approved these categories. The three main categories used in the core categorization 
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process were policy form, policy content, and policy process. The constructs that were under 
policy form category represented 32.4% of the constructs. The policy content category 
comprised 26.5% of the constructs. The policy process category contained 41.1% of the 
constructs. These categories were used in the content analysis discussed below.  
 
5.3.2 Content Analysis 
This section discusses the process of content analysis was performed for the 46 pre-breach grids 
and the 46 post-breach grids. The 46 pre-breach grids were sub-grouped into five subgroups (as 
previously mentioned) in accordance with the SSE-CMM five levels. The same process was 
applied for the 46 post-breach grids. Each of these groups was subject to content analysis as one 
group. Also, each one of the five groups was categorized into subgroups, and these subgroups 
were analyzed to compare perceptions of different groups of participants. Each group of the five 
groups was sub-grouped once based on the age range and once based on the experience.   
The content analysis method adopted in this stage is Honey’s (1979) content analysis, which is 
described in Jankowicz (2004) book. As described in the previous chapter, the content analysis 
process was performed as follows: 
Step 1: Identify ratings for the overall construct regarding each element. The ratings of overall 
construct reflected the overall perception of each participant. Figure 5.2 shows a sample grid 





























































































































This policy is customized / reflect the organization's culture
4 1 1 1 1
This policy is standard / similar to other organizations G2 15 58.3 3 91.7 M
This policy is in advanced level / provide high level of security / 
strong 5 1 5 5 3
This policy is in basic level / does not provide high level of security / 
weak
G2 6 83.3 14 61.1 L
This policy follows the latest standard for creating policies
5 1 4 1 3
This policy does not follow the latest standard for creating policies G2 11 69.4 9 75.0 L
This policy shows who is responsible for what/ The employee can 
know if it applicable to him/her or not 4 2 5 5 5
This policy does not shows who is responsible/ The employee can’t know 
if it applicable to him/her or not
G3 2 94.4 14 61.1 M
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it (guidelines is 
included) 1 4 1 2 1
This policy is descriptive / shows only what to do G3 14 61.1 4 88.9 M
This policy tells what to do in case of breach / the guideline to 
execute the policy is clear 1 4 1 1 1
This policy does not tell what to do in case of breach G3 15 58.3 3 91.7 M
The standards and guidelines are clearly separated
3 4 5 5 2
The standards and guidelines are mixed and overlap G1 4 88.9 12 66.7 M
The standards within this policy do not conflict with other standards 
and policies 3 3 5 5 4
This policy has some standards that conflict with other standards and 
policies
G2 3 91.7 13 63.9 M
The standards within this policy are consistent
5 5 4 5 5
The standards within this policy are not consistent/ conflict G2 3 91.7 17 52.8 M
This policy has the required level of detail / explain all the rules in 
details 3 3 3 5 2
This policy is does not has the required level of detail/ brief and general G1 7 80.6 9 75.0 L
This policy has the required controls/ rules
3 4 3 2 1
Some necessary controls need to be added to this policy G1 10 72.2 6 83.3 L
Employees can have the same understanding to this policy
4 4 5 5 3
This policy is open to different interpretations G2 2 94.4 14 61.1 M
Removing this policy will affect the level of security of the 
organization 5 4 5 5 5
Removing this policy will not affect the level of security G2 1 97.2 17 52.8 M
This policy is simple, clear and straightforward
5 5 5 5 3
This policy is complicated, ambiguous and not understandable G1 4 88.9 16 55.6 M
This policy is accurate and precise
4 3 5 5 3
This policy lacks of accuracy and precision G1 3 91.7 13 63.9 M
The standards within this policy are not repeated in other policies
4 3 5 1 4
Some of the standards within this policy are repeated in other policies G3 6 83.3 10 72.2 L
This policy is easy to remember 
4 4 5 5 5
This policy is hard to remember G1 0 100.0 16 55.6 H
The link between this policy and other policies is available and clear
4 4 5 5 5
The link between this policy and other policies is not available/ not clear G2 0 100.0 16 55.6 H
This policy has standards that are subset of another policy
4 3 5 5 5
This policy does not has any standard that is subset of another policy G2 1 97.2 15 58.3 H
The purpose of this policy is clear and understandable
4 5 5 5 5
The purpose of this policy is not clear G1 1 97.2 17 52.8 H
The risk of non-complying to this policy is available and clear
4 4 5 5 5
The risk of non-complying is not available / not clear G3 0 100.0 16 55.6 H
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are stated clearly/ 
explicit 1 1 2 1 1
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are not stated clearly/ need 
more details
G1 17 52.8 3 91.7 M
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are enough
1 1 2 1 1
The sanctions of non-complying are not enough G3 17 52.8 3 91.7 M
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are specific
1 1 2 1 1
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are subjective and not 
specific
G3 17 52.8 3 91.7 M
Both the technical and business parts of this policy are available
4 4 1 4 1
The technical part or business part is missing G1 9 75.0 7 80.6 L
Easy to comply with this policy 
4 5 5 5 5
Hard or impossible to comply with this policy G2 1 97.2 17 52.8 M
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear what it cover and what 
not 4 5 5 5 5
The boundary of the policy is not clear / it is not clear what it cover and 
what not
G1 1 97.2 17 52.8 H
The cost of following this policy is less than the benefit of following 
it 2 1 1 1 1
The cost of following this policy exceeds the benefit of following it G2 17 52.8 1 97.2 M
This policy serves the business objectives / goals
5 4 4 5 4
This policy does not serve the business objectives / goals G2 3 91.7 15 58.3 M
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an employee) / it is 
important for the security of the organization 5 5 5 5 4
This policy does not reflect its importance to me (as an employee) / it is 
not important for the security of the organization
G2 3 91.7 17 52.8 M
This policy is flexible / less strict
1 1 1 1 2
This policy is more strict G1 17 52.8 3 91.7 M
This policy is reasonable and appropriate
5 5 5 4 5
This policy is not reasonable G2 3 91.7 17 52.8 M
This policy is written in simple, plain language
5 5 5 4 5
This policy is include some technical terminologies that are not 
understandable by all employees
G3 3 91.7 17 52.8 M
This policy is well-documented / well-structured / precise / organized
4 4 5 5 3
This policy is not well-documented / not well-structured G3 2 94.4 14 61.1 M
Overall, this policy is comprehensive and robust 
4 4 5 5 5
Overall, this policy is not comprehensive nor robust 
Overall reverse 2 2 1 1 1
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Step 2: Calculate the sum of differences for each bipolar construct against the overall construct. 
For example, the first construct (in the first row) had ratings as 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, whereas the overall 
construct had ratings as 4, 4, 5, 5, and 5. Then, the difference between each two corresponding 
ratings is identified. That is, we identified the difference between the rating of the first construct 
against the first element and the overall construct against the first element and so on. After that, 
the differences were added to get the sum of differences, which was equal to 15 for the first row. 
This number was then written under the column “sum of differences” in the first row (refer to 
figure 5.2). 
Step 3: convert the sum of differences for each construct into “percentage similarity score.” This 
allows the researcher to compare grids that have a different number of constructs. A “look-up 
table” could be used to extract “percentage similarity score” rather than calculate it manually. 
Jankowics (2004) provided a method for calculating “percentage similarity look-up” that can be 
used here. In this study, the “percentage similarity score” was calculated using the following 
formula as extracted from Jankowics, (2004):  
100-{[SD/((LR-1)*C)]*100}. 
where SD is the sum of difference, LR is the largest rating possible (i.e. 5 in this study), and C is 
the number of constructs (i.e. 34 in this study). 
The “percentage similarity score” was calculated for each row (i.e. bipolar construct). The result 
from this calculation was written under “% of similarity” column (refer to figure 5.2). For 
example, “percentage similarity score” for the first row was 58.3% (refer to figure 5.2).  
Step 4: “Reversed” scores should be calculated for the “overall” construct. For example, in five-
points scale 1 converted into 5, 2 into 4, 3 stays the same. The rule of thumb for reversing score 
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is that if the researcher uses n-points scale then each score should be subtracted from n+1 to 
reverse it (Jankowics, 2004). After reversing the overall construct scores, the sum of differences 
was calculated against the “reversed” scores. For example, the “reverse” score for the grid in 
figure 4.2 was 2, 2, 1, 1, and 1. The “reversed” scores were recorded directly under overall 
construct row, and the sum of differences for the “reversed” score was written under “reverse 
sum of differences” column (refer to figure 5.2). In our example, the “reverse sum of 
differences” for the first row was 3 (refer to figure 5.2). 
Step 5: Convert the reverse sum of differences for each construct (from step 4) into percentage 
similarity scores following the same way in step 3. The result from this calculation was written 
under “reverse % of similarity” column (refer to figure 4.2). For example, the reverse percentage 
similarity score for the first row was 91.7% (refer to figure 5.2). 
Step 6: The highest percentage of similarity should be identified, which is the highest percentage 
between the two “percentage similarity scores” (from step 3 and step 5). The number highlighted 
in yellow represented the highest percentage of similarity (refer to figure 5.2). 
Step 7: Record the ranking of each “highest” percentage similarity score in term of high (H), 
medium (M) or low (L). These rankings reflected the correlation between each bipolar construct 
and the “overall” construct. These similarity scores were looked at as a group such that each 
third were ranked as H, M, and L, respectively (refer to figure 5.2). 
After completing step seven, individual grids were ready for group analysis. The following 
section focuses on multiple grids analysis that involves comparing different grids together.  
Step 8: Each construct should be assigned to one of the categories that were generated in the 
previous section before beginning the quantitative analysis. All the information from the 
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previous steps was recorded in spreadsheet tables. The category was recorded under “group” 
column (refer to figure 5.2). G1 refers to the constructs related to the form of the policy; G2 
refers to the constructs related to the process of the policy and G3 refers to the constructs related 
to the content of the policy.   
Step 9: Each of the tables should be converted into a bar chart to show the most important 
constructs' categories, which is the most significant security policy aspect that should be 
considered when to create or change security policy. Each chart was related to a subgroup of 
participants. Participants could be categorized into subgroups based on specific criteria. In this 
stage, the participants were categorized in accordance with the SSE-CMM levels. Then, each 
group was categorized based on gender and experience.   
A table was created for each subgroup of participants. Then, one chart was created for all 
participants. This chart illustrated the percentage of constructs in each subgroup. Each bar 
represented a construct category and illustrated the high, medium, and low correlations between 
constructs and the overall construct. The category that had the highest bar was the most 
important one. Another way for interpreting the charts was via considering the categories that 
have the highest part of the bar that represents the high correlation. That is, the focus should be 
only on the constructs that have high correlations and consider those who have highest “high” 
part of the bar as the most important construct categories. The latest method was adopted in this 
study.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
 Figure 5.3 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 5 participants. The chart shows the 
allocation of the constructs’ categories in the form of a percentage of the total number of 
constructs in each group that rated as high, medium, and low.  
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Each bar shows the high, medium, and low correlation between the constructs or participants’ 
perceptions and the comprehension and robustness of the policy. As can be drawn from the chart, 
the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. 
That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process and how 
it should be as the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most significant 
constructs are those that fall under the policy form, which focuses on documentation and the 











Figure 5.3: Content analysis of the total group of level 5 participants before the breach. 
 
The previous results show the perception of level five participants regarding the security policy 
that was created for our experimental study before initiating the security breach. Likewise, the 
data collected from the same participants after introducing the security breach was analyzed. 
Figure 5.4 shows a bar chart for the total group of level 5 participants after introducing the 
breach. This chart shows that the most significant security policy perceptions were those related 
to security policy process. That is, the participants considered the constructs related to the 
security policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the security 


























Figure 5.4: Content analysis of the total group of level 5 participants after the breach. 
 
Thus, the perception of the level 5 participants regarding the security policy before and after the 
occurrence of the breach was very close. That could happen because of the maturity level of the 
policy that was introduced. The security policy version with the highest maturity level among the 
other versions of the policy was introduced to this group of the participants. However, the 
percentage of the constructs that were rated as high was changed before and after the breach. For 
example, 10.5% of the constructs in the G2 group were rated as high before the breach whereas 
15.9% of the constructs in the G2 group were rated as high after the introduction of the breach.  
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
In figure 5.5, the bar chart shows the perception of the total group of level 4 participants. This 
chart illustrates that the most important security policy constructs were the constructs related to 
the process of security policy. That is, level 4 participants believed that the constructs related to 
the security policy process and how it should be were the most significant features of the security 


















Figure 5.5: Content analysis of the total group of level 4 participants before the breach. 
 
 
The previous result displays the perception of level four participants regarding the Crown 
Confections security policy before introducing the security breach. Similarly, the data that was 
collected from the same participants after introducing the security breach was analyzed, and a 
bar chart was created for these data. Figure 5.6 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 4 
participants after introducing the breach. As can be seen from the chart, the most significant 
security policy perceptions for the level 4 participants after introducing the breach were those 
related to security policy process. That is, the level 4 participants considered the constructs 
related to the security policy process and how it should be as the most significant aspects of the 


















Figure 5.6: Content analysis of the total group of level 4 participants after the breach. 
 
 
Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after the breach 
was very close regarding the most significant perception. However, the percentage of the G2 
constructs that were rated as “high” changed after the breach from 15.7% to 12.7%. For the next 
important perception, level 4 participants’ perceptions changed after the introduction of the 
security breach from policy content to policy form.  
• SSE-CMM Level Three 
Figure 5.7 shows the bar chart for the perception of the total group of level 3 participants 
regarding the security policy before initiating the security breach. The most significant security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The participants believed that 
the constructs related to the security policy process and how it should be were the most 
significant aspects of the security policy. The next most significant constructs are those that fall 































Figure 5.7: Content analysis of the total group of level 3 participants before the breach. 
 
 
The same analysis was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after 
the occurrence of the security breach. Figure 5.8 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 3 
participants after introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The next most significant 
perceptions regarding the security policy were those related to security policy form.  
 
 
































Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after introducing 
the breach was almost the same in term of which group had the highest importance. The change 
occurred in the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high” in each group. By 
comparing figure 5.7 and figure 5.8, we can realize that the number of constructs in the G2 group 
that considered highly significant decreased from 27.4% (before the breach) to 20.9% (after the 
breach). The same thing happened with the G1 and G3 groups (refer to figure 5.7 and 5.8).  
• SSE-CMM Level Two 
Figure 5.9 shows the bar chart for perceptions of the total group of level 2 participants before 
introducing the security breach. As it appears in the chart, the most significant security policy 
perceptions were those related to security policy process and policy form. The percentage of the 
constructs that were rated as “high” in both the G1 and G2 groups was 13.5%. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Content analysis of the total group of level 2 participants before the breach. 
 
 
Similarly, the data that was collected from the same participants after introducing the security 
















2 participants after introducing the breach. As shown in the chart, the most significant security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The next most significant 
security policy constructs were those that related to the policy form. An interesting observation 
from this result is that the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high” in the G1 group 
stays the same before and after the breach, and only slight change happened to the constructs 
rated as “medium” and “low.” That maybe because of the kind of breach introduced to this 
group. This issue will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Content analysis of the total group of level 2 participants after the breach. 
 
 
Here, the perception of the participants regarding the security policy before and after introducing 
the breach changed. By comparing figures 5.9 and 5.10, we determine that even the G1 
considered as highest important before and after the breach the number of constructs that 
considered highly significant increased from 13.5% (before the breach) to 15.3% (after the 
breach). Also, the policy form considered as highest important before the breach, but it was 
















• SSE-CMM Level One 
The chart in figure 5.11 represents the data related to the whole group of level 1 participants that 
was collected before introducing the security breach. As it appears from the chart, the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The 
participants perceived that the constructs related to the security policy process and how it should 
be were the most significant aspects of the security policy. The next most significant constructs 
were those that fall under the policy form.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: Content analysis of the total group of level 1 participants before the breach. 
 
 
The same analysis was conducted for the data that was collected from the same participants after 
introducing the security breach. Figure 4.12 shows the bar chart for the total group of level 1 
participants after introducing the breach. This chart shows that the most significant security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. That is, the participants 
considered the constructs related to the security policy process as the most important constructs, 
followed by the constructs related to the policy form. An interesting observation here is that the 
















group increased from 8.1% (before the breach) to 16.6% (after the breach). Similarly, the 
percentage of constructs that considered as highly significant increased from 7.4% (before the 
breach) to 13.7% (after the breach) in the policy form group. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Content analysis of the total group of level 1 participants after the breach. 
 
To summarize, before introducing the security breach the five groups of the participants agreed 
on that the constructs related to policy process were the most significant aspects of the security 
policy. However, the difference between the groups was in the next significant group. The level 
four and level two groups considered the policy content as the next most significant group. The 
rest of the groups considered the policy form to be the next most significant group. 
After introducing the security breach, all groups agreed on that the constructs related to policy 
process were the most significant aspects of the security policy. Also, all of the groups agreed on 
that the second most significant group was the policy form. Even if the groups agree on which 
policy group was the most significant one, the change in the participants’ perceptions appeared 
















results for all the groups before and after the introduction of security breach shows the changes 
that occur to the participants’ perception regarding the security policy of the Crown Confection 
Company. Here, the comparison was conducted for the group as a whole before and after the 
breach.  
Another comparison was accomplished to examine how the perception of each person changed 
after introducing the security breach. Figure 5.13 shows a sample of five participants from the 




Figure 5.13: a sample of five participants from the five levels and how the perception of each of them changed after 
introducing the security breach (1=acceptable use policy, 2=Info. Sec. roles and responsibilities, 3=password policy, 
























































The sample in figure 5.13 was selected randomly. Each one of the charts represents one of the 
participants from one of the SSE-CMM five levels. In the charts, the more two points from each 
color get closer, the more the perception of the participant get closer before and after the breach. 
For example, for the level 1 participant, we can conclude that her or his perception regarding the 
five security policies was entirely different. On the other hand, if we look at the level 2 
participant we can conclude that her or his perception regarding acceptable use policy was 
almost the same before and after the breach, whereas his or her perception regarding information 
security roles and responsibilities policy differs significantly.  
To sum up, the perception of the participants after the policy was mostly different from their 
perception before the policy. Some of them had some similarities in their perceptions regarding 
some of the policy themes as we saw in the example above. However, no one had an identical or 
very similar perception regarding all the themes before and after the breach.   
Also, a comparison was conducted to compare the participant’s perception within each group. 
For example, figure 5.14 shows how participants from level 4 group have different perceptions 


























Figure 5.14: the difference in the participant’s perception regarding the security policy (pre- and post- breach). 
 
 
Each colored line in the figure 5.14 represents the perception of one participant. The figure 
displays how the participants had some differences in their perceptions regarding each of the five 
policies before introducing the security breach. When two points on two different lines intersect, 
that means the two participants have the same perception regarding the respected policy. As the 
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perception regarding the information security roles and responsibilities policy; however, their 
perceptions were widely different regarding the remote access policy.  
The same analysis was conducted for all of the groups before and after the initiation of the 
security breach. The results from each group were consistent with the previous results. The 
participants in each group had different perceptions regarding the security policy. That difference 
in their perception was due to the different understanding of the same security policy. People in 
an organization may understand the same security policy in different ways in regards to the 
differences in their values. An individual has a different psychological process that she or he can 
use to understand the world around her/him (Kelly, 1963). 
As mentioned before, it is not easy to link these results to the prior studies because, to our 
knowledge, no study that examined the people perceptions regarding the security policy. Some 
scholars like Siponen and Iivari (2006) investigated how different norms can influence the 
success of the security policy.  
Likewise, the content analysis has been achieved for various subgroups to show how different 
subgroups of the participants perceive the Crown Confections security policy. In this study, the 
participants were first categorized into five groups in accordance with the SSE-CMM five levels. 
Then, each of the five groups was re-grouped one time based on the participants’ age and another 
time based on the participants’ experience. The content analysis is necessary when analyzing 
Repertory Grids. Many researchers used content analysis before doing any quantitative analysis.  
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5.3.2.1 Security Policy Perception and Age  
In this section, the groups were categorized based on the participants’ age. First, the participants 
groups were categorized into five groups according to the SSE-CMM levels. Then, each group of 
the five groups was categorized based on the age of the participants. After the grouping, content 
analyses were conducted for each subgroup.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
The participants of this group were sub-grouped based on their age. They were grouped into 
three groups: participants whose age was less than 20 years old; participants whose age was 
between 20 and 30 years old; and participants who were older than 30 years. Figure 5.15 shows 
how participants whose age was less than 20 years old perceived the five policy themes of the 
Crown Confections security policy before and after the occurrence of the security breach.  
Figure 5.15 shows the bar chart for the level 5 participants aged less than 20 years old. The 
charts demonstrate how this group perceived the security policy before the introduction of the 
security breach and how their perception changed after introducing the breach. According to the 
charts, the level 5 participants whose age was less than 20 years old believed that the most 
significant security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. That is, the 
participants considered the constructs related to the security policy process to be the most 























Figure 5.15: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age is less than 20 years old (before and after the breach).    
 
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the occurrence of the breach was very close. However, after the breach, the most important 
perceptions were those related to security policy process and form. Also, the number of the 
constructs that were considered as high, medium or low was different after introducing the 
breach. For example, 17.7% of the constructs that fall under G2 group were considered highly 
important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage changed to 11.8% after the 
breach.  
The same results were reached from the level 5 participants whose age was between 20 and 30 
































important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The 
perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the introduction of the 
breach was very close. However, the number of the constructs that were considered as high, 
medium or low changed after introducing the breach. Also, the second most significant 
perception was different before and after the breach. Before the breach, they considered 
perceptions related to both policy form and content as the next most significant perception 
(11.8%). After the breach, they considered perceptions related to policy form as the next most 














Figure 5.16: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 

































Finally, the third group of the level 5 participants who were older than 30 years had somewhat 
different perceptions of the policy before and after the breach, as can be drawn from figure 5.17. 
Before and after introducing the security breach, this group of the participants perceived that the 
most important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. Also, 
they believed that the next important constructs were those related to security policy form. The 
change in their perception was in the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high,” 
medium,” or “low.” The percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high” in G1, G2, and 
G3 groups of the policy perceptions increased from 12.5%, 8.1% and 6.6% to 19.9%, 16.2% and 

















Figure 5.17: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 

































To summarize, the analysis above shows that the individuals who work for organizations that 
have level 5 information security policy believed that the policy process was the most important 
aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. 
However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they may 
encounter.  
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
In this group, the participants were sub-grouped based on their age. They were grouped into 
three groups: participants whose age was less than 20 years old; participants whose age was 
between 20 and 30 years old; and participants who were older than 30 years old. Figure 5.18 
shows how the five policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old before and after the occurrence of the 
security breach.  
Figure 5.18 shows how the participants whose age was less than 20 years old perceive the 
security policy before the breach and how their perception changed after the occurrence of the 
breach. Before the breach, this group perceived that the constructs related to both security policy 
process and policy content as the most significant security policy perceptions. However, this 
group perceived that the constructs related to security policy process as the most significant 




















Figure 5.18: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age were less than 20 years old (before and after the breach). 
   
 
Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy before and 
after the breach was different. Also, the number of the constructs that got “high,” “medium,” or 
“low” importance changed after introducing the breach. For example, 19.1% of the constructs 
that are related to the G2 group were considered as highly important before introducing the 
breach. However, this percentage changed to 16.2% after the breach.  
The same results were reached from the level 4 participants whose age was between 20 and 30 
years old as it is indicated in figure 5.19. This group perceived that the most important security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. The perception of this group 
regarding the most significant security policy perception before and after the breach was almost 
































changed after introducing the breach (refer to figure 5.19). Also, before the breach, the next most 
significant perceptions were those related to both policy form and content (10%). However, after 
the breach, the next most significant perceptions were those related to policy form (5.9%) 





















Figure 5.19: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
Finally, the level 4 participants who were older than 30 years had very similar perceptions of the 
policy before and after the breach regarding the most significant and the next significant 
perception of the security policy as can be drawn from figure 5.20. However, for the percentage 
































the introduction of the breach. For example, the percentage of the constructs that were rated as 
“high,” “medium” and “low” in the G2 group changed from 23.5%, 8.8% and 8.8% to 22.1%, 



















Figure 5.20: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 40 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
To summarize, we can draw from the analysis above that the individuals who work for 
organizations that have a level 4 information security policy believed that the policy process was 
the most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating 
security policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security 

































• SSE-CMM Level Three 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants whose age was less 
than 20 years old; participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old; and participants who 
were older than 30 years old. Figure 5.21 shows how participants whose age was less than 20 
years old perceived the five policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy before and 













Figure 5.21: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age is less than 20 years old (before and after the breach).  
   
 
Figure 5.21 shows how the participants whose age was less than 20 years old perceived the 
security policy before the occurrence of the breach and how their perception changed after 
































security policy process as the most significant security policy perceptions before and after the 
introduction of the security breach. However, before the breach, they perceived perceptions 
related to security policy form as the next most significant policy perceptions. Whereas after the 
breach, they perceived perceptions related to security policy content as the next most significant 
policy perceptions.   
The perception of this group of the participants regarding the most significant security policy 
perception before and after the occurrence of the breach was very close. However, the number of 
the constructs related to G2 group that were rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low” changed after 
introducing the breach. For example, 19.1% of the constructs that are related to the G2 group 
were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage 
reduced to 8.8% after the breach. A similar reduction occurred in the percentage of the G1 and 
G3 construct groups that were considered as highly significant (refer to figure 5.21).  
Although, before the breach the level 3 participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old 
(as it is shown in figure 5.22) perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to security policy process. Also, they perceived the constructs related to the policy 
form as the next most significant constructs. Their perceptions were the same before and after the 
breach. The change in their perception was in the percentage of the constructs that were rated as 
“high,” “medium,” or “low.” For example, 28.9% of the constructs that are related to the G2 
group were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. This percentage was 















Figure 5.22: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
Similarly, the level 3 participants who were older than 30 years old perceive that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process. Moreover, 
they perceived the constructs related to the policy form as the next most significant constructs. 
Their perceptions were similar before and after the occurrence of the breach. The difference in 
their perception was in the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high,” “medium,” or 
“low.” For example, 30.9% of the constructs that are related to the G2 group were considered as 
highly important before introducing the breach. This percentage was reduced to 22.1% after the 

















































Figure 5.23: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
To summarize, from the analysis above we can see that the individuals who work for 
organizations that have level 3 information security policy believed that the policy process was 
the most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating 
security policy. However, their perceptions changed in response to the security incidents they 
have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Two 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants whose age was less 
than 20 years old; participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old; and participants who 
were older than 30 years old. Figure 5.24 shows how the participants whose age was less than 20 
years old perceived the five policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy before and 


















































Figure 5.24: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age is less than 20 years old (before and after the breach).    
 
 
Figure 5.24 shows that the participants whose age was less than 20 years old perceived the 
constructs related to security policy form as the most significant security policy perception group 
followed by security policy process. Here, the perception of this group of the participants 
regarding the security policy before and after the breach was very close. However, the number of 
the constructs related to each group that was rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low” changed after 
































considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage changed 
to 16.2% after the breach.  
The level 2 participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old had different perception 
regarding the security policy before and after the occurrence of the breach. Before the breach, 
this group perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy form (15.7%) followed by security policy process (13.2%). After the breach, this 
group perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process (14.2%) followed by security policy form (12.3%). Also, the percentage 
of constructs that were perceived as highly significant in all of the groups was change after the 
occurrence of the breach (refer to figure 5.25). For example, 9.3% of the constructs related to the 
G3 group were considered as highly significant before introducing the breach. After introducing 



























Figure 5.25: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age falls between 20 and 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
Lastly, different results were drawn from the level 2 participants who were older than 30 years 
old. Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to security policy process (17.7%) followed by security policy content (11.8%). 
After the breach, the perception of this group was changed. They perceived the most important 
security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process (20.6%) followed by 
security policy form (14.7%). Also, the percentage of constructs that were perceived as highly 




















































Figure 5.26: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose are older than 30 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
To summarize, from the analysis above we can see that the individuals who were work for 
organizations that have level 2 information security policy, except those who were younger than 
20 years old, believed that the policy process was the most important aspect that should be taken 
into consideration when developing or updating a security policy. However, their perception was 
not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level One 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups: participants who were younger 
than 20 years old; participants whose age was between 20 and 30 years old; and participants who 
































years old perceived the five policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy before and 

















Figure 5.27: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants whose age is less than 20 years old (before and after the breach).  
 
This chart shows how the participants who were younger than 20 years old perceived the security 
policy before and how their perception changed after introducing the breach. According to the 
figure 5.27, before the introduction of the security breach, this group believed that the constructs 
related to security policy process (8.8%) as the most significant security policy perceptions 
followed by those related to security policy content (5.9%). However, this perception changed 
after the occurrence of the security breach. After the introduction of the security breach, this 
































significant security policy perceptions followed by those related to security policy content 
(17.7%). Besides, the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high” was increased after 
introducing the breach. For example, 4.4% of the constructs that are related to the G1 group were 
considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage 
increased to 20.6% after the breach.  
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants whose age was between 20 and 30 
years old (as it is shown in figure 5.28). Before the introduction of the breach, this group 
perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to security 
policy process and those related to policy form (9.6%). After the introduction of the breach, this 
group perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process (13.2%) followed by those related to policy form (10.3%). Also, the 
change in their perception was in the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high,” 
“medium” and “low” in each perception group (refer to figure 5.28).  
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants who were older than 30 years old. 
Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those 
related to security policy form (5.9%) followed by those related to security process (%4.4). After 
the breach, they perceived the constructs related to the policy process (25%) as highly significant 
followed by those related to policy form (13.2%) (refer to figure 5.29). It is important to point 
out to that; generally, the percentage of constructs that were perceived as highly significant in all 
of the perception groups increased after the occurrence of the breach. With the G1 group, the 
percentage changed from 5.8% to 13.2%. For the G2 group, the percentage changed from 4.4% 


















Figure 5.28: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 



















Figure 5.29: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 






























































We can conclude from the analysis above that the individuals who work for organizations that 
have level 1 information security policy held different perceptions regarding the security policy 
in accordance with their age. They perceived that the policy process and the policy form were the 
most significant construct groups. However, their perception changed in response to the security 
incidents they have faced.  
To sum up, examining the five groups with the age subgrouping demonstrates how the 
perceptions of the participants in each group were different before and after introducing the 
security breach. That is, the perception of the participants regarding which constructs group was 
the highest significant was different before and after the occurrence of the security breach. For 
some of the groups, they perceived the same constructs group as the highest important group 
before and after the breach. In this case, the change in their perception was not regarding the 
constructs group that perceived as the highest important, but regarding the percentage of the 
constructs within each constructs group that were rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low.” For 
example, the level 2 participants who were older than 30 years perceived the policy process as 
the most significant constructs’ group. However, the percentage of constructs that were rated as 
“high” changed from 17.7% to 20.6%. The percentage of constructs that were rated as “medium” 
changed from 14.7% to 17.7%. The percentage of constructs that were rated as the least 
important changed from 8.8% to 2.9% after the breach. It is important to point out to that the 
perceptions of the participants after the occurrence of the security breach were not necessarily 
the optimal perceptions. That is, the occurrence of the breach does not fix the perceptions; it only 




5.3.2.2 Security Policy Perception and Experience  
Next, the content analysis was conducted on the groups that were categorized based on the 
experience of the participants. After categorizing the participants into five groups based on the 
SSE-CMM five levels, each group was categorized based on the experience of the participants. 
Then, each sub-group was analyzed via a content analysis.  
• SSE-CMM Level Five 
The participants of this group were sub-grouped into three groups based on their experience: 
participants who had less than 2 years of experience, participants who had between 1 to 5 years 
of experience and participants who had more than 5 years of experience. Figure 5.30 shows how 
the participants who had less than 2 years of experience perceived the five policy themes of the 















Figure 5.30: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 

































The charts in figure 5.30 show that the level 5 participants who had less than 2 years of 
experience perceived that the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process followed by those related to policy form. That is, the participants 
considered the constructs related to the security policy process and how it should be as the most 
significant aspects of the security policy.  
Here, the perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the breach was 
very similar. Though, the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high,” “medium,” or 
“low” changed after introducing the breach. For example, 20.6% of the constructs that fall under 
G2 group were rated as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this 
percentage increased to 23.5% after the occurrence of the breach. Similarly, the change occurred 
to G1 and G3 (refer to figure 5.30).  
For the level 5 participants who had between 2 to 5 years of experience, they perceived that 
perceptions that related to security policy process were the most important security policy 
perceptions as it appears in figure 5.31. The difference here was in the constructs that considered 
as the next significant ones. Their perception regarding the most significant security policy 
aspects before and after the breach was similar. Before the breach, the policy form and policy 
content got the same percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high.” After the breach, the 
next significant constructs’ group was the policy form. Also, the percentage of the constructs that 
























Figure 5.31: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with between 2 and 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
Finally, the third group of the level 5 participants who had more than 5 years of experience had 
different perceptions of the policy before and after the breach as can be drawn from figure 5.32. 
Before introducing the security breach, this group perceived that the most important security 
policy perceptions were those related to security policy content followed by those related to 
security policy form. After introducing the breach, this group perceived that the most important 
security policy perceptions were those related to security policy form followed by those related 
to security policy process. The perception of this group totally changed after introducing the 
security breach. Besides that, the percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high,” 


















































Figure 5.32: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with more than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
To summarize, individuals who work for organizations that have level 5 information security 
policy, except who had more than 5 years of experience, believed that the policy process was the 
most important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating 
security policy. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security 
incidents they have faced.  
• SSE-CMM Level Four 
The participants of this group were categorized into three groups based on their experience: 
participants who had less than 2 years of experience, participants who had between 2 and 5 years 
































did the participants who had less than 2 years of experience perceived the five policy themes of 




















Figure 5.33: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have less than 2 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
   
 
 Figure 5.33 illustrates how the participants who had less than 2 years of experience perceived 
the security policy before the occurrence of the breach and how their perception changed after 
the breach. The charts show that this group perceived the constructs related to security policy 
process as the most significant security policy perceptions. Their perception after the breach was 
consistent with their perception before introducing the security breach. The next most significant 
perception before the breach was policy content, whereas the next most significant perception 
































“medium,” or “low” changed after introducing the breach. For example, before the breach the 
percentage of the constructs that were rated as “high” in the G1 group was 8.8%, in the G2 group 
was 15.7% and in the G3 group was 13.7%. These percentages changed after the occurrence of 
the breach to 9.8% in the G1 group, 11.8% in the G2 group and 7.8% in the G3 group.  
Different results were drawn from the level 4 participants who had between 2 and 5 years of 
experience as it appears in figure 5.34. The perception of this group regarding the security policy 
before and after the breach was different. Before the breach, this group believed that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process and those 
related to security policy content. After the breach, however, this group believed that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process followed by 
those related to security policy form. Also, the number of the constructs that got “high,” 
“medium,” or “low” importance level in their ratings changed after introducing the breach (refer 
to figure 5.34). For example, the percentage of the constructs that were rated as highly important 


























Figure 5.34: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with between 2 and 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
Lastly, the level 4 participants who had more than 5 years of experience held same perceptions 
regarding which group was the most influential group before and after the breach. They 
perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to security 
policy form. Here the difference was in the next significant security perception. Before the 
breach, the next important security policy perceptions were those related to the policy process. 
On the other hand, the next important security policy perceptions after the breach were those 
related to policy process and content. Also, the number of the constructs that rated as “high,” 
“medium,” or “low” changed after introducing the breach (refer to figure 5.35). For example, the 
percentage of the constructs that were rated as highly important in the G3 group was 17.7% 



















































Figure 5.35: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have more than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
To conclude, from the analysis above we can see that individuals who work for organizations 
that have level 4 information security policy and had higher experience (more than 5 years) had 
different perception regarding security policy from individuals who had less experience. 
Individuals who had less experience believed that the policy process was the most important 
aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. 
However, their perception could change in response to any security incident they may face.  
• SSE-CMM Level Three 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups; participants who had less than 2 
































who had more than 5 years of experience. Figure 5.36 shows how did participants who had less 






















Figure 5.36: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have less than 2 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
   
 
The charts show that, before and after the introduction of the security breach, the participants 
who had less than 2 years of experience perceived the constructs related to security policy 
process as the most significant security policy perceptions followed by those related to security 
policy form. The perception of this group regarding the security policy before and after the 
































“high,” “medium,” or “low” important in each construct group changed after introducing the 
breach. For example, 25% of the constructs that are related to the G2 group were considered as 
highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage changed to 20.4% after 
the breach.  
Similarly, results of the level 3 participants who had between 2 to 5 years of experience show 
that they believed that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process (as it is shown in figure 5.37). The perception of this group regarding the 
most significant security policy perception before and after the breach was similar (refer to figure 
4.37). However, the different was in the next significant security policy perception. Before the 
breach, this group perceived the constructs related to security policy form as the next significant 
policy perception. Whereas after the breach, this group perceived the constructs related to 
security policy content as the next significant policy perception. Also, the percentage of the 
constructs related to each group that was considered as “high,” “medium,” or “low” important 
changed after introducing the breach. As it appears in figure 5.37, the percentage of the 
constructs that were rated as “high” in G2 changed from 20.6% before the breach to 17.7% after 





























Figure 5.37: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with between 2 and 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
Lastly, results of the level 3 participants who had more than 5 years of experience show that this 
group perceives that the most significant security policy perceptions were those related to 
security policy process followed by those related to security form. The change in their 
perceptions could appear from the change in the percentage of the constructs that was rated as 
“high,” “medium,” or “low” in each group and how this percentage changed after introducing the 
breach. For example, the percentage of the constructs that was rated as “high” in the G1, G2, and 


















































Figure 5.38: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with more than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
From the analysis above, we can see that the individuals who work for organizations that had 
level 3 information security policy believed that the policy form was the most important aspect 
that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security policy. However, 
their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they have encountered.  
• SSE-CMM Level Two 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups; participants who had less than 2 
years of experience, participants who had between 2 to 5 years of experience and participants 

















































Figure 5.39: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have less than 2 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
   
 
Figure 5.39 shows how participants who had less than 2 years of experience perceived the 
security policy before and after the occurrence of the security breach. As it can be drawn from 
the figure, the participants in this group perceived that the constructs related to security policy 
form as the most influential group of the constructs followed by those related to security policy 
process. Here, the perception of this group of the participants regarding the security policy 
changed after the occurrence of the security breach. After the breach, this group perceived the 
constructs related to security policy process to be the most influential group of the constructs, 
followed by those related to security policy form. Also, the percentage of the constructs related 
to each group that was considered as “high,” “medium,” or “low” significant differed after 
































were considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage 
changed to 18.6% after the breach.  
Similarly, before the breach the level 2 participants with between 2 to 5 years of experience 
perceived that the most important security policy perceptions were those related to security 
policy form followed by those related to the policy process. After the breach, this group 
perceived the constructs related to security policy process as the most important group of the 
constructs followed by those related to security policy content. Also, the number of constructs 
that were rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low” in all of the groups changed after the breach (refer 
to figure 5.40). For example, 14.1% of the constructs that were related to the G1 group are 
considered as highly significant before introducing the breach. After introducing the breach, this 
percentage changed to 8.8%.  
Finally, different results were drawn from the level 2 participants who had more than 5 years of 
experience. Before the breach, they perceived that the most important security policy perceptions 
are those related to security policy process followed by those related to security policy content. 
were the breach, the perception of this group changed. They perceived the constructs related to 
the policy form as the most important perception followed by those related to policy process 






















Figure 5.40: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 




















Figure 5.41: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 






























































What can be drawn from the analysis is that the individuals who work for organizations that have 
level 2 information security policy held different perceptions regarding what was the most 
important aspect that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security 
policy. Also, their perception was not stable. It was affected by the security incidents they may 
face.  
• SSE-CMM Level One 
The participants of this group were grouped into three groups; participants who had less than 2 
years of experience, participants who had between 2 to 5 years of experience and participants 


















Figure 5.42: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants who have less than 2 years of experience (before and after the breach).  

































Figure 5.42 shows how the security policy of the Crown Confections was perceived by 
participants who have less than 2 years of experience before and after the occurrence of the 
security breach. The chart shows that this group of participants perceived that the constructs 
related to the security policy process were the most significant security policy perceptions before 
the introduction of the security breach, followed by those related to policy form. After the 
breach, this group perceived the security policy form as the most significant security policy 
perception followed by those related to security policy process. Also, the percentage of the 
constructs that were considered as “high,” “medium,” or “low” important changed after 
introducing the breach. For example, 7.8% of the constructs that are related to the G2 group were 
considered as highly important before introducing the breach. However, this percentage changed 
to 12.8% after the breach.  
Different results were drawn from the level 1 participants who had between 2 to 5 years of 
experience (as it is shown in figure 5.43). Before the breach, this group of participants perceived 
that the constructs related to security policy form as the most significant security policy 
perceptions followed by those related to the policy process. After the introduction of the security 
breach, they perceive that the constructs related to security policy process as the most significant 
security policy perceptions, followed by those related to policy form. Also, the percentage of the 
constructs that were considered as “high,” “medium,” or “low” important changed after 



















Figure 5.43: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with between 2 to 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
Lastly, level 1 participants who had more than 5 years of experience perceived that the most 
important security policy perceptions were those related to security policy process followed by 
those related to policy form. Their perception regarding the most significant policy perception 
was similar before and after the breach. However, the percentage of the constructs that were 
considered as “high,” “medium,” or “low” important changed after introducing the breach. Also, 
the percentage of the constructs in each of the three groups that were rated as “high” increased 

















































Figure 5.44: How the five main policy themes of the Crown Confections security policy were perceived by 
participants with more than 5 years of experience (before and after the breach).  
 
 
The analysis above shows that the perceptions of individuals who work for organizations that 
have level 1 information security policy regarding which of the policy perceptions was the most 
significant one that should be taken into consideration when developing or updating security 
policy were between policy process and policy form. They gave the least importance to 
constructs related to policy content. However, their perception was not stable. It was affected by 
the security incidents they have faced.  
To sum up, the results from analyzing the five groups with the experience subgrouping expresses 
the changes in the perceptions of the participants in each group before and after introducing the 
security breach. That is, the perception of the participants regarding which constructs group is 
the highest significant one was different before and after the breach. In some cases, some of the 
































breach. In these cases, the change in their perception appeared in the percentage of the constructs 
within each constructs group that was rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low,” but not regarding the 
constructs group that was perceived as the highest important. For example, the level 1 
participants who had more than 5 years of experience perceived the policy process as the most 
important group both before and after the breach. However, the percentage of constructs in the 
G2 group that were rated as “high” important changed from 11.8% to 17.7%. The percentage of 
constructs in the G2 group that were rated as “medium” important changed from 20.6% to 
16.2%. Also, the percentage of constructs in the G2 group that were rated as the least important 
changed from 10.3% to 7.4% after the breach (refer to figure 5.44). It is important to point out to 
that the perception of the participants after the occurrence of the security breach is not 
necessarily the optimal perception. That is, the occurrence of the breach does not correct the 
perception. However, the occurrence of any security breach can cause changes the participants’ 
perceptions, which could be reflected on their norms.   
 
5.3.3 Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
The principal components analysis was applied on each of the Repertory Grids to find the 
components or factors that represent a set of bipolar constructs. Indeed, it is very common for the 
principal components analysis to be used for analyzing Repertory Grid data (Huang et al., 2007). 
PCA helps in identifying the correlations between constructs and grouping the constructs into a 
set of labels. This step helps in finding which constructs are highly significant. In this study, the 
constructs were grouped using PCA that utilized the ratings of the participants. The PCA could 
show the security policy aspects that had the most effect on developing an effective security 
policy. This goal is not necessary for the aim of this study. Instead, the PCA was used in this 
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study to show the differences in the perception of the participants before and after the 
introduction of the security breach.   
Each grid was analyzed using the principle components analysis following the same steps of the 
PCA that were applied in the alpha stage. In this research, both Excel 2011 and SPSS 23 were 
used to achieve this analysis. For the purpose of this study, the correlation was done among the 
constructs. The researcher chose the number of factors to retain based on the eigenvalues. The 
number of factors that were retained in this study was between three and four factors. A sample 
of SPSS sheet is available in the appendix.  
Furthermore, the researcher used Varimax Orthogonal Rotation, which is the default type of 
rotation. It is important to mention that PCA was applied to the data drawn before the 
introduction of the breach (we called it “pre-breach PCA”) and the data drawn after the breach 
(we called it “post-breach PCA”). Table 5.2 shows a sample of the loadings of one of the grids. It 











Table 5.2: Varimax Rotated Construct Loadings.  
Constructs Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
This policy is customized / reflect the organization's culture -0.282 0.935 -0.115 0.182 
This policy is in advanced level / provide high level of security / strong -0.254 0.906 0.287 0.178 
This policy follows the latest standard for creating policies 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy shows who is responsible for what/ The employee can know 
if it applicable to him/her or not -0.671 -0.418 -0.585 -0.181 
This policy is prescriptive / shows how to do it (guidelines is included) 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy tells what to do in case of breach / the guideline to execute 
the policy is clear 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The standards and guidelines are clearly separated 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The standards within this policy do not conflict with other standards and 
policies 0.653 0.262 -0.695 0.145 
The standards within this policy are consistent 0.831 0.396 -0.338 0.198 
This policy has the required level of detail / explain all the rules in 
details 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy has the required controls/ rules -0.282 0.935 -0.115 0.182 
Employees can have the same understanding to this policy 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
Removing this policy will affect the level of security of the organization 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy is simple, clear and straightforward 0.892 0.082 -0.424 0.133 
This policy is accurate and precise 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The standards within this policy are not repeated in other policies -0.653 -0.262 0.695 -0.145 
This policy is easy to remember  0.877 -0.082 0.465 0.091 
The link between this policy and other policies is available and clear 0.014 0.121 0.992 0.028 
This policy has standards that are subset of another policy 0.014 0.121 0.992 0.028 
The purpose of this policy is clear and understandable 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The risk of non-complying to this policy is available and clear 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are stated clearly/ explicit -0.222 -0.317 0.067 -0.92 
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are enough 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
The sanctions of non-complying to this policy are specific -0.222 -0.317 0.067 -0.92 
Both the technical and business parts of this policy are available 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
Easy to comply with this policy  0.753 0.607 -0.091 0.237 
The boundary of the policy is clear / it is clear what it covers and what 
not  0.867 0.445 -0.072 0.213 
The cost of following this policy is less than the benefit of following it 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy serves the business objectives / goals 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
This policy reflects its importance to me (as an employee) / it is 
important for the security of the organization -0.282 0.935 -0.115 0.182 
This policy is flexible / less strict 0.558 0.443 0.347 0.61 
This policy is reasonable and appropriate -0.184 0.477 -0.855 0.089 
This policy is written in simple, plain language 0.951 0.247 -0.048 0.178 
This policy is well-documented / well-structured / precise / organized 0.984 -0.156 0.003 0.088 
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After applying the principle components analysis on each grid, a huge number of factors was 
resulted. Therefore, a priori set of labels were identified. The researcher scoured the literature for 
the aspects of creating a robust policy. This literature scouring resulted in the following list of 
labels: 
• Policy process (Knapp et al., 2009): how the policy should be and should be 
implemented. 
• Clarity of the policy (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010): clearness, non-ambiguity of the 
policy content and it easiness to understand.  
• Policy breadth (Goel and Chengalur-Smith, 2010): the policy scope, range, or coverage. 
• Policy Standards and guidelines 9Peltier, 2001): aspects related to the “how” aspect of 
the policy; how the rules should be applied and implemented.  
• Consequences of non-compliance with policy (Hsu et al., 2015): the influence of the non-
compliance to security policy on the organization or/and the individuals within the 
organization. 
• Policy level of advancement (Herath and Rao, 2009): aspects related to improving or 
advancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy. 
• Policy documentation: All rules, standards and guidelines needed are documented and 
available. 
The next step was to assign each component to one of these labels. In this study, an “inductive 
coding” (Patton, 2002) was used to assign each component to the proper label from the pre-
identified list. Sometimes, a component cannot fit with any label. In such cases, that component 
should be labeled as “Ambiguous.” An additional round of inductive coding was conducted to 
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assess the labeling process and to check if any of the “Ambiguous” components can fit any of the 
labels. Consequently, this process resulted in one change to one of the “Ambiguous” 
components.  
For the pre-breach PCA, 29 out of 188 components were labels as “Ambiguous.” Thus, 159 
components were assigned to one of the pre-defined labels. Table 5.3 shows a list of the labeled 
components that were generated from pre-breach PCA. The “X” indicates that the component 
was not included in the rotation.     
For the post-breach PCA, 19 out of 184 components were labels as “Ambiguous.” Thus, 165 
components were assigned to one of the labels. Table 5.4 shows a list of the labeled components 
that were created from post-breach PCA. The “X” indicates that the component is not included in 












Table 5.3: summary of pre-breach PCA that shows the labels of the components. 
  Grid# Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
L5 
1 Clarity Ambiguous Process Process 
2 Process Ambiguous Ambiguous Clarity 
3 Guideline Process Ambiguous Process 
4 Clarity Process Documentation Process 
5 Clarity Breadth Consequence Process 
6 Process Process Ambiguous Breadth 
7 Ambiguous Clarity Documentation  Documentation 
8 Process Ambiguous Documentation Breadth 
9 Clarity Ambiguous Process Process 
10 Process Ambiguous Documentation Breadth 
L4 
1 Ambiguous Process Process Guideline 
2 Process Ambiguous Documentation Clarity 
3 Process Ambiguous Process Guideline 
4 Process Clarity Clarity Guideline 
5 Clarity Documentation Breadth Guideline 
6 Process Ambiguous Process Clarity 
7 Process Ambiguous Clarity Breadth 
8 Process Clarity Process Ambiguous 
9 Process Process Clarity Ambiguous 
L3 
1 Process Ambiguous Process Clarity 
2 Process Ambiguous Consequence Documentation 
3 Clarity Clarity Breadth Process 
4 Process Process Ambiguous Process 
5 Process Clarity Ambiguous Process 
6 Process Process Ambiguous Clarity 
7 Process Ambiguous Process Process 
8 Process Process Ambiguous Guideline 
9 Process Clarity Process Consequence 
10 Clarity Process Clarity Process 
L2 
1 Process Ambiguous Level of advancement Process 
2 Clarity Process Documentation Clarity 
3 Process Process Clarity Documentation 
4 Process Ambiguous Clarity Breadth 
5 Process Process Clarity Guideline 
6 Process Documentation Guideline Consequence 
7 Process Consequence Clarity Documentation 
8 Process Process Process Consequence 
9 Process Clarity Process Level of advancement 
10 Process Process Clarity Consequence 
L1 
1 Ambiguous Process Process Process 
2 Process Ambiguous Clarity Clarity 
3 Process Process Process Ambiguous 
4 Process Process Clarity Process 
5 Process Process Clarity Guideline 
6 Clarity Process Process Process 
7 Process Process Process Documentation 
8 Process Ambiguous Process Guideline 
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Table 5.4: summary of post-breach PCA that shows the labels of the components. 
  Grid# Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
L5 
1 Ambiguous Process Clarity Clarity 
2 Ambiguous Clarity Documentation Documentation 
3 Clarity Process Guideline Consequence 
4 Process Breadth Clarity Clarity 
5 Clarity Ambiguous Process Clarity 
6 Clarity Process Clarity Guideline 
7 Process Clarity Documentation Guideline 
8 Ambiguous Process Guideline Documentation 
9 Ambiguous Ambiguous Process Documentation 
10 Ambiguous Documentation Consequence Guideline 
L4 
1 Process Consequence Clarity X 
2 Process Clarity Documentation Clarity 
3 Clarity Clarity Process Clarity 
4 Process Ambiguous Guideline Documentation 
5 Clarity Level of advancement Process Process 
6 Process Level of advancement Ambiguous Process 
7 Clarity Documentation Clarity Clarity 
8 Process Ambiguous Process Level of advancement 
9 Clarity Documentation Process Clarity 
L3 
1 Process Ambiguous Clarity Clarity 
2 Clarity Level of advancement Ambiguous Process 
3 Process Process Clarity Guideline 
4 Clarity Process Ambiguous Consequence 
5 Clarity Consequence Process Level of advancement 
6 Process Process Guideline Process 
7 Process Ambiguous Process Clarity 
8 Process Clarity Clarity X 
9 Process Ambiguous Clarity Clarity 
10 Clarity Process Level of advancement Process 
L2 
1 Ambiguous Guideline Clarity Ambiguous 
2 Process Process Clarity Guideline 
3 Process Ambiguous Clarity Breadth 
4 Process Clarity Clarity X 
5 Clarity Process Process Clarity 
6 Process Clarity Clarity Level of advancement 
7 Process Process Documentation  X 
8 Ambiguous Level of advancement Documentation Consequence 
9 Process Clarity Consequence Process 
10 Clarity Process Process Process 
L1 
1 Clarity Clarity Process Documentation 
2 Process Process Process Clarity 
3 Process Clarity Clarity Documentation 
4 Clarity Process Guideline Guideline 
5 Process Clarity Guideline Clarity 
6 Clarity Process Clarity Documentation 
7 Clarity Clarity Breadth Clarity 
8 Process Process Clarity Process 
	 208	
The next step was to apply an eyeball analysis on both tables to identify which of the bipolar 
constructs (i.e. perceptions of the security policy) have the most influence on the effectiveness 
security policy. For the pre-breach PCA, the most important security policy perceptions were 
those related to the policy process. The second predominant security policy perceptions were 
those related to the policy clarity. The third predominant security policy perceptions were those 
related to the documentation of the security policy. Table 5.5 shows the number of occurrence of 
each label for the pre-breach PCA. For the post-breach PCA, the predominant security policy 
perceptions were those related to policy clarity. The second predominant security policy 
perceptions were those related to the policy process. The third predominant security policy 
perceptions were those related to security standards and guidelines and policy documentation. 
Table 5.6 shows the number of occurrence of each label for the post-breach PCA.   
 
Table 5.5: the number of occurrence of each label for the pre-breach PCA. 

















Table 5.6: the number of occurrence of each label for the post-breach PCA. 











The results of the pre-breach and the post-breach PCAs show the difference in the ranking of the 
perceptions. In general, the participants believed that the policy clarity and policy process had a 
higher effect on the effectiveness of the security policy. Table 5.5 shows that the policy process 
had the highest effect on the security policy perception before the occurrence of the security 
breach. An example of the aspects related to policy process is “the policy should be customized 
and reflect the organization culture.” On the other hand, table 5.6 shows that policy clarity had a 
major effect on the security policy perception after the introduction of the breach. That is, after 
introducing the security breach, the participants believed that the security policy should be clear 
and understandable. 
The second predominant factor before the breach was the aspect related to clarity of the security 
policy. In other words, participants believed that the policy should be clear and understandable. 
Furthermore, the second predominant factor after the breach was the aspect related to the policy 
process.  
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Besides, the third factor that had a significant influence before the breach was the aspect related 
to documentation of the security policy. In other words, participants believed that the security 
policy should be well documented to be more effective. The good documentation includes, but 
not limited to, the good wording, simplicity, and completeness. On the other hand, the third 
predominant factor after the breach was the aspect related to security policy guideline. In other 
words, the participants believed that the security policy should be clear, understandable and 
clearly separated from the rules. The last three factors on each table had less effect on 
perceptions of the security policy.  
By comparing the results of the pre-breach PCA and post-breach PCA, the results reveal how the 
perceptions regarding which factors have the major influence on the perception of the security 
policy changed after the occurrence of the security breach. Table 5.5 and table 5.6 show that 
before the breach, the three factors that had the significant influence were policy process, policy 
clarity, and consequences of non-compliance. This result is consistent with the previous studies. 
After the breach, the three factors that had the significant influence were policy process, policy 
clarity, and policy documentation. According to Knapp et al. (2009), policy process can 
contribute to the success of the information security. Goel and Chengalur-Smith (2010) 
emphasize that policy clarity is an important measure to measure the quality of a security policy. 
On the other hand, the policy documentation is not an easy process. Ensuring the effectiveness of 
the security policy is an important issue. Thus, the security policy document should support the 





5.4 Conclusion  
The primary goal of the beta stage is to investigate how individuals in an organization perceive 
the security policy of their organization differently and how their perceptions differ after the 
occurrence of a security breach. In this stage, we assessed and evaluated the alpha version of the 
artifact to develop a more mature artifact, the beta artifact. Here, the beta version artifact was the 
Repertory Grid as rated by the participants at this stage before and after the breach, per figure 
5.1.   
The grids were analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively after the participants rated them. First, 
the constructs within the grids were categorized via core categorization. Then, each grid was 
analyzed via content analysis and principal components analysis (PCA). The results drawn from 
these analyses illustrate how the participants perceived security policy differently and how these 











Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
5.5 Introduction 
This chapter aims to synthesize the findings and implications of this research. In this chapter, we 
interpret and discuss the findings from our study to confirm their contributions to both the 
practice and academia. These findings include shaping the values of people via security policy in 
the first place, changing people values in response to a security incident, and the relationship 
between people values and security policy, which can be identified through the assessment of 
norm-rule compliance. In this study, we argue that occurrence of security incident may cause 
changes to values in light of the security policy of an organization. These changes in the values 
may be reflected on the compliance of people’s norms with information security rules and 
standards.  
Previous IS literature studied the factors that directly and indirectly affect compliance with 
security policies. Few studies have touched on how norms influence employees’ intention to 
comply with security policies. That is, they studied the link between the values and security 
policies. However, the IS literature ignores how people values (in respect to security policy) 
change in response to a security breach.  
Thus, this chapter tries to answer our research questions regarding what are people’s values in 
regard to security policy, how their values change in response to a security incident, and how 
organizations can assess the relationship between people norms and security rules and standards 
in order to develop a more effective security policy.  
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6.2 Security Policy Shapes Individual’s Values  
This study argues that values of individuals in an organization are shaped by the security policy 
of the organization at the first place. That is, when employees receive the security policy of their 
organization, they gain preliminary perceptions regarding these security policies, which in turn 
play a significant role in shaping their values. Previous research indicates that the policy can 
shape the people’s norms, and behaviors (Sabatier and Weible, 2014; Schneider and Ingram 
1997). On the other hand, people who belong to the same organization may have different 
perceptions and understanding according to the different values they have in the first place 
(Vaast, 2007; Albrecthsen and Hovdena, 2009). 
The findings of this research indicate that there is a noticeable difference among employees 
values concerning their organization’s security policy. By comparing the ratings of the 
participants before the breach in both stages (the alpha stage and the beta stage), we can see the 
differences in people perceptions regarding each of the security policy. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show 
how the participants who have the same security policy perceived these policies differently in the 
two stages, the alpha stage and the beta stage, respectively. When two points on two different 
lines intersect, that means the two participants have the same perception regarding the respected 
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As it appears in the figures above, there are big deviations in the individuals’ perceptions 
regarding each policy. Thus, even though they have the same security policy, this security policy 
does not shape their norms in the same way. They may construe the security policy differently 
due to the differences in the individuals’ original values. This finding is consistent with Kelly’s 
(1955) Personal Construct Theory that implies that people construe events around them based on 
their personal experience, values, and beliefs.  
At the groups level, the results of this study show that people perceptions regarding security 
policy vary in accordance with the maturity level of the information security policy. In this 
study, we had five groups of participants and five versions of the information security policy, 
each with a different level of SSE-CMM. Each group had a different version of the security 
policy. At the alpha stage, individuals who received a security policy with a lower maturity level 
had different perceptions from those who received a security policy with higher maturity level. 
Table 6.1 shows the means of the five groups as divided based on the five SSE-CMM levels.  
 
 




Info. Sec. Roles 
and 
Responsibilities 
Password Policy E-mail policy Remote Access Policy 
L1 
MEAN 3.00 3.55 2.45 2.45 1.91 
SD 1.61 1.21 1.29 1.21 1.22 
L2 
MEAN 3.25 3.75 2.88 3.00 2.88 
SD 1.39 1.04 1.25 1.20 1.25 
L3 
MEAN 3.17 3.42 3.92 3.42 3.08 
SD 1.03 1.24 1.16 0.79 1.16 
L4 
MEAN 4.22 4.00 4.67 3.67 3.33 
SD 0.67 0.71 0.50 1.00 1.41 
L5 
MEAN 3.53 3.71 4.29 4.24 3.47 
SD 1.18 0.99 0.69 0.75 1.01 
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It can be seen from table 6.1 that the policy related to “information security roles and 
responsibilities” was perceived to be the most significant policy that should get more attention 
for participants with the lower maturity levels policy (level1 and level2). On the other hand, 
participants with the higher maturity levels policy (level3, level4, and level5) perceived 
“password policy” to be the most significant policy that should get more attention. Consistent 
results were drawn from the beta stage. Individuals with the lower maturity levels policy 
perceived “clean desk policy” as the most significant policy that should get more attention. 
Individuals with the higher maturity levels policy perceived “password policy” and “email 
policy” as the most significant policy that should get more attention. Therefore, the maturity 
level of the information security policy plays a significant role in the process of shaping the 
people’s perceptions regarding the security policy.  
Moreover, the results of this study indicate that people’s perceptions regarding security policy 
differ according to the age of the individuals. In this study, each SSE-CMM level group was 
grouped into three subgroups based on their age range. People from the same age group hold 
different perceptions regarding the same security policy. Norms of an individual are typically 
affected by age (De Kort, 2008; Morris and Venkatesh, 2000). Siponen and Vance (2010) has a 
consistent result. Their study indicates that the age of an individual affects his or her intention to 
violate the security policy. Thus, the differences in individuals’ age will be reflected on how 
those individuals construe the same security policy.  
Similarly, the results of this study indicate that people’s perceptions regarding security policy 
differ according to their experience. Here, we had three subgroups of participants within each 
SSE-CMM levels group. These subgroups were grouped based on their experience. Individuals 
who belong to the same experience group had different perceptions regarding the same security 
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policy. The experience of an individual can influence the individual’s norms (Venkatesh and 
Morris, 2000; Thompson et al., 1996). Consistent with this argument, Siponen and Vance (2010) 
indicate that the experience of an individual affects his or her intention to violate the security 
policy. When the experience of a person increases, his or her norms will change according to the 
change in his or her experience. This change in the individual’s norms will be reflected on how 
she or he construe the security policy since an individual construes events around her/him in 
accordance with his or her norms and values (Kelly, 1955).  
The deviations in people’s perceptions regarding the information security policy reflect the 
mismatch between security rules and standards and people’s norms. This mismatch between 
rules and norms can be reflected on people’s compliance with the information security policy 
(Vaast, 2007; Albrecthsen and Hovden, 2009). That is, individuals who have different 
perceptions regarding the security policy interpret these policies differently, which in turn will be 
reflected on their compliance behavior. It is typically impossible for all individuals to have 
shared perceptions regarding the same security policy. However, organizations need to reduce or 
eliminate the deviation in the perceptions of their employees through applying various means 
such as training and awareness. Indeed, awareness affects the people’s perceptions and beliefs 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Some organizations do not have awareness programs. Other 
organizations have some awareness programs, but their employees still have a deviation in their 
perceptions. That deviation may be attributed to the kind of awareness programs they have. 
Previous authors have suggested various approaches for developing robust security awareness 




6.3 Security Breaches Can Influence Individual’s Values  
The results of this study show that the differences among people’s perceptions were still 
available even after they were exposed to security breaches. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show differences 
in both the alpha stage and the beta stage.   
 
Figure 6.3: Perceptions of the whole participants regarding each security policy before the breach (level five 
participants – the alpha stage). 
 
Figure 6.4: Perceptions of the whole participants regarding each security policy before the breach (level five 
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The figures above show the big deviations in the perceptions of the individuals regarding the 
security policy. Indeed, this security policy does not shape their norms in the same way, even 
when they have the same security policy.  
Similarly, our results show that there is a deviation between an individual’s perception regarding 
the security policy before and after the occurrence of a security breach. The deviation can be big 
or small. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 provide examples of the individuals’ perceptions regarding the 








Figure 6.5: An example of an individual’s perception regarding the security policy before and after the breach and 








Figure 6.6: An example of an individual’s perception regarding the security policy before and after the breach and 






















In some cases, the deviation in an individual’s perception may be in some of the policies, not all 
of the five policies. That is, some individuals have the same perception regarding some of the 
policies before and after the breach. Such cases can be linked to the type of breach the 
participants were exposed to during the experiment. If the breach is not related to one (or more) 
of the five policies, the perception of participants regarding that policy may be still the same 
before and after the breach. For example, level 2 participants from the alpha stage were exposed 
to a phishing e-mail security breach. Some of the participants within this group have the same 
perception regarding the policy related to “information security roles and responsibilities,” which 
may have less or no link to the phishing e-mail security breach. Figure 6.7 shows an example of 
participant’s perception from level 2 groups who exposed to phishing e-mail. As can be seen 
from the figure, his or her perception regarding “information security roles and responsibilities” 
policy is mostly the same before and after the occurrence of the security breach. Also, level 2 
participants from the beta stage were exposed to a phishing e-mail security breach. Some of the 
participants within this group have the same perception regarding the password policy, which 
can have less or no link to the phishing e-mail security breach. Figure 6.8 shows an example of 
participant’s perception from level 2 groups (from the beta stage) who exposed to phishing e-
mail in the beta stage. As can be seen from the figure his or her perception regarding the 























Figure 6.8: Example of participant’s perception from level 2 groups who exposed to phishing e-mail (the beta stage). 
 
 
Likewise, other factors such as the experience of the individuals may have a significant influence 
on the amount of deviation in an individual’s perception regarding a security policy. In some 
cases, perceptions of individuals who have more experience tend to have less deviation than 
those who have less experience. Figure 6.9 shows individuals from the same group who has the 


















deviations between the perceptions of each one before and after the breach differ in accordance 





a) A participant with more than 5 




b) A participant with between 3 




c) A participant with less than 3 




Figure 6.9: different amount of deviations in perceptions of individuals from the same group who has the same 
































The experience of an individual has an effect on the people’s norms (Venkatesh and Morris, 
2000; Thompson et al., 1996). When the experience of an individual increase, his or her norms 
change in response to the change in his or her experience. Thus, the change in his or her norm 
will be reflected on how she or he understand or construe the information security policy (Kelly, 
1955). 
 
6.4 Norm and Rule Compliance 
As emphasized earlier, the mismatch between people’s perceptions raises the need for increasing 
the clarity in understanding the information security policy among individuals to reduce or 
eliminate the deviation in their perceptions. Organizations can employ awareness and training 
programs to develop the clarity in understanding their information security policy. These 
programs educate and inform employees about issues and concerns related to security policy and 
security breaches. However, awareness and training programs may not change the way 
employees understand or construe the security policy. Therefore, organizations need to design 
proper awareness and training programs that can change how individuals construe the security 
policy. With the aid of Repertory Grids, organizations can assess their employees’ perceptions 
through concretizing, mapping, monitoring, evaluating and configuring their employees norms in 
order to identify the relationship between norms and rules. 
Organizations can use Repertory Grids as an assessment technique to understand the 
misalignment between employees’ norms and security rules. Understanding the misalignment 
between norms and rules can help organizations to design appropriate solutions for the problem 
of norm-rule compliance. That is, organizations can ensure norm-rule compliance through 
changing the values of their employees. Examples of solutions for the norm-rule compliance 
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problem are designing effective and efficient security policy, awareness and training programs 
that can change employees’ norms, and change management programs that can help in reducing 
the risk of norm-rule compliance problem. Designing change management programs can be done 
through aligning the security policy with the business. Thus, security and business can work 
together to achieve business goals with little or no risk.   
On the other hand, understanding the mismatch between norms and rules can help in ensuring the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and efficacy of the information security policy through enhancing the 
existing policies or developing new policies. 
Using Repertory Grids as an assessment mechanism, which can aid in improving organizations’ 
security, can have other benefits. By the aid of Repertory Grids, “end-users” of the security 
policy can engage in developing better security policy or improving the existing policy. 
Extensive studies have emphasized the importance of user engagement (or involvement) and 
how it can play a significant role in the success of any project (Lin and Shao, 2000; Wu and 
Marakas, 2006). Damodaran (1996) points out that the user involvement helps in improving the 
quality of the system, avoiding costly, unwanted system features, enhancing the system 
acceptance levels, and allowing for better understanding of the system by the user.  
Indeed, using Repertory Grid as an assessment mechanism is highly dependent on the user 
involvement. As seen earlier, end-users (i.e. employees) could be interviewed to elicit the 
elements, constructs or both to develop the Repertory Grid that can be used for the assessment. 
Then, after agreeing on the final version of the Repertory Grid, the end-users rate the constructs 
against each element. Also, organizations can use secuirty experts to elicit elements, constructs 
or both and let the end-users to rate that grid. Thus, end-users can be involved in developing the 
Repertory Grid, rating the grids, or both.  
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To sum up, the previous three sections answer our research question. The first section explains 
how the security policy shapes the individuals norms. The second section clarifies how the 
security breach changes and re-shapes the individuals norms. The third section describes how the 
Repertory Grid can aid in identifying the relationships among the security rules and individuals, 
norms, and how these relationships can help in assessing the norm-rule compliance. Table 6.2 
summarizes how each section addresses a research question through reconsidering the research 
questions.        
 
Table 6.2: summary of how each section answers a research question. 
Research Questions The Answers 
RQ1 How does security policy 
shape individual’s values in 
the first place? 
• There is a noticeable difference between participants’ 
values.   
• Individual’s experience, age and security policy 
maturity level govern the shaping of the values. 
RQ2 How does a security breach 
change an individual’s 
values? 
• There is a noticeable difference between participants’ 
values, and between the value of each participant 
before and after the breach. 
• The variance in the values is governed by the type of 
breach and security policy maturity level, and other 
factors like individual’s experience. 
RQ3 What is the relationship 
between the security policy 
and an individual’s values? 
• RepGrid as a comprehensive assessment mechanism 
can be used to concretize, map, monitor, evaluate and 
then configure rules and norms.   
RQ4 How could assessment of 
norm and rule compliance 
help in creating better 
policy?    
• RepGrid can show where is the misalignment 
between norms and rules. 
• By using RepGrid as an assessment mechanism, end-
users can engage in creating better policy or 





The objective of this chapter is to discuss the findings of this study, which was conducted to gain 
an understanding of how individuals construe the security policy in their organizations and how 
their perceptions may change in light of security incidents. The Repertory Grid technique was 
used to analyze the data that were drawn from the two stages of the study.  
The results show that employees from the same organization hold different perceptions regarding 
the same security policy. Their perceptions also change in response to the occurrence of a 
security breach. Other factors may also affect the shaping and re-shaping of employees’ 
perceptions such as the type of security breach that individuals encountered and the experience 
of the individuals. When the security breach, which individuals faced is related to some policies 
(and has no relation to the other policies), the deviations in their perceptions regarding these 
policies may be greater in comparison with the perceptions regarding the other policies. Also, 
this research proposes that when experience of an individual increases, the deviation between her 
or his perceptions before and after the breach decreases.  
Accordingly, organizations need to understand the relationship between the norms of employees 
and security rules. The Repertory Grid technique can aid in explaining this relationship, so 
organizations can develop and design proper techniques to reduce or eliminate deviations among 
employees’ perceptions, and between an individual’s perceptions before and after the occurrence 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Overview 
Information systems security is one of the most important issues that executives and 
management deal with. Indeed, most violations to the information systems security are 
committed by employees within organizations. Poor compliance with security policies mostly 
occurs because of the misunderstanding of the actual meaning of the security policies, which 
may reflect the mismatch between organization’s rules and individual’s norms. In fact, 
employees in the same organization usually hold different perceptions regarding the security 
policies of the organization, which may be reflected on their behavior (Vaast, 2007; Albrecthsen 
and Hovden, 2009). 
This thesis investigates the perceptions of individuals regarding the information security policies 
of an organization and how perceptions change in response to the occurrence of a security 
incident. This research aims to answer the following research questions: 
• How does security policy shape individual’s value in the first place? 
• How does a security breach change individual’s value? 
• What is the relationship between the security policy and individual’s values? 
• How could assessment of norm and rule compliance help in creating better policy?    
In order to answer these research questions, this research has employed the Repertory Grid 
(RepGrid) technique that is grounded on the Personal Constructs Theory (PCT). The Repertory 
Grid technique is a hybrid quantitative and qualitative technique that can be used to study the 
people’s perceptions and the changes in their perceptions. This study adopted Sein et al. (2011) 
Action Design Research (ADR) method, which depends heavily on the building and continuous 
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testing of the artifact within an organizational context to generate “prescriptive design 
knowledge.” In this research, the Action Design Research method has been used to illustrate how 
the artifact can emerge as a result of the interaction between technology and organizational 
context. Indeed, ADR tends to solve a problem within an organizational context through 
building, intervening and evaluating the artifact. This study involves two stages of the Action 
Design Research method: the alpha stage and the beta stage. 
The goal of the alpha stage is to build the alpha version of the artifact: the emerging norm-rule 
compliance RepGrid that is continuously tested and validated in order to build the beta version of 
the artifact. The beta stage aims to develop a beta version of the artifact. Thus, the alpha artifact 
is tested and validated in the beta stage to develop the beta artifact; a more mature norm-rule 
compliance RepGrid. A full Repertory Grid data collection and analysis was conducted for each 
stage. That is, in each stage the constructs were drawn from the participants using RepGrid 
interviews and the elements were supplied to the grids. Then, each grid in each stage was 
analyzed using content analysis and the Principle Components Analysis (PCA). The results from 
the two stages were discussed in chapter 6.   
 
7.2 The Study Contributions  
This research fits in the field of Information Systems Security, which falls under the discipline of 
Information Systems. In the past, there was continuous growth in the research projects related to 
various Information Security issues. However, most of these research projects have targeted 
technical and organizational problems and concerns. There is a lack of research focusing on the 
human aspects of the Information Security. Therefore, this research makes both research and 
practical contributions.        
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On the research side, this research makes four contributions. First, to our knowledge and from 
our literature review, this research is the first study to explore how people’s perceptions are 
shaped by the security policy of the organization and how their perceptions changed in response 
to the occurrence of any security incident. Thus, understanding the shaping and re-shaping of the 
people’s perceptions (and thus people’s norms) in the light of the security policy and security 
breaches may contribute to the improvement of the information systems security compliance.         
Second, this research has adopted Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and Repertory Grid 
technique. Using Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and Repertory Grid technique is a 
critical step toward understanding the people’s perceptions and values. Understanding people’s 
values through Kelly’s cognitive mapping (Repertory Grid) will open the door to various 
research projects that concern about studying one of the most important human aspects, namely 
personal values. Adopting Kelly’s Repertory Grid technique is an important methodological 
improvement in the field of Information Systems. This technique allows for measuring the 
cognitive constructs of the individuals by measuring their perceptions.  
Third, this research uses the Repertory Grid technique to investigate the people perceptions 
regarding the security policy. Adopting this method in this study demonstrates that the Repertory 
Grid is suitable technique to be employed by non-psychological scholars to investigate the 
people’s perceptions. Repertory Grid technique is a friendly, easy-to-use technique that 
motivated researchers from different disciplines such as information systems, information 
technology or engineering to develop research project (or parts of a research project) regarding 
people’s perceptions and values.  
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Fourth, this research adopted a combination of Repertory Grid technique and Action Design 
Research (ADR). This combination has allowed the researcher to develop more mature artifact 
for assessing people’s perceptions and values.      
The main practical contribution for this research is the use of the Repertory Grid technique to 
understand the relationship between the individual’s norms and the security rule of the 
organization. Understanding such relationship will allow organizations to develop better norm-
rule compliance through the development of better policy and designing appropriate awareness 
and training programs to create a sync between norms and security rules and standards. Thus, 
with the aid of Repertory Grid, organizations can investigate and understand how their 
employees perceive security policy and how their perceptions change in response to security 
incidents. Indeed, organizations can create a simulation evaluation (like what we did in this 
study) to evaluate the perceptions of the employees and to identify where is the misalignment 
between the norms and the rules instead of applying this assessment after the occurrence of a real 
security breach.      
 
7.3 Limitations 
This research has some limitations. First, this study conducted in the settings that simulate real 
organizations. Each session lasted for two to four hours, including the two rounds of the rating 
and the introduction of the security breach. The small time difference between the first rating 
(before the breach) and the second rating (after the breach) may affect the difference between the 
perceptions before and after the breach. This limitation can be avoided in the third stage (not 
included in this study) when the experiment is applied to a real organization.  
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Second, this study points out to the effect of the age and experience on the level of deviation 
between an individual’s perceptions before and after the occurrence of the security breach. 
However, this research does not consider whether there is a correlation between the individual’s 
age and experience, or whether that relation (if valid) has an influence on the divergence between 
an individual’s perceptions before and after the security breach. 
The third limitation is related to the use of Repertory Grid technique and the difficulty of 
retesting the people’s perceptions. Kelly emphasizes that individuals are oriented to the future 
more than the past. They behave based on their anticipations of events. Individuals learn and 
improve from the experience they get over time (Kelly, 1955). Accordingly, their values and 
constructs may differ over time, making the retesting of perceptions difficult.      
 
7.4 Future Research 
There are some recommendations for further research to extend the findings of this study. First, a 
third round of this study should be conducted following the Action Design research (ADR) 
method. In the next round, the experiment should be conducted in a real organizational setting in 
order to get the final “conceptual” artifact. The researcher will apply the learning from the 
previous stages to real organizational settings in order to design the final artifact, which may be a 
solution to a specific problem. Indeed, both the solution and the problem can be generalized 
(Sein et al., 2011).      
Second, this study examines how a security policy shapes perceptions and how perceptions differ 
in response to a security breach. It also studies the effect of some factors, such as age and 
experience, on people’s perceptions. This study has been conducted on one type of organizations. 
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Further study may consider applying the artifact on different kinds of organizations to examine 
the effect of different factors such as the size of the organization, the culture of the organization, 
and the geographical location on the shaping and reshaping of people’s perceptions, and on the 
relationship between norms and rules. 
 
7.5 Summary  
This dissertation addresses an important issue related to information systems security that can be 
considered as one of the major concerns to the security of the organization. It investigates how 
security policy shapes the people’s perceptions and how their perceptions change in light of the 
occurrence of a security breach. Also, this research suggests an assessment mechanism to assess 
the relationship between an individual’s norm and security rules and standards.  
This research study contributes to the information security literature through investigating the 
shaping and reshaping of the individual’s perceptions and norms, and through understanding the 
relationship between norms and rules. The results of this research study do not only offer a 
starting point to many research opportunities concerning human aspects within the field of 
information systems security but also provide a basis for management to evaluate and understand 
individual values in order to develop a more suitable security policy which will ensure more 
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Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 5 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 5 100.0 
































 Initial Extraction 
VAR00001 1.000 1.000 
VAR00002 1.000 .338 
VAR00003 1.000 .999 
VAR00004 1.000 .997 
VAR00005 1.000 .999 
VAR00006 1.000 .997 
VAR00007 1.000 .999 
VAR00008 1.000 .999 
VAR00009 1.000 .999 
VAR00010 1.000 .937 
VAR00011 1.000 .999 
VAR00012 1.000 .999 
VAR00013 1.000 1.000 
VAR00014 1.000 .997 
VAR00015 1.000 .997 
VAR00016 1.000 .997 
VAR00017 1.000 .999 
VAR00018 1.000 .999 
VAR00019 1.000 .998 
VAR00020 1.000 .999 
VAR00021 1.000 .996 
VAR00022 1.000 .999 
VAR00023 1.000 .997 
VAR00024 1.000 .997 
VAR00025 1.000 .999 
VAR00026 1.000 .999 










Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 













1 12.647 48.643 48.643 12.647 48.643 48.643 9.566 36.794 36.794 
2 8.779 33.765 82.408 8.779 33.765 82.408 9.402 36.163 72.956 
3 3.812 14.661 97.068 3.812 14.661 97.068 6.269 24.112 97.068 
4 .762 2.932 100.000 
      
5 3.305E-15 1.271E-14 100.000 
      
6 2.594E-15 9.976E-15 100.000 
      
7 8.875E-16 3.413E-15 100.000 
      
8 7.330E-16 2.819E-15 100.000 
      
9 4.434E-16 1.705E-15 100.000 
      
10 2.942E-16 1.131E-15 100.000 
      
11 2.442E-16 9.391E-16 100.000 
      
12 2.220E-16 8.540E-16 100.000 
      
13 2.143E-16 8.243E-16 100.000 
      
14 1.400E-16 5.386E-16 100.000 
      
15 1.661E-17 6.389E-17 100.000 
      
16 -1.361E-17 -5.235E-17 100.000 
      
17 -5.388E-17 -2.072E-16 100.000 
      
18 -7.674E-17 -2.951E-16 100.000 
      
19 -1.437E-16 -5.529E-16 100.000 
      
20 -1.692E-16 -6.509E-16 100.000 
      
21 -2.100E-16 -8.077E-16 100.000 
      
22 -3.632E-16 -1.397E-15 100.000 
      
23 -4.368E-16 -1.680E-15 100.000 
      
24 -4.980E-16 -1.915E-15 100.000 
      
25 -8.291E-16 -3.189E-15 100.000 
      
26 -1.721E-15 -6.620E-15 100.000 
      













1 2 3 
VAR00001 -.978 -.058 -.198 
VAR00002 -.324 .483 .001 
VAR00003 -.362 -.561 -.744 
VAR00004 -.149 .860 .485 
VAR00005 -.784 .195 -.588 
VAR00006 -.598 .799 .023 
VAR00007 -.591 .541 .597 
VAR00008 -.870 -.347 .350 
VAR00009 .784 -.195 .588 
VAR00010 .750 .584 -.183 
VAR00011 .784 -.195 .588 
VAR00012 .779 .574 .249 
VAR00013 .771 .165 -.615 
VAR00014 .598 -.799 -.023 
VAR00015 -.598 .799 .023 
VAR00016 -.598 .799 .023 
VAR00017 .870 .347 -.350 
VAR00018 .779 .574 .249 
VAR00019 .590 .806 .027 
VAR00020 .870 .347 -.350 
VAR00021 .222 .936 -.267 
VAR00022 .844 -.511 -.162 
VAR00023 .571 .747 -.338 
VAR00024 .598 -.799 -.023 
VAR00025 .784 -.195 .588 
VAR00026 -.870 -.347 .350 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 













Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 
VAR00001 -.622 .377 -.686 
VAR00002 .032 .563 -.140 
VAR00003 -.203 -.474 -.856 
VAR00004 .127 .912 .386 
VAR00005 -.167 .403 -.900 
VAR00006 -.001 .968 -.245 
VAR00007 -.405 .884 .230 
VAR00008 -.960 .212 -.181 
VAR00009 .167 -.403 .900 
VAR00010 .924 .085 .274 
VAR00011 .167 -.403 .900 
VAR00012 .735 .166 .656 
VAR00013 .918 -.381 -.107 
VAR00014 .001 -.968 .245 
VAR00015 -.001 .968 -.245 
VAR00016 -.001 .968 -.245 
VAR00017 .960 -.212 .181 
VAR00018 .735 .166 .656 
VAR00019 .832 .399 .382 
VAR00020 .960 -.212 .181 
VAR00021 .783 .617 -.052 
VAR00022 .393 -.877 .274 
VAR00023 .959 .272 .059 
VAR00024 .001 -.968 .245 
VAR00025 .167 -.403 .900 
VAR00026 -.960 .212 -.181 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.a 






Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 
1 .700 -.484 .525 
2 .536 .842 .061 
3 -.472 .239 .849 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.   






Ahlam Almusharraf was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. She received his Bachelor of Arts 
in Information Systems from Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia in 2008. She received a Master of Science in Information Systems from 
Virginia Commonwealth University in 2011. Her research interests include behavioral 
information systems security and systems analysis and design. She has co-taught a course 
at Virginia Commonwealth University in system analysis and design. 
 
